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PREFACE 
My interest in scientific theory deepened on reading 
Professor G.A. Rauche's paper, The function of method in 
the constitution of knowledge (1983) and Professor Singh's 
on Knowledge and faith in philosophy (1981) both published 
in the Journal of the University of Durban-Westville. 
These papers made me realise that science was not the 
objective enterprise I had imagined. They showed that 
method, faith and belief had important roles to play in 
the constitution of knowledge. This pointed to the social 
and ethical aspects of scientific theory. 
Another paper in The quarterly review of biology (59: 3): 
Fraud in biomedical research (M.M.Kristein) coupled with 
my experiences in the Faculty of Science in this 
university, raised many thought-provoking and uneasy 
questions concerning science and scientists. In search of 
answers to these questions I turned to the guidance of my 
supervisors. For their erudite guidance, infinite patience 
and their deeply valued friendship, I owe to Profesor G.A. 
Rauche and Professor R. Singh, a debt in gratitude. 
I would also like to express my gratitude to Mr Nelson 
Govender (of the Academic Media Centre: U. D-W) for 
helping me with the computer. To Mrs P. Ramkisson and Mrs 
J. Nadasen who so willingly typed the manuscript, I am 
deeply grateful. To my wife for her continued patience, 
encouragement and discussions on religion, and to my 
children for their patience and curiosity concerning the 
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In this dissertation scientific theory is investigated in 
order to show its socio-ethical aspects. An historical 
approach shows that prevailing historical conditions 
influence the development of scientific theory. These 
conditions are also created by the theories that they 
influence. Thus there is a continual interaction between 
theory and practice, pointirig to the socio-ethical aspects 
of theory. An investigation of scientific theory including 
biological theory also shows this continual interaction. 
Efforts to derive moral precepts from biological theory, 
e.g., Darwinism, sociobiology and genetic theory reveal 
the influences and prejudices of the particular historical 
periods in which the theories are developed. These aspects 
of scientific theory show that the scientific enterprise 
is not characterised by objectivity and disinteredness. 
The community aspect of scientific practice also shows 
that scientists are de~~nJen t 0n one another and that 
theories are interrelated. These spects of scientific 
theory show the transcultural and transnational nature of 
theory and lays a foundation for the basis of ethics and 
for scientific responsibility. 
1 
positio questionis 
In the light of the questionable nature of scientific 
theory, it is asked whether theory can indeed have 
practical implications. The question is answered in the 
affirmative but with the realisation that scientific 
theory is conditional. Since scientific theory is 
constituted under particular historical conditions its 
practical aspect becomes apparent, pointing to a critical 
relationship between theories. If historical conditions 
are important , in the postulation of theory, then 
biological theory, as scientific theory, becomes 
problematic because of the deterministic qualities 
attributed to evolutionary theory, especially when seen in 
the light of the gene. When viewed in the background of 
historical conditions it can be seen that biological 
theory, like any scientific theory, is also rooted in 
experience. This points to a critical relationship between 
theories and shows their moral r dimension. In such a view 




Our universe has always been a source of wonder. Attempts 
to understand the universe have led to investigations of 
various aspects of nature. These aspects have been 
interpreted as different natural processes "through which a 
balance is maintained in the universe. Although these 
processes might seem to have contradictory effects, or, 
aspects of the universe might seem to be contradictory, 
the universe is accepted as an orderly whole. Human 
attempt to understand this order and to be a part of it or 
to identify with it is evident in the earliest works of 
art, from the pa1eo1ithic Period. The desii~ to identify 
with nature shows at once that the human considers himself 
as not being an integral part of nature and yet, of 
wanting to belong to or be an integral part of the world. 
Awareness and understanding (of natural processes) are 
thus of profoundest importance, for while humans can free 
themselves of the surroundings, they are perpetually 
striving in thought and in action to identify with it. 
This striving therefore, represents an attempt to maintain 
a balance through contact with some power in the universe 
in order to intervene in the "play of natural forces" to 
understand - and to control (Bazin, G. 1958). "Ritual 
burial of the dead" and "the provision of supplies and 
food for an afterlife" (Tobias, P.V. 1969, pp. 29-30) show 
human need to discover something, some being or power that 
was greater than himself "with which he yet felt that he 
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could harmonize his nature, in which he could repose his 
doubts, through faith in which he could gain confidence 
and hope" (Huxley, J. 1929, pp. 3-4). 
Depending on the method of investigation of these natural 
processes, religious beliefs and scientific theory 
developed to satisfy this need. Faith in religion, to a 
large extent, provided a focus in which man could find 
some stability. But as religion itself came to be 
questioned, the focus was shifted to reason and a rational 
investigation of the Universe, for a possible factual 
foundation for belief. The focus thus shifted from faith 
(and belief in Scripture) to reason to provide knowledge 
in which man might stabilize his belief. Each 
construction of the world though incomplete, is not drawn 
merely to fill a void, but is tested incessantly till it 
is considered as the "essence of the body of veritable 
fact, having an existence independent of the wishes or 
ideals of mankind" (Huxley, J. 1929, p.6). This search in 
nature has led to the development of scientific theory. 
Science and religion, therefore, more than any other human 
institution have to a large extent both influenced and 
governed human life and progress. Their being viewed as 
autonomous and mutually exclusive sources of knowledge 
have had divergent effects on society; but not without 
being influenced by society itself. Religion is seen as 
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distinct from science in i~s method of enquiry. The 
authenticity of religious knowledge is based on historical 
Revelation. This also forms the basis for human conduct. 
Scientific knowledge is based on a rational investigation 
of nature by systematically organizing facts and 
formulating statements about observable phenomena. 
Consequently, general laws and theories are formulated, 
which show relational patterns between different 
phenomena. Scientific knowledge is dependent on the 
discovery of new relationships and integrating statements, 
laws and theories into more comprehensible theories. 
Observations are also explained by investigating the 
conditions accountable for the occurrences which have to 
be empirically testable, (Popper, K. 1959) and also 
predictive through logical consequences of hypotheses. 
According to Popper (Popper, K. 1959) the irrefutability 
of an hypothesis makes the hypothesis scientific. 
Francis Bacon (1561 - 1626) had an influential role in the 
shaping of modern scientific theory. Together with Bacon 
John Stuart Mill (1806 - 1873) proposed that induction is 
the most important method of science. Its app l ication to 
data avoided "subjective preconceptions" resulting in 
objectivity. Thus empirical and not abstract or 
metaphysical knowledge was obtained: "inductivism holds 
that the scientist should observe any phenomena that he 
encounters in his experience, and record them without any 
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preconceptions as to what to observe or what the truth 
about them might be - truths of universal validity are 
expected eventually to emerge" (Dobzhansky, T. et al. 
1977, p.476). 
Inductivism, however, is problematic as scientists always 
work with a preconceived plan as to what they wish to 
observe, and study "objects and events" what will provide 
some answers to questions of interest to them. Also, 
universal truths cannot be arrived at through induction 
since any accumulation of observations cannot logically 
provide a universal statement or generalization - which 
must have "greater logical content" than the mere sum 
total of singular statements (Hume, D. 1711 - 1766). 
Scientific hypotheses and theories are formulated in 
abstract terms (refer,e.g. Mendel's unit "factors"). 
The method of contemporary science is based on the 
hypothetico-deductive model (df William Whewell(1794 -
1866), William Stanley, J. (1835 - 1882) and Charles S. 
Pierce (1839 - 19l4)}. Dobzhansky, et al (1977) however, 
feels that Popper (Popper, K.R.1959) characterizes 
scientific method precisely. But Popper's "piecemeal" 
approach does not provide a cohesive picture of science. 
His principle of "falsification" results in increase in 
"piecemeal", functional knowledge which is just one type 
of knowledge and does not "constitute the whole truth 
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about man" (Rauche, G.A. 1983). Essential knowledge has 
not kept pace with the increase in functional knowledge 
with the result that only certain aspects of man and of 
nature are accounted for. This is largely in terms of 
mathematical equations providing only probable knowledge 
of functional aspects. 
The expression of nature, including man, in mathematical 
terms greatly contributed to the view that scientific 
knowledge is objective and therefore reliable in reaching 
the truth. But the problematic attempts to reduce nature 
(and man) to basic constituents in physics (atom) and 
biology (gene) shows that science must despair of 
explaining man and nature in reductionistic terms. This 
shows also that science is a more complex enterprise which 
includes an imaginative (creative) aspect and a critical 
attitude which are interdependent. Science is, therefore, 
concerned both with invention or discovery and with 
validation or confirmation. I~aginative and critical 
attitudes are not unique to science. Artists, poets, 
philosophers are also creative and advance "models of 
experience" - just as the scientist does, for example, the 
"billi~rd ball" model of the atomic theory. Models are 
imaginative ways for expressing what is not observable in 
empirical science and like religious models are used to 
interpret and organize experience (Barbour, I.G. 1970). 
The use of models and the thematic approach (Bolton, G. 
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· 1974) show that science has no "uninterpreted data" (or 
data free of being interpreted without preconceptions). 
This also undermines the view of the objectivity of 
science. A consideration of such aspects of science shows 
that scientific theory is not an indisputable picture of 
reality. Like in religion, faith and belief (Singh, R. 
1981) have a role in the formulation, development and 
interpretation of scientific theory. Intuition, faith and 
belief thus also become sources of knowledge, like the 
application of reason to experience. 
Science grows by the fact that its answers to questions 
pose new questions, and therefore new interpretations for 
old or past institutions. This is evident in Greek 
thought where science influenced morality and also social 
(and political) institutions, and also from the 
Seventeenth Century onwards where science assumed an ever-
expanding cultural role as a substitute for religion. 
"Thus, the more the world cam& to be understood in 
scientific terms the more need there was for scientific 
education and the more has human progress been seen as a 
function of scientific advancement" (Richards , S. 1983, 
p.97). 
The view that science is objective in its investigations 
has also led to the belief that the "scientific method" 
produces certain knowledge. This has influenced both the 
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human and social sciences to adopt this "method" in an 
effort to attain certainty for their results. This has 
led to, what might be termed a "functional" approach to 
these disciplines. Human characteristics and behaviour 
are seen in the light of the Darwinian hypothesis as being 
derived, through genetic continuity, from the non-human 
world. Ethology and sociobiology attempt an almost direct 
link between human and non-human behaviour. Man is 
therefore, to a large extent, seen as a product either of 
his genetic or environmental determinants. 
Undoubtedly, the scientific method, as it is popularly 
known, has produced a vast quantity of knowledge which has 
both beneficial and harmful aspects, depending on its use. 
The present questioning of scientific method, of 
scientific objectivity and consequently of scientific 
knowledge and certainty, has led to much uncertainty and 
doubt regarding the "scientific method". In this 
uncertainty man cannot see hisr way to a peaceful existence 
and consequently, turns again to religion. 
However, in the background of scientific knowledge man 
could no longer rely on biblical literalism for an 
explanation of the world and of himself. The Bible thus 
can be seen as an explanation of the world in allegorical 
terms. Novel interpretations of the Bible also had novel 
implications for ethics. Science therefore undermined the 
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authority of Scripture as a source of knowledge, and 
consequently, as the basis of ethics. Conflict between 
reason and faith, each interpreting the world in a 
different way, has its roots in the Mediaeval Period and 
contributed largely to the later and also the contemporary 
crisis of knowledge. For in virtually absolutizing reason 
as the basis of truth (through the scientific method) the 
metaphysical aspects of scientific theory could not be 
seen: that scientific theory is also based on faith - in 
reason; that its reality is also based in concepts, which 
can be traced to Greek thought. And viewed in the 
background of atomic theory, reality assumes a 
mathematical form. 
Such a view of science lacks the "wholeness" of Greek 
thought. The Greeks, through rational investigation (and 
in this sense, scientific) attempted to find a single 
substance or principle that constituted the basis of both 
man and the Universe, and this included their gods. This 
is unlike modern scientific theory (rooted in the 
Mediaeval Period) which seeks to explain everything in 
material terms and where explanations of the immaterial or 
the metaphysical, is left to religion. Where (scientific) 
knowledge to the Greek had metaphysical, epistemological 
and ethical significance or implications, modern 
scientific knowledge is concerned with investigation only 
of the material, in reductionist terms. Metaphysics and 
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ethics are not regarded as part of such an investigation. 
Although modern science has ethical implications and 
although science has influenced ethics from Greek times, 
post-Mediaeval scientific theory has tended to disregard 
this aspect of science, that is, it has not taken into 
account its social and ethical aspects. Modern society is 
to a large extent the product of scientific theory of the 
post-Mediaeval Period. And in this is evident the 
influence of both physical and biological scientific 
theories. Since these theories have influenced society, 
they have also influenced ethics. 
In any society ethics is of primary importance since its 
concern is with human relationships. In a wider sense, it 
also concerns man's relationships with the rest of the 
universe. And as society changes through change and 
development in scientific theory, so does ethics. Man, 
therefore, has to constantly grapple with the problem of 
good and evil, not only on an individual, but also on a 
collective level. Waddington feels that, "What is 
demanded of each generation is a theory of ethics which is 
neither a mere rationalization of prejudices, nor a 
philosophical discourse so abstract as to be irrelevant to 
the practical problems with which mankind is faced at the 
time" (Waddington, C.H. 1960, p.19). Teilhard de Chardin 
and others relate ethics to evolution throughout the 
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cosmos whereas Huxley (Huxley, J. 1929) tries to show by 
logical steps a relationship between the processes of 
evolution and the ethical feelings that humans experience. 
This suggests that human ethical feelings are related to 
the feelings of, e.g., altruism and parenta~ care, etc., 
that are present in man's non-human ancestors. The 
"social Darwinists" highlighted such aspects of 
evolutionary theory as the "struggle for survival" and 
"survival of the fittest" as the basis for moral conduct-
since the Darwinian hypothesis was interpreted in these 
terms. 
The problems of ethics, however, cannot be solved by a 
single unchangeable theory, as "changing historical 
conditions" influence morality. Waddington and Huxley 
(Julian) see ethics as a separate theory that emerges out 
of evolutionary theory, from certain aspects of animal 
behaviour (non-human behaviour). However, scientific 
theory has ethical implications as it developed through 
rational insight into the structure of the world. It is 
in this sense that ethics can be seen as an aspect of 
scientific knowledge for the basic structure of the world 
is determinative of moral conduct. Consequently, there is 
a close connection between ethics and metaphysics (Rauche, 
G.A. 1985, refer p.93). 
Under "changing historical conditions" man constitutes and 
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re-constitutes knowledge of the universe, and so 
reconstitutes himself, in relation to the world and also 
to his fellow-man. Man needs his fellow-man to 
reconstitute himself, his individualness, against that of 
his fellow-man. This need and dependence is the basis or 
ground for the development of "norms" against which man's 
actions might be judged "morally right or wrong". The 
function of ethics is thus shown in "the relationship 
between moral theory and moral act: the way a specific 
philosopher experiences the world (reality), that is the 
way he forms his image of man, and that is, in turn, the 
way he expects man to act towards his fellow-man (the 
moral act) (Rauche, G.A. 1985, p.94). In this need and 
relationship between man and his fel10wman to constitute 
and reconstitute the world under "changing historical 
conditions," is evident the "moral ought." 
Ethics is therefore closely related to knowledge of the 
world or of those principles that govern the world. 
Religion has also been important in the development of 
ethics as it (religion) also constitutes knowledge of the 
world - based o~ faith. Developments in scientific 
knowledge ("scientifi~" in the popular use of the term) 
has resulted in reinterpretation of religion and this has 
largely affected ethics. This also emphasizes the view 
that ethics is dependent on the development of knowledge 
which is related to different experiences of the world 
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(reality) under "changing historical conditions". This is 
evident from mythological to contemporary thought and 
illustrates the metaphysical dimensions of ethics or moral 
theory, which results from man's need for freedom (Rauche, 
G.A. 1985, refer pp. 98-100). Such freedom is realized 
with man's identity with society and reality (nature) -
when man is integrated with nature. 
If "changing historical conditions" are important in the 
understanding of metaphysics and ethics, then it is 
profitable to investigate the influence of scientific 
theory on society and ethics, from a historical point of 
view. Besides showing how scientific theory developed, 
such a view ~ou1d also illustrate the influence of society 
on science and also the influence and implications of 
scientific theory for both society and ethics. It would 
also illustrate how previous scientific and religious or 
mythological thought, had influenced the direction and 
development of scientific theory, and also the 
relationship of scientific theory to social and ethical 
systems. 
The world-views of Copernicus, Kep1er, Galileo and Newton 
changed man's outlook towards the physical world, 
resulting in a mechanistic-materialistic world-view. This 
greatly influenced biological theory, where animals also 
were looked at in the background of a "universal 
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mechanism". Darwin's theory greatly affected ethics and 
consequently, morality. Against divine direction of 
morality, science (biology, ethology, sociobiology) seemed 
to show that human behaviour, even aggression, etc., were 
natural, in that they were derived from non-human 
forebears: the human therefore, could not act otherwise. 
"Universal mechanism" and the resultant deterministic view 
of behaviour greatly influenced studies in genetics. 
Reasons for certain types of behaviour were therefore 
sought in the inheritance of certain "particulate 
entities" or genes - which were thought to govern 
behaviour, just as they were responsible for the 
anatomical development in the biological world. 
Scientific developments have also influenced political 
development or change (Greek polis, feudalism, Capitalism, 
Marxism) in numerous ways, even from the times of ancient 
Greece. Most of the changes that scientific theory has 
effected in society have emerged from its challenge to 
religion which at first supported a static world view, 
intolerant to change. The interaction between scientific 
and religious ideas was complex. Initially, the new view-
points which emerged from science continued to exist 
alongside firmly established views that were largely 
attributed to religious authority of previous centuries. 
The development of the steam engine resulting in the 
Industrial Revolution completely changed Western Society 
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and man's view of the world. However, it was through 
biology that the impact came which had far-reaching 
consequences for society and ethics effecting a major 
revolution in human thought. Like Newton in physics, 
Darwinism "proposed a set of theoretical concepts which 
was able to encompass within a single unified scheme vast 
reaches of data from many types of phenomena - inanimate 
and animate, respectively" (Barbour, I.G. 1966, pp. 80-
81). Newton's world-view saw nature as an "intelligently 
designed machine". Newtonian and deistic assumptions, 
therefore, merged in the "argument from design" which was 
also held by natural theology. Newtonian physics 
therefore tended to support natural theology. The 
Darwinian hypothesis, however, produced a world-view that 
saw both the animate and inanimate world as "dynamic" -
changing in directions governed by laws within itself: 
change was a feature of all aspects of the world and of 
life. 
Lyell (1830) and Cuvier (1801) had introduced the idea of 
evolution long before Darwin. To them, however, change 
was due to "catastrophism" or to divine intervention. 
These series of acts of divine creation or intervention 
was not dissimilar to the "Genesis" account of the Bible. 
Darwin's theory, however, refuted the belief in the 
"stability of biological forms" (as created), consequently 
affecting the status of man. The effects on society were 
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far-reaching since they seemed to show that the divine was 
not necessary to account for the universe and for man. 
The ethical value of the Bible was questioned and society 
turned to science to find there the basis for its moral 
conduct. 
From the biological view-point life is seen as a "struggle 
for survival" where the "fittest survive". However, in 
the light of contemporary biological theory (studies on 
embryology, genetics and behaviour) the Darwinian 
hypothesis is interpreted to show that co-operation and 
mutual aid are also part of biological processes. 
Determinative and indeterminative aspects of biological 
processes ' confirm the view of the dynamic interaction 
between animal and the environment. 
Scientific theory can, therefore, be ' seen as the product 
of man's contingent experience of the world (reality). 
, 
Through such experiente he constitutes the environmental 
conditions in terms of theory reflecting his needs and 
problems which emerge from the particular conflict 
experience he seeks to cope with in specific historical 
situations. Consequently, the theory is a reflection of 
the specific historical conditions - and as such has both 
metaphysical and ethical implications. 
Since scientific theories result from contingent 
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experience, they constitute truth perspec~ives (Rauche, 
G.A. 1985) which, being controversial, enter into a 
critical relationship with one another. The continuing 
argument concerning truth constitutes a critical 
relationship between scientific theories implying a moral 
ought (Rauche,G.A. 1985) which forms the basis of the 
attitude in which a meaningful debate might be conducted. 
If contemporary society, including the scientific society 
still looks at science as an objective enterprise or as 
institutionalized truth, man would do well to try and 
understand the way in which his forebears of the 
Palaeolithic Period saw nature and of their communal 
efforts to interpret nature, and themselves as part of the 
natural world. 
From such a viewpoint, science loses its objectivity and 
can be seen as one method among others (faith, intuition, 
etc.) used to understand the world. The knowledge, 
therefore, obtained through the scientific method provides 
knowledge only from that one perspective - highlighting 
the subjective element in science. Scientific theory is 
thus operative within a certain framework, constituted by 
man himself, through his experience of the universe. Thus 
experience constitutes the basis both of scientific theory 
and ethics. In such a view of scientific theory religion 
and the other different disciplines can all be seen as 
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constituting truth from different perspectives. 
Viewing science in historical perspective shows man as 
a product of history, both biological and cultural. It 
shows also that he is both limited and unlimited through 
his dependence on his fellowman - for the boundaries of 
science are neither cultural, biological nor physical and 
that man alienates himself from his fellow man only in his 
mind, through concepts and ideas of his own weaving. 
The present investigation is aimed at demonstrating the 
problem~tic nature of knowledge especially in its 
constitution as scientific theory under certain historical 
conditions. In an attempt to understand scientific theory 
it is therefore important to investigate the influences 
that surround its beginnings and also its changes and 
development under different historical conditons. In its 
beginnings in Greece is seen the attempt to understand the 
universe in terms of a basic substance. With the sophist 
and Socratic movements the emphasis turned to truth 
because of the changed historical circumstances from that 
of the Milesian School. 
The emphasis on truth was accentuated during the Mediaeval 
Period when the problem arose between faith and reason, 
in the attainment of truth. The establishment of the 
. primacy of faith with the use of reason by the Christian 
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philosophers led to the authentification of the use of 
reason in the investigation of the world and finally to 
the development of the trends that led to modern 
scientific theory and the empirical approach. This 
emphasised the problematic nature of the scientific 
approach in the constitution of knowledge. It showed that 
science is a method in the constitution of knowledge; 
leading to the view that the certainty and objectivity of 
this knowledge is questionable. 
Scientific theory, especially biological theory, is 
investigated in this light. An attempt is made to 
demonstrate that its ethical and social implications are 
not logical consequences of certain and objective 
knowledge, but that they, like the constitution of theory, 
are dependent on the interpretation of theory, under 
particular historical conditions. It reveals also that the 




THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCIENTIFIC THEORY 
AND ETHICS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE. 
CHAPTER 1 
THE GREEK INPLUENCE 
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1.1. INTRODUCTION 
Any investigation into the origin and development of 
western scientific thought starts with ancient Greece and 
those influences that had shaped Greek thought. These 
influences have been revealed through artefacts excavated 
in the region around the Agean Sea. Among other facets of 
their life, these show that the Aegean people had certain 
particular views about the dead, which pointed to the 
supernatural elements of their thought. Theological 
speculations are thus evident in Aegean thought. Whatever 
form these speculations might have assumed they represent 
an attempt to understand the world around t~em, so that 
they might live in harmony with the world. This need to 
understand the world has been the primary motive 
responsible for the development and for the continuously 
changing face of knowledge. 
The Achaeans later came into this region and brought with 
them the Olympic cult (Bazin, G. 1964), which later was 
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adopted by the Greeks as a whole. This was significant 
for, there never developed among the Greeks a predominant 
priestly class. Although the Greeks did have priests, 
they did not develop into a dominant class that could 
impose its teachings and will upon the people. 
The Greeks, free of a dominant priestly class, gave full 
rein to their restless and inquisitive spirit and 
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continuously tried to interpret the world around them, in 
mythology, in basic principles and finally through "cause 
and effect", at each stage their experience of the world 
constituting the grounds both for knowledge and the 
conduct of their lives. Their physical environment, too, 
had a marked influence on them. Mountain barriers 
separated one plain from another, keeping different groups 
apart and fostering in them a spirit of jealous 
independence of each other. This local patriotism greatly 
influenced the political development of the various groups 
independently of each other. Historically, therefore, 
from an early stage, the Greeks attained an individuality 
which is basic to development in other spheres. 
1.2. MYTHOLOGICAL INFLUENCES 
The influence of the advanced Minoan civilization on the 
Achaeans is unmistakeable (Robinson,C.E., 1966). At 
Mycenae, the Archaeans established a civilization that 
flourished for some 500 years (1600-1100 B.C.). This 
prosperous city had trade links from Egypt in the east to 
settlements on the northern coasts of Syria and the 
Western coast of Asia Minor. Homer's account of the 
gathering of the Greeks for the Trojan War, provides a 
good account of Mycenaean society. From this account and 
from the decipherings of clay tablets (found at Mycenae) 
"emerges a picture of a monarchical society with a feudal 
aristocracy, the wealth of the whole being based on 
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agriculture" (Robinson, C.E., 1966, p.17), a manufacturing 
class, an independent merchant class and a bureaucracy of 
clerical staff. "The tablets also tell us something new 
about the religious beliefs of these people, for they 
record offerings of country products, and of gold, not to 
any remotely conceived principle of fertility in nature, 
but to the Olympian deities, familiar in classical times -
to Zeus, poseidon, Hera, to Hephaestos, Lady Athena and 
Appolo" (Robinson, C.E., 1966, p.16-17). 
The offerings made to the deities show the extent to which 
the Greek felt himself exposed to the variable and varied 
powers of nature. His own personality, provided the Greek 
with a basis for understanding these phenomena, through 
himself: he himself was on occasions gentle, angry, 
jealous, etc. He therefore personalized natural phenomena 
filling the universe with gods, whom for his happiness and 
good harvests, for good winds to carry him across the 
seas, he sought to "propitiate with offerings and 
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ceremonies". The Greek polytheistic religion therefore, 
developed in him a sense of responsibility towards his 
fellows and also towards nature. But this responsibility 
could only be accomplished if he gained knowledge of 
nature, which gained through his experience, formed the 
basis of morality. Knowledge therefore also had ethical 
implications. 
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The Greek therefore, saw himself as part of the universe. 
Nature therefore was not an object apart from him; he was 
part of nature -part of the phenomena of nature, which he 
had deified. He felt that he belonged in this family; the 
only difference being that he was mortal. This 
,anthropomorphic character of mythological thought based on 
experience of nature is evidence of the depth of the Greek 
personal involvement with nature - to which both men and 
gods were subject. 
The Dorian invasions destroyed much of Mycenean culture 
establishing a ruling Dorian aristocracy in the city-
states. Here the Dorian commoners and the pre-Dorian 
people had virtually no political power. In this period 
Homer's Iliad and Odyssey portrayed the socio-cultural 
conditions of the Achaeans, serving education in very much 
the same capacity as the Bible in western Christian 
civilization.Thus Homer's classics constituted the basis 
for the development of the city state which was supposed 
to reflect the universal order maintained by the (Olympic) 
Homeric gods with Zeus at the head (first ordering 
principle). Homer's Iliad and Odyssey were addressed to 
the aristocracy for to him arete (excellence, goodness, 
virtue, order) dominated the city-state; it was a 
reflection of the Olympian order. Knowledge of the 
Olympian Order thus had both epistemological and ethical 
significance. 
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Hesiod's poems, however, were addressed not to the 
aristocracy but to the peasants. His Theogony, the Olympic 
Pantheon, as a Cosmogony introduces the ideas of Chaos and 
Eros. This was again linked to the historical conditions 
of the city-state in the 7th Century B.C. The governing 
aristocracy was oppressing the peasants. On the basis of 
this injustice in the city-state Hesiod felt that arete 
could not be the governing principle. He therefore sought 
for justice (dike) or natural balance. 
Unlike Homer who assumed a first ordering principle (Zeus) 
Hesiod introduced Chaos in an attempt to picture a 
beginning or a "gap" or "gulf" devoid of anything. Hesiod 
thus sought something more primary than the gods. This he 
found in Chaos from which through the creative principle, 
Eros, natural phenomena and the gods came into existence 
in an orderly way. Hesiod's Theogony (origin of the gods) 
was also a Cosmogony (the origin of world order). 
Hesoid's work shows that the inquisitive Greek could not 
rely on any traditional view or on any authority on which 
to accept the world. He relied on his own faculties; on 
his experience of the Universe. But this in itself was 
not adequate. He had to rely on ideas like those of 
Hesoid, to provide some ground for rational speculation • 
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With Hesiod, therefore, the understanding of the physical 
has already been placed on a metaphysical basis, in a 
primary principle beyond the universe whose order was 
derived by a principle of creation. Order was important to 
maintain the Universe, as it was important to maintain 
the city-state, for without order, neither could endure. 
The ideas of th~ "gulf" the "impulse" and "to get behind 
the "gulf" having been the driving force of both 
philosophical and scientific thought. 
Just as each entity in the Universe had as important a 
role as the other, in the maintenance of order, so had 
each citizen in the city-state, a duty towards every other 
citizen - for the origin and maintenance of harmony. 
Consequently, from the experience of the harmony in the 
universe is derived the principle of natural balance which 
forms the basis for harmony or justice in society. In 
this harmony, society identifies itself with the universe. 
Expansion and relationships with other societies results 
in new experiences which form the basis for the 
development of new ethical systems. Mythological thought 
therefore, is also a form of knowledge as it too is born 
of experience of natural phenomena which the mind 
translates into mythological symbols. Philosophical 
thought, however, attempts to detach itself from the 
senses and examine experience critically. Thus, while the 
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mythologist symbolizes the philosopher abstracts concepts 
from, his experience of natural phenomena. 
The scientific nature of Greek thought emerges from the 
fact that it is based in experience of the world. From 
this it is induced that there is something more primary 
than the observed phenomena. In this way scientific 
thought attempts to find what is basic to the observed 
phenomena, assuming a basic unity or order in the 
Universe. This basic concept can be compared with the 
hypothesis that underlies theories in the natural 
sciences. 
1.3. GREEK COSMOLOGY 
The transitory nature of physical things and their seeming 
lawlessness appeared as a perpetual struggle between 
opposites. This deeply impressed the Greek mind. 
Contact, with especially the Eastern peoples, had taught 
the Greeks about the cyclic nature of heavenly phenomena. 
They also learned mathematics which could be used to 
advantage to express systematically their observations of 
those heavenly phenomena. Consequently, they were able to 
formulate theories about the universe and about the earth 
itself. Discoveries in marine biology by Anaximander and 
of fossils by Xenophanes in places as far afield as Malta, 
Paros and Syracuse, were used to support their theories 
that the earth had been originally in a moist state. 
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These theories were based on palaeontological and 
biological evidence. Again, like in mythological thought, 
these theories were based in experience. But now the 
experience did not have to be expressed in "mythological 
garb" (Rauche, G.A. 1983) but could be expressed in the 
form of concepts. In view of the seeming transitoriness of 
physical phenomena and the cyclic changes of the heavenly 
bodies they felt that there was something more primary 
that persisted through change; "that could cease to exist 
in one form and appear in another" (Burnet, J., 1971, 
p.7), something that was "ageless" and "deathless". They 
arrived at this idea since they found that the interplay 
of opposites occurred as a natural rhythm and as a natural 
cycle, the natural balance of which pointed to an 
underlying basic principle that governs this natural 
rhythm. 
This showed, however, that the "new form" of the universe 
expressed in terms of concept~ rather than gods could not 
express everything: there still remained "something" that 
could not be formulated. Already the metaphysical had 
appeared and was there to taunt whomever might attempt to 
express it in physical form. 
The important character of Greek, especially of Ionian, 
thinking at this stage was that it did not resort to any 
theological speculations. To the Ionians "theos" meant 
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"primary substance", having a non-religious use. Rational 
insight was the primary feature of Greek scientific 
thought at this stage and was concerned with understanding 
the heavenly bodies and other natural phenomena through 
knowledge of a "primary substance". Since knowledge of 
this substance was beyond experience it could only be 
understood through rational insight. This way of 
understanding the universe is best exemplified by the 
thinkers of the Milesian School. 
1.3.1 The Milesian School 
The thinkers of the Milesian School were among the first 
to attempt what migHt be termed a scientific explanation 
of the apparent order (Cosmos) in nature. Experience 
showed that everything was born of something. The water of 
Thales and the Boundless (Infinite) of Anaximander 
constitute attempts to find a primary cause. Anaximander 
thus postulates not any particular entity (e.g. water) as 
the "primary substance" but a metaphysical concept. 
Anaximander also proposed the origin of life from water 
vapour ("the moist element as it is evaporated by the sun" 
- Clodd, E. l897). This is in keeping with his Infinite, 
as water vapour creates the impression of being boundless. 
His view of man being "like a fish in the beginning" 
(Clodd, E. 1897, p.7) shows the evolutionary nature of his 
thought which is in accord with modern biological theory 
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concerning the marine ancestry of vertebrates. The 
embryologist, Ernest Haeckel, also expressed a similar 
view in his recapitulation theory: "Every organism, from 
the unicellular protists to the cryptogams and 
coelenterata, and from these up to the flo~ering plants 
and vertebrates, reproduces in its individual development, 
in virtue of certain hereditary processes, a part of its 
ancestral history" (E. Haeckel, 1910, p.125). Studies of 
the early embryological stages of higher vertebrates do 
show the possession by them of features of more primitive 
vertebrates. This view also presages the theory of the 
mutability of species and, of consequence, the theory of 
evolution. The most important aspects that emerge from his 
theory, however, is the.inorganic origin of life, the 
relatedness of all life forms and the role of Strife in 
their origins. (Reflected in later biological theory). 
Anaximander's theories thus fit the life forms and 
consequently man, into the order of the Universe, for they 
too like the rest of the universe originate in the 
Infinite. They also gave a deeper meaning to the place 
and relationship of man to the cosmos. With the 
postulation of the Infinite (apeiron) as the "basic staff" 
of the Universe, Anaximander" referred the world of 
experience to a reality beyond experience" (Windelband, W. 
1956) of the physical, so providing a metaphysical basis 
for the theory of Thales. Anaximenes, also felt that 
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"cosmic matter" was infinite and single. For him it was 
air. Change was explained by the constant movement of the 
air during processes of condensation or rarefection. 
These processes also introduce the concept of space, air 
is rarefied or condensed in relation to sp~ce. Man, and 
everything else in the Universe, is thus explained in 
terms of physical processes, even the gods. Deity was 
therefore neither prime cause nor primary substance. 
Anaximenes thus provided the "space" in which the "atoms" 
of the Atomists could move about freely. 
These first principles arrived at by inductive reasoning 
constitute the basis for the explanation of the Universe 
through deductive reasoning and provide for the 
hylozoistic principles that give form to substance. The 
Milesians thus provide a primary substance for the causal 
processes that give form to the Cosmos. 
With the Milesians there is a movement away from the 
mythological explanations of Homer and Hesiod to 
explanations of natural phenomena in terms of concepts: of 
cause and effect. Observation (experience) and inductive 
reasoning provide the basis (arche) from which the Cosmos 
can be constructed by deductive reasoning. Herein can be 
seen the scientific nature of Ionian thought. The thinker 
did not see himself as a creature apart, but a~ an 
integral part of that universe he was attempting to 
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explain and understand. This is amply evident from the 
view of Anaximenes that the soul both of the universe and 
of man is identical, "air". Consequently, all aspects of 
the universe had a single cause. It was at this point 
that later philosophers began. The search for a single or 
basic cause has continued into the present. 
The Milesian move away from mythological thinking was due 
to a large extent to the changin~ circumstances in the 
city-state. As the city-state began to expand, so did its 
economy. Instead of an agriculture-based economy, the 
rise of a merchant class necessitated a commerce- or 
trade-based economy. Consequently, the environment had to 
be studied and the vagaries of weather understood if 
successful maritime trade were to be carried out. This 
led to studies of climatic conditions and consequent 
realization of their cyclic periodicity. Navigational 
procedures requiring accurate knowledge of the position ·of 
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the stars and the storage of information necessitated the 
mastering of calculational and measuring techniques. Use 
of mathematics thus became important and was used 
increasingly to express different aspects of the universe. 
The resultant was a changed and changing universe 
explanations to which could not be found in mythology. 
The universe therefore, had to be understood in a novel 
way. Knowledge of the arche or One (which remained 
constant through all change) would thus afford man an 
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understanding of the world, his position in it, and of 
consequence, a basis for his conduct (paideia). Man could 
thus place himself into the "cycle of nature", and 
understand, and accept, and play his part in the world, in 
accordance with his "natural destiny" (Moira). For the 
Greek, therefore, knowledge (of the Universe) also had 
ethical implications as it constituted the basis of both 
his understanding the cosmos and his conduct in society. 
The development of scientific thought in this direction 
was continued by the pythagoreans who again showed the 
basic harmony of the universe. 
1.3.2 The pythagoreans and the Eleatic School 
The Pythagoreans were influenced to a large extent by 
Orphism, a new influence from the north. Eastern 
influence on this doctrine is evident in the idea of the 
release of the soul from the "Wheel of Birth". As the 
body, according to the Orphis~ doctrine hindered the 
realization of "truth" and therefore "reality", knowledge 
(or realization) of the "truth" necessitated the release , 
of the soul from the body. This could be achieved by 
"purity" and "abstinence" (Burnet, J. 1958, p.200). 
Orphism was a reaction against the growing material and 
commercial interests of the polis. Its followers were 
found among the "philosophers of aristocratic origin" who 
felt disgusted at the state of affairs in the polis. 
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The Orphist teachings were further developed by the 
Pythagoreans. To live correctly, was for them to turn 
from the material temptations of the world and to 
contemplate the divine, the representation of "truth, 
goodness and beauty". In this way both the body and soul 
could be purified. The body would thus be healthy by 
restoring the "opposites into right proportion with each 
other" (Rauche, G.A., 1966, p.30). After the body had 
been purged, the soul could also be purged through music 
which produced the "sweetest harmony" when contrasts were 
in the correct proportion to each other. Since this 
proportion depended on mathematics, music consisted of 
"Eros" and "reason". Music therefore constituted the 
cosmos and the world soul. 
To the pythagoreans, "numerical proportions and relations" 
could be used to express the harmony of the universe. 
Numbers therefore constituted the basis of cosmic harmony 
through which "truth, goodness, justice and beauty can be 
known". Even though these numbers symbolized the divine, 
they also had "rational significance", they were concerned 
with an understanding of the universe in mathematical 
terms through "intellectual intuition". The Pythagorean 
doctrine, therefore, provided a dualistic view of the 
Universe: material objects are considered imperfect images 
of "numbers and geometrical bodies". The m~terial 
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universe, therefore, is the imperfect reflection of the 
perfect mathematical Universe which can only be known by 
contemplation (which has in it an element of revelation). 
pythagoreanism came to represent a "way of life" in which 
man could realize his limitations since he was an 
imperfect image of the perfect form. The realization of 
this limitation constitutes the basis for his behaviour to 
his fellow-man. He can however, attain knowledge of the 
perfect through contemplation. This would develop in him 
a healthy body and also a healthy mind or a balanced life 
in which all the opposites are in their correct 
proportions. This would also provide for harmony in the 
city-state, and a stable society. 
Knowledge of the perfect through contemplation thus also 
has moral implications for it constitutes the basis 
(ethical) for the way man could lead a harmonious life. 
Although his knowledge provided a basis for the conduct of 
life in the polis, its development was itself due to the 
unsatisfactory conditions in the polis where man had 
turned only towards his material needs. 
Xenophanes, of the Eleatic school denied the possibility 
of knowledge of a primary substance, or of the gods. He 
saw that man looked at things and interpreted them from 
within the compass of his experience. The answers he 
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would provide would thus be coloured by the depth of his 
knowledge and the extent of his experience. His answers 
therefore could not be conclusive, and even if by chance 
he did say what was right, he would not know that it were 
so. 
parmenides, like Xenophanes, considered the all as one. 
Heraclitus, however, felt that the basic law of all things 
was an all-pervading movement: harmony being maintained by 
opposed forces. For him fire was the primary substance as 
it remained unchanged through continuous change. He too 
found that processes in nature were always orderly: nature 
thus had an orderly form. The pythagoreans felt that 
their number-theory could be used to provide, through the 
relationships of numbers, a more exact expression of the 
Heraclitean idea which, beginning with the many found 
permanency in change. This showed that Nature was never 
static or complete but was always in a "state of 
becoming". This view can be seen to be closely related to 
that of Anaximander together with which it provided the 
basis for Aristotle's idea of Being and becoming. This 
was again expressed in the later theory of evolution. 
Heraclitus arrives at this through abstraction (rational 
act). Consequently, the world of the many is governed by 
a rational principle. And since there is constant change 
its basis had to be some everlasting substance which was 
of an intelligible nature. This Heraclitus called logos 
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(world reason). It constituted that to which everything 
in the universe and the universe itself was subject 
(destiny). 
Man could rise above material interests by attempting to 
grasp the nature of change as a rational law and so come 
to know the logos. The search for this knowledge 
constituted the basis of man's conduct (morality). As 
change was inevitable, it should be accepted but with the 
realization that change was the basis of harmony in that 
it was governed by the logos. Comprehension of this logos 
would thus free man from material interests which was the 
basis of conflict. 
For Parmenides, conflict arose because the world, which 
was a world of appearances (doxa world), was accepted as 
real. Man had to live in such a world, but if he could 
understand the reality or the essence of the world, there 
would be no conflict. His argument that all is one stems 
from intuition, or of thinking itself. (Since one cannot 
think of something that is not, one always thinks of 
something that is). This identity is called the "first 
science of being qua being or the first ontology" (Rauche, 
G.A. 1966). Parmenides was thus opposed to Heraclitus in 
that he saw being not as becoming but as being or is. The 
many is explained by Parmenides by the spreading and 
fusion of being. 
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1.3.3 The Emergence of Dualism 
The Greeks had always sought to express the world in all 
its various aspects by a single cause or principle. Even 
in mythological thought, although there were numerous 
principles or gods there was always a principal god to 
whom the others were responsible and who in many cases was 
the cause of the others. This need to express the world 
in terms of a single basic substance was due to their 
striving to understand the universe and themselves so that 
they might find in this understanding the basis for their 
attitude to the universe and also towards one another. 
This is evident in the mythological thought of Homer and 
Hesiod, in the various basic substances of the Milesian 
School in the philosophies of the pythagoreans and the 
Eleatics, Parmenides and Heraclitus. Each of the systems 
developed by each school influenced the others, and also 
succeeding philosophers. Each served for a time in the 
specific historical circumstances in which it was 
developed for both knowledge of the universe and also for 
the moral conduct of the society of the polis. Knowledge 
of the basic substance of the universe was therefore 
problematic in view of changing historical circumstances. 
The solution offered by Parmenides and Heraclitus were 
contradictory. The question therefore arose as to what 
formed the universe and how it was formed. Such questions 
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led to the view that there had to be formative principle 
(something that did the forming) which acting on a 
substrate produced the different forms: there were thus 
two principles, one active, the other passive. 
1.3.3.1 Empedocles 
Empedocles explains changes in the universe by the process 
of fusion (from parmenides) and separation governed by 
love and hatred. These are seen as different aspects of 
an intelligence. He saw change as an illusion. Influenced 
by Orphism (through the Pythagoreans), Empedocles talks of 
continuous rebirth (of the universe) due to the mixture of 
the basic elements, by love and hate. The maintenance of 
order or the beginning of disorder is due to the 
preponderence of one or the other. Love and hate, are 
thus the principles responsible for the endurance or the 
dissollution of the universe or of order and disorder. 
I 
For the development of these principles, it is easy to see 
that Empedocles began with the experience of the human 
self. It was the self that both loved and hated. The 
unity of love and hatred lay in their being different 
aspects of a single self and it was the dominance of love 
that brought peace and happiness, or harmony, to the self. 




Anaxagoras posited (in rational terms) a world spirit 
(or world reason), nous as an intelligent principle. 
Against chaotic matter this was regarded as a formative 
principle. In this way the nous particles caused the forms 
to develop and made intelligible and knowable, and was so 
the cause of a world order. By a mechanical process the 
nous by impulse could produce other worlds - introducing 
the idea of a mechanical functioning of the universe. 
(Rauche, G.A. 1966). 
Since everything in the world strived for the nous it was 
at once both the efficient cause and also the final 
purpose of everything. This principle, . therefore, 
accounted for everything in the universe. Anaxagoras also 
showed that the senses were responsible for presenting an 
accurate picture of the world. From Empedocles, the 
senses could perceive things through the presence in the 
body of the same particles that constituted the world. 
Although the senses were not deceptive, Anaxagoras did 
show the relativity of sense perceptions. 
In the view that the same elements composed both the 
universe and the body of man,. Anaxagoras showed a direct 
organic link of the body with the rest of the universe. 
Like Empedoc1es he believed that this was due to a 
vita1istic principle. However, the processes that caused 
the changes, both physiological and chemical processes 
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were entirely mechanical. They were guided, however, by 
the nous, or the intelligent formative principle. 
This identity of the constituents of the body and spirit 
of man with those of the universe showed that man was part 
of the universe and was therefore subject to those 
processes to which the universe was subjected. He was 
therefore an integral part of the universe and it was his 
responsibility tG act in such a way that his actions 
reflected the harmony of the cosmos if he were to lead a 
life of peace and harmony. 
1.3.3.3 Greek Atomism 
The philosophers of the Eleatic School, together with 
Empedocles and Anaxagoras, provided the background on 
which the atomists could find the basic or primary 
substance of the universe in physical particles. The 
Greek atomists return to the physical world in their quest 
for a basic or primary substance. These philosophers laid 
down the foundations of physics, which, 
although"corrected"in some instances and modified in 
others,have endured even into modern times. To the 
atomists, Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus the basic 
elements of substance or matter consisted of 
indestructible, indivisible particles Which they 
called "atoms". 
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The atomists postulated a single arche in indivisible 
and qualitatively alike atoms. They were innumerable and 
imperceptible but they occupied space. Leucippus felt that 
since the atoms were substance they had magnitude and were 
consequently mathematically (from pythagor~ans) divisible. 
Mathematics thus constituted the basis upon which the 
indivisibility and the infinite number of the atoms could 
be understood without recourse to physical division -since 
they were imperceptible. 
The dualism of Empedocles and of Anaxagoras was overcome 
by the atomists by positing the atoms as a single basic 
substance from which everything in the universe 
originated. They overcame the love and hatred of 
Empedocles and the mixture of particles of the nous with 
those of a passive basic substance causing them to become 
intelligible and knowable, by attributing to the atoms 
themselves a sort of intelligence, or logos (from 
Heraclitus). Leucippus did not/postulate any source for 
the motion of the atoms in the void, outside that of the 
particles themselves. Although he did not elaborate on 
the motion of the atoms, he did deny the element of 
chance: " naught happens for nothing, but everything from 
a ground and of necessity" (in Burnet, J. 1958 p.340). 
Epicurus attempted to explain motion as the tendency of the 
atoms to fall through the void, since they had weight. The 
general view however, was that the movement of the atoms 
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in the void was not purposeless since they were endowed 
with a logos. This intelligence and purposefulness was 
the explanation for the appearance of form. 
Unlike antecedent systems, atomism showed how body or 
matter was to be regarded if it we~e to constitute 
ultimate reality. Everything in the universe was 
attributed to atoms and their movements; even the life of 
the soul was described in terms of the finest and almost 
perfect motion. Democritus felt that the soul was 
composed of "fire atoms" as these were the smallest of all 
atoms and being the most mobile were responsible for 
motion. These atoms also imparted their motion to inert 
material and consequently were distributed throughout the 
entire universe. This shows that the "fire atoms" were 
somewhat different from the others in that they could 
impart motion to other atoms - in other words, that the 
soul was responsible for life which pervaded the entire 
universe. This was very similar to the view held by 
Anaxagoras. Therefore, although the atomists thought they 
had overcome the dualism of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, 
they had not succeeded. And this dualism is inherent even 
in the contemporary view of the atom. 
In organisms, breath held the "fire-atoms" of the soul 
together. With the loss of breath, therefore, there was 
nothing to hold these atoms together and they dispersed, 
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resulting in the loss of the psychical life of the 
organism. In this way, man's spiritual individuality was 
also lost at death, it was completely dispersed. With the 
atomic theory, therefore, even the soul and death came 
within the compass of mechanical explanation. Even in 
contemporary times death is explained in terms of the 
cessation of physiological or mechanical functions. 
Since the senses were incapable of detecting the finer 
stimulations of objects they could not provide any 
knowledge of true form. Such knowledge could only be 
attained by thought (which consisted of the gentlest 
movements). As the pleasures of the senses were due to 
the gross or violent movements of atoms, they were 
transitory and disturbing to the soul (the fine and gently 
moving fire-atoms). Only the pleasures of the soul were 
true and lasting as these consisted of the fine and gentle 
movements of thought (atoms). The soul atoms could only 
attain their condition of "gen~le harmonius motion" 
through intellectual knowledge. In this way could man 
attain true happiness: by leading an harmonius life 
through the exercise of temperence and self-limitation. 
Man's peace could therefore come, only from within 
himself. The harmony and happiness of society thus 
depended on the attainment by man of true knowledge. This 
was gained by withdrawal from sense desires and exercising 
the intellect. Social worth was, therefore, measured in 
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terms of "mental calibre". 
Knowledge, therefore, which was attained by rational means 
(exercise of the intellect) was also the basis of 
morality. Knowledge had both, epistemological and ethical 
significance. It also provided a basis for man's freedom 
from superstition and fear of death. The atomist view of 
the dispersal of the soul's atoms at death freed man from 
any concern for his soul after death. Fear of what 
happens to the soul after death is often the basis for 
man's moral actions or for his "good-behaviour". The 
atomic theory freed man from such fear, substituting in 
its place, knowledge, as a guide to correct action. In 
this way the responsibility for harmony in society rested 
with man himself. 
The atomists had arrived at the concept of the atom not 
through any physical demonstration, but through the 
inductive and deductive processes characteristic of 
scientific thought. Atomism thus constituted the basis of 
the first homogeneous world view obviating the problems 
inherent in arche or other systems: the problem of the 
origination of things (form) from the apeiron of 
Anaximander, or the nous of Anaxagoras. For arche the 
atomists had substituted atoms. Motion and pressure were 
the primary forces (which were inherent - logos - in the 
atoms themselves) responsible for the cohesion of atoms to 
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form (material) objects. Atomism was thus able to provide 
explanations for a large number of phenomena which could 
hitherto not be explained adequately. Man, soul, breath, 
death and also cosmic forms were all explained in terms of 
atomic behaviour. Atomism explained the cosmos in 
mechanical terms - completing the "mechanism" of 
Empedocles and Anaxagoras. This was an approach that 
again manifested itself in the philosophies of the 
Seventeenth Century till the close of the Nineteenth 
Century. 
Although atomism seemed to have answered the question 
posed by Thales two centuries before, other questions 
concerning the universe converged on the atomic theory for 
explanations. Their observations of what they considered 
"order" in nature had led the Greeks to call the Universe 
"cosmos". Their teleological thinking directed them 
towards a purpose in nature. Therefore, many could not 
reconcile teleologism with a mechanical atomism divested 
of purpose. The atomists, however, saw purpose inherent 
in logos. Consequently, atoms were rational and their 
movements purposeful, atomism contributing to an 
intelligible cosmos. The Universe was thus a reflection 
of cosmic reason. Thus a life "consistent with Nature" 
was the goal of human existence. This view provided the 
atomists with some basis to ask for man's acceptance of 
cosmic processes. Being composed of atoms, man was 
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composed of the same basic substance as the rest of the 
cosmos - a view very similar to that of Anaxagoras. In 
this acceptance based ultimately on universal order and 
reason, man could purge himself of ignorance and emerge 
into a life of knowledge "consistent with n~ture", as it 
provided for man's freedom and happiness. 
Much change had occurred in the polis since the times of 
Homer and Hesiod to the times of the Greek atomists. The 
city-states had been governed through various types of 
governments each organizing society in a different way. 
Coupled with the growth of the city-states arose the need 
for expansion. This led to war with neighbouring states. 
There was also internal conflict between the aristocrats 
and the democrats, the rising rich merchant class and the 
poor peasants. Internal conflicts and the Peloponnesian 
War (431-404 B.C.) finally led to the decline and fall of 
the city-state. 
Thus, changes in the historical conditions or in man's 
experience of the environment led to changes in the 
philosophical climate of each successive period. This in 
turn led to changes in the city-states which were in 
search of just and stable governments. For the purpose of 
achieving this objective philosophical thought attempted 
to analyse the situation and provide knowledge, by which 
the cosmos might be understood. Knowledge of the basis of 
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this order was essential if society were to be structured 
into a harmonious and moral whole. 
1.4. The Search for truth and the Universais 
1.4.1 The Sophist School 
Like the preceeding philosophical views and systems, the 
Sophist school also developed in reaction to the 
historical circumstances which enveloped the polis after 
the Persian Wars. The search for knowledge of the cosmos, 
which had begun in mythological thought contlnued into an 
investigation of arche'. This was seen in terms of a 
single substance (Milesians) or as many substances (as 
one-Parmenides) or in the dualistic terms of the 
. Pythagoreans and the atomists (although the atomists did 
not consider their atoms dualistic). No general agreement 
could be reached and the nature of the cosmos was 
described in contradictory terms. With the 
democratisation of the po1is interest was diverted from 
the Universe to man for it was the individual who was 
important in such a government. Just as the atoms (which 
were identical) were responsible for everything in the 
Universe, so was every individual equal in the polis and 
responsible for the harmony of the polis. Each individual 
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felt his views to be just as valid as another's, with the 
result that individual assertion became an important 
factor in the polis. There was therefore, still the 
struggle between the aristocrats and the democrats and 
between conservative views and modern ideas: the struggle 
between old cults and the new rational (or scientific) 
outlook. Democratic rule was also beset by corruption 
with the result that the gulf between the rich and the 
poor widened, with increased tension and controversy in 
the polis. In this situation, divergent views emerged. 
Atomism which had been postulated to explain the structure 
of the Universe and to show man how he might be free of 
superstition and pursue a harmonious existence in identity 
with the cosmos could also be used to support assentive 
individualism. Man therefore became the centre of 
interest. To the sophists therefore, it was important to 
develop that potential in man which was important to and 
enhanced his own interests. They were, therefore, often 
hired by the rich to teach the. how to develop and enhance 
what was to their interests. 
As far as knowledge was concerned, sophism was therefore 
subjectivistic and of consequence relativistic. Morality 
was dictated by what was important to the individual. In 
sophism itself, however, there were two streams of 
thought: one, that laws and customs existed of necessity 
to maintain social and moral order (since this made man 
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rational and social) the other, that morality was 
conventional and used by the powerful to impose their will 
on others. 
The Sophists' theory of knowledge however, brought to 
light many important questions concerning knowledge as an 
objective truth and as a basis for morality. This showed 
that the importance of the intellect could not be 
overlooked in the search for knowledge. On the assumption 
that reason or the rational judgement itself was competent 
to attain the truth, they did not question the intellect. 
Accepting sense data as factual (or valid) led to the view 
that the knowledge gained through the senses (or from 
experience) led to an objective truth. The Sophists 
showed that constitution of this truth depended to a large 
extent on the subject. 
The Sophists conceived of "nature as 'hUman nature' and as 
'human nature' limited to its physical, impulsive and 
individual aspect" (Windelband, W., 1956, p.122). 
Socrates, however, believed that this could be overcome by 
human reason. Sophist epistemology had led to relativism 
which led to a resistance to authority and the 
disintegration of social and moral consciousness. To the 
Sophist knowledge consisted in expertise. And since the 
demand of the time was for political oratory (important in 
a democracy as a means to retain power), their teachings 
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consisted in large part of rhetoric. This neither 
provided answers nor strove towards a truth but was almost 
always directed against existing social institutions and 
religious tradition. 
1.4.2 socrates 
In the midst of the destructive relativism of the 
sophists, Socrates strove towards stable, universally 
valid knowledge or truth. .But to achieve this man had to 
rely on his fellowman. Man could not absolutize his views 
as he had done under the influence of sophism. To 
Socrates, it was self knowledge that was important, 
carried on in the presence of one's fellow man. Socrates 
believed that since each man constituted his own truth, 
knowledge of the Truth could be attained through 
reflection and dialogue. This method was the way to moral 
perfection, for it consisted in the methodological 
I 
examination of knowledge constituted from different 
experiences. By rational examination (scientific 
approach, as far as the Greeks were concerned) knowledge 
of the truth and of morality could be obtained. 
Epistemology and ethics were therefore grounded in 
experience. 
By the Socratic dialogue knowledge emerged through the 
"maieutic method", showing the dependence of man on his 
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fellowman and also, that man is limited by his fellowman. 
Experience constituting both the ground and limit of 
knowledge. Socrates felt that the truth was latent in the 
individual. But this could only be realized by the 
individual if he "suppressed" his "sensual appetites". 
"Truth was therefore knowable to all and could 
be taught to all. All good acts were composed by the four 
cardinal virtues: Sophia or wisdom, andreia or manly 
fortitude, sophrosyne, or self-restraint and dikaiosyne or 
a sound balance or justice" (Rauche, G.A., 1966, p.45). 
Socrates believed that the pursuance of truth for its own 
sake would bring happiness, for it was virtuous. Truth 
and virtue were thus identical. Happiness, therefore, was 
not the aim of the search for truth, for this would be 
selfish. Happiness was the result of having attained the 
truth. 
The philosophy of Socrates, therefore, showed the reliance 
of man on his fellow-man for the attainment of truth. In 
this realization man could live at peace with his fellow-
man. Socrates' truth thus had both epistemological and 
ethical significance. 
1.4.3 Plato 
Plato's search for truth was largely modelled on the 
example of Socrates. While Socrates regarded truth as 
universal, Plato's search led him to universal concepts. 
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These were attained through rational insight into the soul 
and the universe. His idea of the pre-existence of the 
soul was the basis of the view that the universal concepts 
remind one of an objective (i.e., existing outside the 
mind) perfect world of universals of which the Good 
(Agathon) was the comprehensive idea. 
Experience of conflict in the polis directed Plato's 
search for harmony in which man and the polis might be 
freed from conflict and attain natural balance or justice. 
This lay in the resolution of the conflicts of his soul 
which reflected the conflicts of nature of which man was 
an integral part. For Plato, conflicts arose in man's 
imperfection and was largely the result of man's 
dependence on sense perception for the attainment of 
knowledge - senses afforded knowledge of only the doxa 
world. Such conflict could only be overcome through the 
exercise of reason which would acquaint man with knowledge 
of reality and provide the basis for man's correct action, 
to obtain a natural balance. It was only in the state, 
however, that man could understand his relation to the 
cosmos. For it was in the realization of the rational 
nature of the cosmos that man could attain identity with 
nature and his place in the state in accordance with his 
natural capacity. Plato relates the soul to the Ideas 
through the soul's pre-existence. The soul's ability to 
construct and demonstrate mathematical figures without 
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recourse to sense-experience showed that these Ideas could 
also be understood in this way. And just as mathematical 
figures that were demonstrated participated in the Ideas 
or pure forms so did the objects of sense-experience 
(imperfect objects) participate in their pure forms. It 
was only through rational insight that knowledge of this 
world of forms could be attained. The world of forms, 
however, was objective, i.e., it was outside the mind 
(emanent), but could only be understood through the mind. 
The world of sense experience thus participates in the 
world of forms or universals through likeness. 
In the Republic Plato shows how justice in the state would 
be a reflection of justice or harmony in each individual 
in the state. Plato's theory of Forms therefore, leading 
to the Universal Good provides the basis for the harmony 
of both the polis and the individual. Knowledge (rational 
knowledge - in this case, knowledge of the Good) also has 
ethical significance in that it is a guide to correct 
action (morality). 
Plato's philosophy went beyond the Greek ideal of 
individuality in that the individual was completely 
subordinate to political purpose or to a harmon i ous state. 
In such a society, harmony depended on, and was the 
responsibility, of each individual (Republic). Therefore, 
each man in the state was dependent on his fellow-man. 
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Although Plato's state was constituted as an aristocracy 
(as opposed to the democratic polis) no individual gained 
any material benefit from the state, besides virtue of 
every individual which consisted in living in harmony in 
the polis. The three classes, (Republic) their relation to 
one another, and the continuation of the order would also 
influence other institutions of society. The maintenance 
of the correct composition of society required the correct 
choice of parents (Republic, 416b). Consequently, 
marriage was not a matter of individual choice. This 
undermined the importance of the family unit as a source 
of stability in society. 
The Utopian aspects of Plato's philosophy are, however, 
evident in the failure of the realization of his political 
ideal. In realising this Eaililra, Plato, in his latter 
works, allowed other elements which were more suitable to 
the historical conditions, to replace his idealistic 
philosophy. Religion; nearer ~o the "national mode of 
thought", mathematics, useful in music and astronomy, and 
also some ancient customs were revived. His latter works, 
therefore, assume a "Mixture of monarchico-oligarchic and 
democratic .elements" (Windelband, W., 1956, p.216). 
Plato's metaphysics was based on nature as being 
teleological. Yet, in the Socratic spirit, he neglected 
to give any knowledge of nature, for, as the world of the 
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senses was in a constant state of Becoming he felt it 
could not afford certain knowledge. Plato thus claimed 
not truth, but probability, for his theory of nature. It 
is principally in the Timaeus that he sets out his theory 
of nature. Here he discusses the "world soul" (Timaeus, 
37) as responsible for setting the cosmos in motion. At 
the centre of this cosmos was the earth but it was 
stationary. And just as the soul of man is responsible 
for his life and proper functioning of his body, so the 
"world soul is responsible for the life of the cosmos". 
Plato's latter works thus show that although. man is 
concerned about his origin and destiny, he cannot 
understand or accept these on purely theoretical and 
metaphysical terms. Man has his experience (sense 
experience) only, to begin with. He therefore has to 
begin with nature and natural phenomena. By his rational 
capacity and the limitations of his historical conditions 
he attempts to understand the ~orld around him though his 
sense-experience which is important in the acquisition of 
knowledge. It is at this point that Aristotle began. 
1.4.4 Aristotle 
Aristotle's philosophical forebears following the 
teleological trend were much concerned with motion as 
being rational and purposeful. They did not, however, 
consider an efficient cause. Since Plato's forms, for 
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example, imparted only essences to sensibles, and not 
motion, he considered only formal and material causes. 
Empedocles also, for example, did not recognize that an 
efficient cause was responsible for the qualitative 
changes observed in the four corporeal entities he 
regarded as constitutive of matter. 
Experience of the physical world and of biological 
processes showed Aristotle that things changed in 
accordance with their nature, i.e. that change was 
purposive and also that change required cause. An 
investigation into the nature of material substance would 
therefore involve a consideration of the constituent 
elements composing bodies and of the causes involved in 
continuous changing processes. Aristotle's concern was, 
therefore, with the extrinsic causes (the efficient or 
final and purposive causes) and with the intrinsic causes 
material and formal causes). Aristotle, therefore, 
considered nature "as a principle of activity or change, 
actual or possible" (Aquinas, T., In Durbin, 1968). 
This required the primacy of substance, as other 
categories existed because of substance. Its primacy in 
definition is shown by its being involved in other things; 
in knowledge, because an object is best known in its being 
known as "What it is!" Aristotle felt that his 
predecessors could not arrive at a primary substance 
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because they were not dealing with Being as such but only 
with parts of Being. Thus they could give no more than 
the essential attributes of those parts only. Ultimate 
causes were to be grasped of Being not incidently but of 
Being qua Being. Thus, "What is Being?" really amounts to 
"What is substance?" It was substance that many ~f the 
early philosophers described as one or many, as 
numerically finite or infinite, so that it must be our 
first and principal if not our only subject" (Warrington, 
1970, pp. 167-168). Aristotle was asking therefore, "What 
is the essence of things? What is the nature of the 
Universe?" 
The answer to these questions, he felt, is contained in 
the understanding of the dynamic relationship that exists 
between potentiality and actuality and in the realization 
that actuality is prior to potentiality. Nature could 
thus be viewed as ~potency". Actuality then becomes prior 
(in time) in the sense that a "actual member of a species 
precedes any potential member, though the individual is 
potential before ~t is actual" (Aristotle:ln Warrington,J. 
1970, p.237). Consequently, the relationship between 
potentiality and actuality is representative of that 
relationship existent between substance (matter) and form. 
Inherent in the potentiality of matter are intrinsic 
causes: material cause (the potential form of matter which 
can become different objects) and formal cause 
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(determining the form of an object actualized from 
matter), and the extrinsic cause, purposive cause 
(teleological) and efficient cause (referring to the 
energy or the actuating force). These forces operative in 
matter are responsible for the actualization of form or 
the reality of matter. From sense experience of the 
particular organisms of nature (or formalized 
potentiality), the universal is arrived at by abstraction. 
Unlike Plato who taught that (the form) the Universal is 
prior (refer, the objective world of Forms (Republic, 476 
d-e, 505 a-b), Aristotle viewed the particulars as the 
substance from which the Universal is derived. 
Aristotle arrived at these conclusions not only through 
rational argument but also through his studies and 
observations on plants and animals especially the 
variations and gradations in their organisation. His 
study of variations also showed him the force of heredity 
I 
as a potential for change. Studies in embryology also 
revealed the inherent principles of purposeful change, the 
teleological aspect of biology and the intrinsic and 
extrinsic causes operative in emb~yological development. 
Taxonomic studies showed the hierarchical order of life-
forms and that although they displayed enormous diversity 
in mo~phology and habitat, in the relationships of these 
life-forms with their habitat and to one another, in 
coexistence and in lineage, they mirrored and so revealed 
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the basic order and unity of nature; of a changing nature 
in a changing universe. Change was there~ore an inherent 
and integral part of nature and should not be regarded as 
illusory.Sense experience thus had to be accounted for in 
any attempt to gain knowledge of the universe. 
From these observations he laid down the foundations of 
classification and a basis for the development of 
biological theory. Aristotle showed therefore, that in an 
attempt to understand the universe and obtain knowledge of 
its forms and processes, only rational argument (in the 
sense used, e.g., by Plato) was not sufficient. He 
emphasized that sense-experience also, viewed in the light 
of inductive reasoning should be the basis for general 
laws, in scientific theory. General principles should not 
be accepted on logic alone. Laws of nature are formulated 
on experience of the regular sequence of occurrence of 
certain phenomena. He, therefore, rejected the element of 
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chance. Principles inherent in nature-directed her 
productions. Consequently, "germs" responsible for the 
production of life forms were not "chance" productions. 
Being the simplest life forms, they were the same for both 
plants and animals. This implied the common origin of 
both plants and animals - which provided grounds for the 
view 6f the basic unity of all forms. 
Aristotle's views, therefore, show different aspects as 
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whole within themselves and as part of a whole: as part of 
the Cosmos. The varied parts also change each in accord 
with those principles inherent in them, in response to 
changing circumstances to maintain the harmony of the 
Cosmos. 
For Aristotle, therfore, knowledge gained through 
experience and the practice of reason had both theoretical 
and practical or moral value (Ethica Nicomachea, VI 2, 
l139a 11). As theory, it constituted theoria, or 
scientific knowledge (episteme) and as practical knowledge 
or phronesis, tekne). Practical reason itself was also 
theoretical in that it provided insight into the correct 
principles for action which, as tekne was necessary for 
aristic creations and as phronesis for justice in public 
and political life (Ethica Nicomachea, V.S). The 
individuals' exercise of the knowledge he possessed, 
however, depended on free choice: thus his action was 
dependent on his will.The responsibility for moral action 
therefore, fell on the individual. It was through his 
attaining knowledge of the truth (through the exercise of 
reason) that the individual would know how to live a moral 
life. 
Since the Good, therefore, is the goal of human endeavour, 
the highest goal being Happiness (through knowledge), 
depended, of consequence on the exercise of reason (Ethica 
Nicomachea, II I 6. l097b 24). Good- habits, (Ethica 
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Nicomachea, II 4, 1106b 11) or virtue in man allowed him 
the perfect use of reason from which only pleasure (Ethica 
Nicomachea, X 4, ll74b 31) could result. Reason, 
therefore, is concerned with knowledge, which formed the 
basis for morality. Consequently, the action directed by 
reason is correct action as it is both grounded in and 
obtains its directive from knowledge. Aristotle thus 
distinguished between dianoetic and ethical virtues 
(Ethica Nicomachea, I 13, l103a 2). 
Whereas Socrates and Plato had not considered material 
possessions and "good fortune", Aristotle allowed these 
also so long as they were subject to reason. The 
potential value of material possessions could not be 
discarded if reason in ethics were to reach its perfect 
development. Consequently, pleasure was not the motive, 
but the result of virtue. 
Knowledge thus covered the understanding of objects, their 
relationships and cause of activity and also of 
teleological processes. The highest knowledge was that 
sought for itself and for no ulterior purpose. In the 
Metaphysics (XI 7, l072b 24) and in the Ethica Nicomachea, 
Aristotle shows that the highest happiness consists in the 
possession of this perfect knowledge or pure Form, which 
constitutes the perfectness of God. According to 
Windelband, "This is ethically, as well as metaphysically, 
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the fundamental principle of the philosophy of Aristotle. 
It is rooted in his personality: and is the expression of 
that pure joy in knowledge that forms the basis of all 
science and is the absolute condition of the independence 
of science. In the logic of Aristotle Greek science 
recognized and formulated its essence, and in his ethics, 
its practicability (Windelband, W. 1956, p.284). 
The practicability of ethics, however, is dependent on the 
Will which controls the desires, preventing their exercise 
in extremes. Knowledge, bo t h of objects and of human 
nature is necessary if insight is to recognize the correct 
mean for action (Ethica Nicomachea, 11 5, 1106a 28). Thus 
from his knowledge of the world and of human nature 
Aristotle developed the fundamental principle of the 
"valu~ of moderation". This value Aristotle recommended 
in all walks of life, individual; social, political and 
economic. 
Aristotle, realizing the importance of man's individuality 
allowed him his independent development and did not 
submerge him into the state - as Plato had done. Social 
education was important for the development of virtue. In 
such education the individual could realize his dependence 
on others. Although the individual was subject to society 
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and the state he had much freedom in private life. 
Realizing the importance of the family unit for the 
stability of the state, Aristotle contended against the 
community of wives, children, property, etc. of Plato's 
state. Marriage was therefore valuable for Aristotle saw 
in it the basis of moral relationships whose practice in 
the state could lead to stability. The family unit, 
through marriage thus constituted the basis for the love 
and responsibility ,needed to stabilize the state. It thus 
constituted the basis for the prototype of political 
forms. 
Aristotle's view that nature has inherent principles 
governing her productions or actualizing the possibilities 
of potenti~lity, both explains the hierarchical order of 
the universe and also provides an explanation for the 
constant striving of entities in the universe for 
perfection. This striving is guided and integrated by 
desire and love for perfection or pure intelligence. 
Aristotle arrests the constant striving by introducing the 
Unmoved Mover (pure intelligence) which by its very 
existence causes everything in the universe to strive for 
it. The existence of the Unmoved Mover is explained by 
its desire for itself and its contemplating only itself. 
It is therefore detached from the world. This ultimate 
Universal is also reminiscent of Plato's dualism. Matter 
therefore is pure potentiality and exists because of a 
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pure intelligence. 
This view of the Universe in evolutionary terms finds 
man's place in nature, his relationships to the rest of 
nature and of consequence, to the Cosmos. The "germ" can 
also be seen as the pure potentiality of the biological 
world and comes from the non-biological world. In this 
way it becomes the basic intelligence connecting the non-
biological to the biological world establishing a 
relationship between these two: Man's origins and place in 
Nature is thus brought within the sphere of scientific 
explanation. 
It is evident, therefore, that even from the mythological 
explanations of Homer and Hesiod, to the culmination of 
Greek thought in the works of Plato and Aristotle there is 
no distinction, between physics, ethics and logic. 
Science and philosophy, knowledge and morality (Rauche, 
f 
G.A. 19·85) are therefore inseparable - as all thinkers 
formulated their conclusions from observations of nature 
or from experience, constituted by the rational faculty of 
the mind, in a particular way. 
That the Greeks had an intensely humani~tic approach to 
life is evident in their literature and art. The symmetry 
of the Parthenon symbolizes the restraint and balance of 
the Greek mind. Their striving for perfection can be seen 
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in the detailed beauty of the sculptures of Apollo, Pallas 
Athene and Aphrodite. The mysteries of the universe, they 
felt, were not beyond solution which lay in correct 
attitude and action - and this depended on rational 
knowledge. 
By the Fifth Century, B.C., the great Greek minds had 
worked out, on a rational basis, systems to explain the 
Universe. These constituted the basis of both, man's 
knowledge of the Universe and, consequently, moral 
conduct. The method of Socrates, culminating in the 
philosophy of Plato, regarded the world as unreal, as a 
reflection of the real world (of Forms). Aristotle, 
however, restored the "reality" of the world showing that 
experience and reason both, were constitutive in 
understanding the world. Even though the rational and 
self-contained or complete systems of these two 
philosophers provided the basis for the development of 
society and its moral conduct, the events of history made 
these systems appear unreal. The collapse of democracy, 
and the polis and the influences that came with war 
introduced again the feeling of insecurity and the 
question of Man's attitude to life rose once again. Man 
turned away from the rational explanations of the world 
towards the supernatural - a thread that runs through most 
societies in history, even into modern times when man 
attempts to cope with the daily problems of living, which 
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at times assume monumental proportions. And of this is 
born the perennial questions which man answers 
alternatively in rational and supernatural terms: "Whence 
my origin? What my purpose? and wither my destiny?". 
1.4.5 Lucretius 
The teachings of Lucretius are expounded in his poem, De 
Rerum Natura based on Epicurean philosophy, a combination 
of Aristotleian Cosmology and Atomism. Epicurean 
philosophy had been much malignant because it was 
interpreted to mean indulgence in sensual living. His 
view, however, was that peace and happiness could be 
obtained in the pursuance of "pure, high and noble aims" 
(Clodd, E. 1897, p.21). With Empedocles he (Epicurus) 
agreed that only the fit and capable forms survived - this 
is much later echoed in the Darwinian hypothesis, seen as 
a law in nature. 
Lucretius also emphasizes the "unvarying laws of nature" 
as the basis for the combinations of atoms and the natural 
changes of one form into another. Even the soul, he 
taught, was composed of very fine atoms. Those ' of finer 
constituency formed the essence whose property governed 
the character both of man and animals, and died with the 
body. Thus natural agents governed both the origin of the 
celestial bodies and of life. But these were not the 
result of design or some pre-determined plan. This view 
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is very similar to contemporary views of evolution which, 
it is felt is not predetermined, but is the result of the 
mutual influences of and between organism and environment. 
This is consonant with Lucretius's view that man's history 
included a struggle out of primitive savagery. Based on 
atomism, he saw man's evolution and change in mechanistic 
terms, governed by natural causative agents. This called 
also for man's acceptance of natural processes and of 
seeing himself as part of and a product of these 
processes. 
The work of Lucretius, because of its anti-theological 
spirit, was obscured for many centuries. Aristotle, on 
the other hand was much admired by the latter mediaeval 
theologians. Christians interpreted his work to regard 
him as a "pillar of the faith". His philosophy, 
therefore, was interpreted in the light of prevailing 
living conditions by Christian thinkers to support their 
theological views. 
1.5. Discussion 
The scientific nature of Greek thought is evident in their 
attempt to understand and to explain changes in the 
universe, and that proceeded in orderly fashion, in terms 
of a basic substance, and the cause of change, on a 
rational basis. Understanding these changes and the 
processes in nature effecting them, man would be freed of 
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fear or apprehension and be the better able to cope with 
the changing circumstances of life on his own strength. 
In mythological thought man feels too exposed to the 
vagaries of the natural elements and events which, to 
understand, he represents in terms of "anthropomorphic 
plastic images", of gods (or demons) whom he must appease 
or propitiate. Man has (in mythological thought) to 
accept his "lot" almost as an "imposition by the gods. His 
fortunes, therefore, could be either good or bad depending 
on whether he had given the gods their due. 
A rational understanding of the universe freed man from 
such fears. It also urged him to accept his "lot" or his 
position in the world, not out of fear or resignation but 
from an understanding or knowledge of the principles that 
governed it. This would also place him in "authentic" 
relation to the world so that he would see himself as part 
of the world. And as part of it, his was the 
responsibility to maintain the order. But released from 
fear, he could also resort to excesses, and cause the 
imbalance in the order. Philosophy had to show 
therefore,that order could only be maintained through 
man's identity with the cosmos. This imposed on him a 
responsibility for he had to maintain order as he not only 
lived in the cosmos but was also a part of it. In this 
way he was placed in direct relation to the cosmos, 
society, and the state. 
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That man was part of the cosmos affirmed his relationship 
to the principles that governed its order. The basic 
substance (of the cosmos) thus had to be such that it 
explain the origin both of the cosmos and of man. The 
Milesian School offered its explanation in terms of arche 
(or first cause: Thales, water: Anaximander, apeiron; 
Anaximenes, air). 
The Milesian approach introduced the problem of unity and 
multiplicity. Heraclitus and Parmenides felt this was due 
to the materialistic approach of the Milesians. They 
(Heraclitus and parmenides) felt that the One was 
inaccessible to the senses and therefore, could only be 
grasped through reason. Thus Heraclitus arrived at the 
One as a principle, the logos. Parmenides' postulation of 
the One as pure Being introduced a dualistic picture of 
the world. This formed the basis of the idea of 
multiplicity in nature, on which the Pythagoreans 
introduced numbers as being involved in the harmony of the 
universe. Numbers thus assume rational as well as 
ontological significance, in their expression of harmony 
and beauty of the world in numerical relations. 
Empedocles and Anaxagoras attempted to reconcile the 
cosmological views of Heraclitus and the Eleatics. 
Empedocles uses Paramenides' fusion and separation to 
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explain the disintegration and birth of the cosmos through 
love and hate (Rauche, G.A., 1966), two aspects of a 
single entity. Here again is seen the anthropological 
character of Greek thought, not in mythological terms, but 
in terms of the emotions that govern human conduct. 
Anaxagoras completes the dualistic approach by postulating 
an intelligent nous, which, acting on a chaotic substratum 
produces harmony from chaos. The Atomists attempt to do 
away with the nous and duality with the logos of 
Heraclitus, an intelligent principle, both causing and 
directing atomic movement, in the production of form. 
The mechanical approach resulting from the substratum -
mind (nous) dualism coupled with the materialist interests 
that resulted after the democratisation of the polis, 
resulted in the Sophist movement. This focus sed attention 
on man as the active agent in constituting reality. The 
relative values that emerged from the Sophist movement, 
prompted Socrates to search, not for reality, but truth. 
The emphasis thus shifted from reality to truth and man as 
the constituter of this truth. The rational approach is 
again evident in the Socratic dialogue. This approach is 
employed by Plato in his search for the truth or the Good. 
It also leads to a dualism in which the world is regard . as 
unreal in that it is a "shadow" of the real world of 
Forms. In this view the senses by which man investigates 
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the universe produces only an imperfect knowledge of the 
universe. The universal truth or the Good is beyond the 
reach of the senses. 
The removal of the "mythological garb" from the forces of 
nature by the Milesians did not rob it of its vitalistic 
and purposive characters. The hylozoistic nature of Greek 
thinking is evident in the Infinite of Anaximander, the 
air of Anaximenes, in fact, in Greek thinking as a whole, 
leading to their regarding the cosmos as an organism: it 
had to be regarded as an organism since the changes in it 
were purposive. To this the mechanical view of the 
atomists is no exception as atoms were regarded as being 
rational (logos), their movements purposive, forming 
intelligible objects. Thus even the mechanical view of 
the atomists included teleological features. 
The teleological aspect of Greek thought is apparent from 
the beginning of Greek philosophy, even in Anaximander's 
teachings which reveal the beginnings of evolutionary 
theory. However, the logos of Heraclitus, the 
homoiomeriae of Anaxagoras and the logos (in the atoms) of 
the Atomists all display evolutionary features (purposive 
change). Eros, or love of Truth, is also the driving 
force - of Plato's rational insight for the purpose of 
attaining knowledge. It is also the cause of the motion 
of the cosmos in its striving for knowledge and truth _ 
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the Unmoved Mover. This can be seen in Aristotle's 
causality in the actualization of potentiality as form, in 
a hierarchical order. 
The doctrine of the eternity of the cosmos and the 
evolutionary character of Greek thought underlay the 
principle that "nothing comes from nothing". This directs 
Greek search towards knowledge of a first cause, from 
which the structure of the cosmos could be explained. 
Each first cause (or basic substance), Arche (Milesians), 
Logos (Heraclitus), nous (Anaxogoras), Agathon (Plato) and 
Unmoved Mover (Aristotle) also constitutes the basis from 
which a cosmic structure is developed, each leading to a 
specific way of life and conduct (paideia), since man and 
society are also part of the cosmos. This is also 
applicable to the pluralistic approaches of the atomists 
and the Sophists, who explain the world in terms of atoms 
(atomists) and subjective human truths (or opinions). The 
anthropological approach of Socrates finds the "first 
cause" in the moral world of human reason, through the 
maieutic method. 
The principle that "nothing comes from nothing" and the 
search, on a rational basis, ' for the first principle or 
cause of the world consequent on it ("that nothing comes 
from nothing"), constitutes the scientific character of 
Greek thought, which also has an ethical dimension, for, 
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from it the structure of the world could be explained of 
which human existence and affairs were an integral part. 
Thus, the nature of the first, cause permeating the cosmos 
determined man's way of life and conduct or his 
relationship with his fellowman (society and the state). 
The development of inductive and deductive reasoning in 
their search for the first cause also constitutes the 
scientific aspect of Greek thought. This includes the 
problem of the one and the many, of the particular and the 
universal, and beginning with the ontology (the identity 
of thinking and being) of Parmenides, culminated in the 
syllogistic logic of Aristotle (Rauche, G.A., 1987 
Personal communication). 
On these grounds Aristotle finds the Universal in the 
"things themselves", affirming the reliance on the senses 
(for inductive reasoning). He, therefore, begins in the 
sense world which is regarded as real. In Aristotle's 
approach is evident the basis for an empirical 
investigation of the Universe, such as that of modern 
science, seeking reality or principles in the experienced 
world. Although investigation of the world (reality) 
began in experience, knowledge of the world (reality) was 
constituted in terms of principles or concepts (arche, 
nous, Agathon) that were beyond the world of experience 
(or the physical world); even the atoms (material 
75 
particles) were beyond sense perception and moved about 
(purposively) because of an inherent logos. Knowledge of 
the world, therefore, through the scientific approach 
(rational) was given in metaphysical terms. Even the 
dualistic approachs of Empedocles and Anaxagoras was 
overcome by the nOllS, and that of the Atomists by the 
logos - to preserve the ordered hierarchy and unity of the 
cosmos. Unity and order thus become the basic values of 
the cosmos. However, the dualistic approach is again 
evident in the philosophy of Descartes and in the 
separation of philosophy and science from theology at the 
close of the Mediaeval period. 
The teleological aspect of Greek philosophy in general and 
especially that of Aristotle, of a hierarchial order 
impelled by a love of perfection to attain perfection 
(Unmoved Mover), forms the basis of the view of evolution 
as a constant and inexorable movement towards perfection. 
This is also evident in the humanist views of evolution 
(e.g., those of Waddington, C.H., 1960; Huxley, J. 1948; 
1953; and Tobias, P.V., 1969), which stress the 
compassionate aspects (love, understanding, etc.) of 
numans. 
Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy also infiltrated 
Mediaeval theology. Mediaeval theologians thus used the 
Greek rational approach, and Aristotle's syllogistic logic 
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that reflected the Greek cosmos, came to reflec t the 
cosmic structure of the second half of the Mediaeval 
Period, and also its social structure, (Thomas Aquinas) 
(Rauche, G.A. 1985). 
Thus the rational trends of thought that began with the 
Milesians (in about 600 B.C.) were developed by different 
Greek philosophers still they culminated in the 
Aristotelian World View, which, was introduced by the Arab 
philosophers into the latter half of the Mediaeval Period 
and so influenced Western ways of thinking. 
Although rational knowledge of the universe had, besides 
epistemological, also social and ethical implications, the 
latter implications also arise from the fact that each 
philosopher, or group of philosophers, depended on 
preceeding theories for the development of their own: 
preceeding theories thus provided a basis on which other 
theories could be developed. This points to the 
limitations of each theory, which reflects human 
limitations. The fact of dependence on and the need for 
others in the development of knowledge and understanding 
also shows the social aspect of scientific theory and 
constitutes the basis for one's moral conduct towards 
one's fellowman. It also constitutes the basis of 
responsibility to one's fellowman. This becomes of 
increasing importance in the trends of scientific thought 
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THE MEDIAEVAL PERIOD 
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2.1 Introduction 
Greek philosophy in general and especially the works of 
Aristotle laid a scientific basis for understanding the 
Universe (and Nature) in both its physical and biological 
aspects. Many aspects which had previously been 
attributed to the Gods or to some supernatural agency 
could now be understood as "natural events" following from 
the properties of whatever basic substance the world was 
thought to consist of. The effect of this was to distance 
the Gods from the events of the world. Divinity was thus 
not immediate in the understanding of natural phenomena, 
as mythological thought had been. 
During the post - Aristotelian period, the great unitary 
systems, Platonism and Aristotelianism, whose ultimate 
thought was concerned with a "unified conceptual knowledge 
of the world" providing for the direction of the polis a 
unitary political and ethical system, began to dissipate 
into separate specializations. Scientific activity became 
concerned with special researches into nature study, 
history, etc. Theophrastus (the foremost pupil of 
Aristotle) developed botanical studies, Aristoxenus, the 
theory of music and Dicaearchus, historical sciences. The 
resultant was different schools of thought existing in 
sharp contrast with one another. Interest in the problems 
of metaphysics and the speculative spirit so active in the 
formation of fundamental unitary systems was slowly pushed 
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into the background. It seemed that scientific activity 
was relegated to corroboration, through diverse 
specializations, of the works of the great philosophers. 
Different branches of science became independent 
(Windelband, W. 1956). The different schools of thought 
often differed only slightly in their interpretations of 
the works of the Great Masters, leading to rivalries 
between them. Philosophy thus became more utilitarian 
than explanatory. Conflict between different schools was 
over practical, not, theoretical issues: it seemed, that 
of Aristotle, was the final word of the speculative 
movement. Deficiency of originality, characteristic of 
this period, was due to early Greek science providing its 
successors with the necessary conceptual principles for 
comprehending reality. The main concern was for using 
these inherited principles fruitfully in the new 
conditions of life • 
. The Pelopennesian War had destroyed Athens, the centre of 
Greek culture, Persian power becoming dominant in Greek 
politics. Greece was eventually coriquered by the 
Macedonians whose conquests spread far into the East. 
Greece, finally lost her independence on her incorporation 
into the Roman Empire. During the Second Century A.D., 
the conquering Romans assimilated much of Greek culture 
and Greco-Roman civilization spread with Roman conquests 
of Europe, Asia and North Africa. Not only the imperial 
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might of Rome, but shared cultural concepts created an 
unifying system of values primarily "Greek in origin and 
Roman in execution", which spread throughout the entire 
Mediterranean World and also other parts of . the Roman 
Empire. And as a result of their mixing with other 
nations both the Greek spirit and culture slowly 
dissipated. Thus the political decadence which was 
unfortunate for Greece was fortunate for the Western 
World. 
In the ensuing maelstrom of cultural anarchy succeeding 
the fall of the Roman Empire it was the individual who 
strove for the security inherent in the peace of mind and 
the joy of individual life. Philosophy was one more 
called upon to provide some direction for the individual 
to acquire happiness through peace of mind. Unlike Greek 
philosophy which sought to provide man with happiness 
through life in the polis, the philosopher of this period 
I 
did not have the polis to reflect the harmony of the 
Cosmos and so show man his place in it. Rational 
arguments - Reason - had not been successful in providing 
any lasting stability for the polis wherein the individual 
might find some peace of mind; as an integral part of a 
microcosm that reflected the Cosmos at large. To the mass 
of the people, therefore, the knowledge born of Reason was 
not adequate for the provision of happiness, as it did not 
provide directives but required a realization on the part 
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of the individual. Philosophy was, therefore, required to 
provide practical wisdom. Knowledge became an ancillary 
to living, its ideal being the development of a perfectly 
free and happy man. Ethics became individualistic, its 
function being to release man from the grip of the outer 
world. In the turbulence of the time the "terrified mind" 
seized upon religion to provide it with some peace. 
Philosophical interest thus passed from ethics to 
religion. Platonic transcendental metaphysics with its 
separation of material and immaterial substances was 
adopted by religion to provide it with some scientific 
form. It was ideal for this purpose: its teleological 
principles give to the life of nature and man a divine 
cosmic purpose. Its philosophic material became the basis 
on which Christianity could constitute itself into a 
didactic system (Windelband, W. 1956). Ethics was thus 
gradually transmitted into religion. The enlistment of 
Platonism into the service of religion shows that it was 
no more regarded as a philosophical system that could 
provide a basis for man's understanding of nature and his 
place in the Cosmos: this was the basis for his ethics. 
Philosophy was thus pressed into the service of religion 
which now became the basis of ethics. 
It was Christianity that came to answer the religious 
needs of the time. In the empire with its diver~e peoples 
the Christian ideas of universal brotherhood, the 
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existence of one almighty, merciful, loving God and with 
the promise of eternal salvation found fertile soil in the 
confused and unsettled minds of the period (Harrison, J.B. 
and Sullivan, R.E., 1975). Christianity thus became the 
object towards which man could orientate himself in order 
to attain peace and a lasting happiness. 
The dawn of the Mediaeval Period saw the Christian faith 
firmly established. As it was not an abstract 
philosophical system, faith, not reason, led man to God. 
As a revealed religion it provided the truth_and Christ 
had shown the way - through love and faith. There was 
nothing for man to "work out" or to understand: he had 
only to follow "the way" and was assured of "eternal 
salvation", from his uncertainty and his unhappy 
condition. Faith assured this joy in this world and the 
afterlife. 
2.2 THE FIDEISTIC PERIOD 
It was Augustine who tried to penetrate this faith with 
reason (Copleston, F. 1962) so that he might see human 
life in the light of Christian wisdom. A mere acceptance 
of Revelation was not enough. Man should know why he 
should have Faith. Reason could provide this answer and 
prepare man for faith. Even though he felt that Reason 
could lead man to knowledge (through Faith), Augustine 
was aware of man's dependence on his senses for knowledge 
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of the external world, which was necessary for his 
practical life. Through the senses he learnt of the 
mutability of objects. This showed that these were not 
the proper objects of knoweldge. To Augustine the 
mutability; the constant state of flux of the objects of 
the external world was due not only to the relativity of 
sense perceptions but also to the "deficiency" 
(imperfection) in the objects themselves. Like Plato, 
Augustine felt that true knowledge consists in the 
knowledge of unchanging objects: man should thus 
concentrate on the immutable as it is the "correlative 
object" of the soul. Perception of imperfect objects led 
to belief in the perfect.Thus Platonism was used for the 
exposition offundamental Crhistian doctrines, (Copleston, 
F. 1962), although Christianity differed from Platonism in 
that it was aimed at the attainment of, not an impersonal 
Good, but a personal God. And whereas The Good «Plato) 
was attainable only by the "philosopher kings" (Republic), 
the God of Christianity could be "attained" by every 
individual who followed the teachings of Christ. Thus 
could man find happiness and free himself from the 
surrounding unhappiness and unc~rtainty brought to him by 
his senses. Christianity therefore, placed within the 
reach of every individual an ideal that would give him 
peace of mind. Faith assured him of this. 
85 
Augustine's ethics, like that of the Greeks, was 
eudaimonistic. Happiness, however, was in God, not in the 
"abstract ideas of Plato. And the way to this happiness 
is through love; (expressed by Christ in Matthew 5:44). 
With this Augustine introduces moral obligation (the 
obligation of a free Will) for the ultimate attainment of 
happiness. Augustine, presented a notion of God and divine 
creation, which was easier for the "common man" to 
understand and accept on faith alone. In this way he was 
able to establish a much "firmer" metaphysical basis 
(realized through creation) for moral obligation. This led 
to the relationship between the individual, the state and 
I 
the church. Individual moral responsibility became the 
basis of ha~mony. 
The scientific character of Augustine's thought can be 
seen in his method of attaining to higher goals. He began 
in experience (of what he considered) of real objects 
(although mutable). Although he did not consider this 
experiental knowledge as true knowledge it was 
nevertheless indispensible in the acquisition of true 
knowl~dge. Added to this was the fact that he als6 saw 
history as the development towards the truth through the 
"dialectic" between good and evil. For Augustine the 
spread of Christianity was the assurance that this 
"dialectic" was leading towards the Good and eventually to 
God. He thus showed the importance of the historical 
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dimension in the acquisition of knowledge. 
Augustine's philosophical and theological views are 
therefore also a "child of the times"; born of the 
struggle of the human mind in its search for peace and 
knowledge of the way to attain this peace. History had 
shown that Greek "rationalism" could not lead to this 
knowledge. His own experience of nature showed him that 
there were higher and more perfect forms of knowledge or 
truth, that of mathematics and logic, based in reason. 
Logical deductions further led to a single Form, the 
"timeless One" (Rauche, G.A. 1985) which can only be 
intuited, but defies comprehension or definition. 
Consequently, God (One) could not be reached by Reason. 
Intuition, aided by Grace and based on love and faith, was 
the only way to reach God. But this depended on free 
will. Acquisition of knowledge of God depended thu~ 
primarily on Will and not on reason. The Will thus 
becomes more primary than love and faith and shows that 
permanent striving of the human mind to attain Truth. The 
responsibility of the acquisition of this knowledge thus 
rests in the individual. 
Abelard, following Augustine (through Neo-Platonism, 
-Plotinus), endorsed Plato's view that the formae 
exemplares (divine ideas, generic and specific) being 
ideas in the divine mind are identical with God. His 
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contention was with the ultra-realism of William of 
Champeause. Logically he showed that such realism was 
absurd (refer Copleston, F. 1962, p.17l). Although the 
concepts formed by abstraction bear no individual 
reference it did not mean that universals were only 
subjective constructions or mere words. The content of 
generic and specific ideas was in their objective 
reference. Consequently, Abelard's "nominalism" (of which 
he was accused) was no more than a denial of ultra-
realism. Thus he asserted the distinction between 
universals derived by (logic) reason, and real objects, by 
denying the objective foundation of universal concepts. 
Viewing the teachings of Abelard in Aristotelian 
perspective, John of Salisbury regarded genera and species 
not as the objects of sense but as forms derived from the 
activity of the mind comparing likenesses in different 
objects, and abstracting these likenesses and unifying 
them into universal concepts or forms. Thus universal 
concepts are not devoid of objective foundation and 
reference. In this way mathematics and physics could also 
be used in the description of objects. Mathematics 
treated of lines and surfaces, neither of which exist 
apart from objects. And physics was concerned with motion 
and other elemental properties of objects which in reality 
exist in varying combinations. 
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Anselm generally followed in the footsteps of Augustine: 
God was the external and subsistent truth and as such the 
ontological cause of nature. He also felt that belief 
should be based on understanding: "For I do not seek to 
understand in order that I may believe, but I believe that 
I may understand. For I believe this too, that unless I 
believed, I should not understand" (in Copleston, F. 
1962, p.177). Consequently, since belief was at the basis 
of all understanding it was important that one understood 
what one believed. For if one did not understand, belief 
would be blind. This would involve a denial of both Will 
and responsibility. Consequently, action or conduct could 
thus not be moral, for choice, which involves will and 
responsibility, are both implicit in morality. 
Like Augustine, Anselm did not make a clear distinction 
between theology and philosophy, for he felt that belief 
should be understood on a rational basis. On this basis 
he accepted the primacy of faith. ' The argument he uses as 
proof of God's existence (and therefore the justification 
for Faith) concerns the "different degrees of perfection 
found in creatures". For experience shows the different 
degrees of qualities in objects: showing their striving 
for perfection. This implies a standard of perfection 
(showing that the argument is Platonic in character). 
Although following in the Augustinian tradition, Anselm's 
thoughts are more systematically elaborated displaying a 
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"methodic application of dialectic". 
2.3. THE EMANCIPATION OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT 
The development of the university system during the 
Mediaeval Period led to a greater systematization of the 
thoughts leading up to and of the period. Universities, 
especially the university of Paris, became the centre of 
Mediaeval European cul t ure. The Papacy represented the 
"supernational character of Mediaeval religion". Culture 
and religion became more closely bound toget?er by the 
intellectual outlook and the common language they used, 
Latin. 
Resultant increase in nationalism showed that the 
political Unity of the Roman Empire was more theoretical 
than objective. Nationalism, however, was to some extent 
checked by the intellectual outlook, feudalism and the 
Mediaeval political and economic institutions. 
It was inevitable that the expanding university life 
result in intellectual and academic expression. This took 
the form of systematization (based on Aristotelian logic) 
of the science, knowledge and speculations of the period. 
Typical of the system was the classification of science 
provided by Hugh of St. Victor (refer Copleston, F. 1962, 
p.188, 189). From this classification it can be seen that 
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science was regarded as the sum total of all knowledge, 
theoretical, practical and technical. According to Peter 
Lombard, God's existence, creation and the soul's 
immortality fall into the province of natural reason as 
they can be understood before they are believed, by faith. 
Influenced by the Timaeus the School of Chartres 
(Copleiton, F. 1962) was inclined to ultra-realism. For 
Bernard of Chartres matter existed in a chaotic state 
before being ordered in accordance with the ideas existing 
in God. He saw the whole of nature as an organism and 
maintained the idea of a world-soul. Bernard of Tours 
depicted the world-soul as animating nature, so giving 
order to chaos (or prime matter). But this order was also 
in accordance with the ideas of God. 
John of Salisbury, not being one of the ultra-realists saw 
the School of Chartres as attempting to mediate between 
Plato and Aristotle. Thus while some members saw 
corporeal form as copies of the ideas in God, others saw 
matter in a state of continual flux. In general, the 
hylomorphic theory was adopt~d and interpreted in the 
light of the Timaeus. 
In the background of dissention between the Holy See and 
the Empire, John of Salisbury drew on the political 
writings of Cicero, the Stoics and the Roman jurists and 
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also on the Civitate Dei in expounding his views for 
society. From his idea of natural law he felt that no 
ruler is above the law and thus could not enact laws 
counter to the natural law. The ruler was, therefore, an 
instrument of natural law and had to follow it out of love 
of justice. Since he followed it out of love, it showed 
that he did so of this free Will and sense of 
responsibility. Thus John of Salisbury accepted the 
supremacy of natural law or of ~ecclesiastical power". 
2.3.1 The Arabian Philosophers 
Although Platonic and neo-Platonic philosophers dominated 
the first half of the Mediaeval Period it was used only as 
a preamble to Christian philosophy. The second half of 
the Mediaeval Period was dominated principally by 
Aristotelian or neo-Aristotelian doctrines. His 
introduction to Western philosophi was due principally to 
the Arabian philosophers. They commented and developed on 
it, interpreting it, in the main, in the spirit of neo-
Platonism and in the back-ground of Islam. Consequently, 
much of the philosophy was coloured by islamic thought and 
so was incompatible with Christian theology. Thus 
Aristotelianism was largely opposed by Christianity in the 
Thirteenth Century. It seemed to be opposed to the views 
of Augustine, Anselm, and other great philosophers of 
Christiandom. 
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Alfarabi introduced Aristotelian (syllogistic) logic to 
Islamic philosophical thought. His principal use for the 
Aristotelian argument was for the proof of the existence 
of God. Islamic theology also held the view that objects 
are passive. Consequently, the idea of God as first mover 
and Cause (Aristotle) served well Islamic theology. Neo-
Platonic influences were also evident in his work: the 
Ideas in God as examplars and the source of ideas in the 
human mind. Thus he felt that it was man's duty to 
orientate himself towards knowing God. 
Similar to the system of Alfarabi, Avicenna divided 
philosophy into logic, speculative philosophy (Physics, 
mathematics and theology) and practical philosophy 
(ethics, economics and politics). Of the speculative or 
theoretical sciences, metaphysics (in true Aristotelian 
tradition) he calls the "higher science", mathematics the 
"middle science" and physics the "lower science" (Afnan, 
r 
S.M., 1958). Physics, as a "particular science" was 
concerned with the properties of changeable, existing 
natural bodies. Metaphysics, however, as a universal 
science had to prove that its premises and principles were 
correct. 
Although the study of Being was metaphysical, (Aristotle _ 
but reached through experience and abstraction), the mind, 
of necessity, could apprehend the idea of Being through 
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self consciousness. Thus he distinguishes between 
"necessary" in the sense of an object's "coming into being 
and passing away" and "necessary" in the sense that the 
existence of an object is determined by an external cause 
- whose action is determined, although the being "produced 
by the cause is contingent". Through this argument he 
arrives at the uncaused Being or necessary being in whom 
essence and existence are identical. Basing his argument 
on Aristotle's theory of potentiality through which he 
arrives at "Pure act", Avicenna (though he does not say 
"Pure act") says ~hat God is Truth, Goodness, Love and 
Life and from this derives the identity of Goodness and 
absolute love. And since God is Goodness, He radiates his 
Goodness and so creates necessarily. (Since He is 
necessary being his attributes are also necessary). This 
view tends to deny God's freedom and supports the 
"emanation theory" (which is Greek in origin). 
Avicenna also investigated atomism as most Islamic 
theologians had adopted it as an "explanation of 
generation and corruption" (coming into being and passing 
away) (refer, Afnan, S.M. 1958, pp. 208-210). The 
Mu'tazelites and other theologians of the Islamic world 
had also adopted Democritian atomism and (with some 
modifications) had used it to explain creation (on earth). 
In this way a purely mater'ialistic theory was derived from 
Divine wisdom. Avicenna, however, in the Isharat adduced 
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various arguments against Atomism (Afnan, S.M. 1958). 
Averroes wrote numerous commentaries on the works of 
Aristotle and considered his (Aristotle's) system as the 
"Supreme Truth". This brought him into direct conflict 
with Islamic theology. Consequently, he attempted a 
reconciliation between his philosophy and theology: that 
philosophy is a scientific (reason), while theology is an 
allegorical formulation of the same truth. In this way 
Averroes made theology subordinate to philosophy as it 
meant that theology or the allegorical formulation of the 
Truth was for the "unlettered". The Islamic theologian 
interpreted this as meaning that what is true in 
philosophy is false in theology. This led him into 
conflict with Islamic theologians and resulted in the 
prohibition of Greek philosophy and burning of Greek 
philosophic works in Islamic Spain. 
The translations of the works of Aristotle and the 
commentaries, by especially, the Arab thinkers showed 
Latin Scholastics that the view that only theology could 
settle questions concerning the Universe,and man's 
attitude towards God and the Universe, was being 
challenged by knowledge gained by reflection of the human 
mind, on the Universe. Added to this was the fact that 
these commentaries were by Islamic thinkers who obviously 
had to reconcile their philosophy with their theology. 
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Consequently, systems that were independent of Christian 
theology, in particular, could also produce knowledge of 
the Universe. Indeed, knowledge of these systems had been 
used by theology to prove the existence of God. The 
systems of Aristotle, Avicenna and Averroes showed 
Mediaeval Scholastics that an order of truth concerning 
the Universe could be attained independent of Christian , 
revelation. It became appare n t also that it was not only 
a set of revealed dogmas but the work of human reason that 
had arrived at these truths. The relation between 
theology and philosophy became more apparent and led to a 
"delimitation of the provinces of the two sciences". The 
Mediaevals began to realize the extent and achievements of 
the human intellectual endeavour. 
In contrast to this general acceptance many of the 
Mediaevals still resisted the works of Aristotle. This 
was, in large part, to certain writings being erronously , 
attributed to him, which shed a "false light" on his work. 
Although his Logic and ethics were retained, his works on 
natural philosophy and metaphysics and commentaries on 
them, were often prohibited on pain of ~xcommunication. 
These works contained doctrines which were at variance 
(e.g., eternity of world) with Christian teachings. This 
later led, often to persecution of, especially scientific 
thinkers. 
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Graeco-Islamic literature thus had a marked and disturbing 
influence on Christian theology. Although theology was 
yet supreme and following Anselm the correct course was 
"Credo ut intelligam", the doctrine of the "twofold truth" 
emerged, to which many adhered. The work of Averroes, 
however, took this further when he spoke of philosophical 
and allegorical truths. This effected an enduring 
separation between the "two truths" and helped in large 
part towards the autonomy of philosophical thought which 
allowed the emergence of the modern scientific outlook. 
This view together with the work of Avicenna greatly 
influenced the theology and philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. 
According to Afnan, "in the field of rational and also 
religious speculations it may be safely said that as long 
as Thomism is studied in European centres of learning ••• 
the Persian philosopher will continue to be heard" (1958, 
p.288). 
f 
Graeco-Islamic literature thus changed the course of 
philosophy and through the influence of Thomism that of 
Christian theology also. The authority of experimental 
science also greatly increased in the wake of his studies 
in medicine and the natural sciences. The attempt of 
later philosophers to harm~nize reason with revelation or 
to see revelation in the light of reason (and later, 
science) is already evident in Avicenna (Afnan, S.M., 
1958). Since he could not be satisfied by Orthodox dogma 
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or by Aristotelianism, he sought a synthesis rather than a 
rejection of one of them. In this way he showed that 
knowledge is dependent on experience, a total experience, 
and consists in the synthesis and not the rejection of any 
part of experience. The Greeks also attempted to 
construct their systems in the light of "total 
experience", but not having a set of revealed dogmas like 
Christianity or Islam, they did not experience the depth 
of the crisis of faith between philosophy and religion. 
The depth of the crisis or conflict can be seen from the 
questions that emerge from Avicenna's work; questions that 
tantalised the searchers before him, questions "that 
plagued the mediaeval Scholastics, questions that yet lead 
the sea"rchers: 
"Is reality as distinct from facts a simple 
element or the product of two or more; is 
it an entity or a relation; must we seek it 
through analysis or synthesis?" (Afnan, S.M., 
1958, p.290). 
Or is it "organic and unitary?" 
The works of both Avicenna and Averroes revealed an 
attempt at the reconciliation of the truth of philosophy 
and that of theology (truths of reason and of faith). 
Averroes considered them as equally valid as they were but 
two different ways of looking at the world; hinting that 
understanding of the world depended on experience. The 
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consideration that revelation was the "unlettered" way of 
understanding the world, seemed to point to reason 
(philosophy) as being superior to faith. The theologian, 
however, still saw faith as being superior to reason. 
2.3.2 Emergence of philosophical autonomy 
Bonaventure's views were typical of those of most 
theologians. His unshakeable belief in God obviated any 
questions concerning God. More was he concerned with the 
relationship of man and God, of man's attitude to God. 
Since he felt that union with God was the most important 
aim of life, knowledge of God was essential to predispose 
the soul towards a closer union. The sufficiency of 
Scripture for the attainment of this knowledge obviated 
the need for any study of philosophy. The fact that 
Aristotle's metaphysical philosophy did not consider 
personal communion with God, led to his mistrust of the 
system. He felt that the world should be seen in 
"relation to the creative Word": Christ was the "medium" 
or Centre of all sciences. 
Although he rejected Aristotelianism, his view that 
knowledge of creatures or of objects was the first step in 
the soul's ascent to God is Aristotelian. This 
conviction, coupled with that of the Unmoved mover is 
distinctly Aristotelian in character. His view was that 
the soul can know God in its recognition of dependence on 
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God. The soul can, therefore, know God through 
contemplation of its own consciousness. Thus the soul can 
attain knowledge of God without reference to the external 
world. In his belief that man must strive towards Gods, 
Bonaventure shows that it is man's choice, for God does 
not override man's free will (he thus shows man's 
responsibility for his actions) as this is consonant with 
his purpose. Consequently, man can reach God through his 
own actions. This union with God is what constitutes true 
happiness. In this way Bonaventure showed man's 
responsibility for his actions. The metaphysician cannot 
attain knowledge of God unless he receives "illumination" 
by the Word. The science of the metaphysician can 
therefore only be complete when it is "crowned by 
theology". 
Unlike Bonaventure, Albert the Great saw the foundation of 
theology both in revelation and reason. That part of 
theology that was reached by reason he called metaphysical 
philosophy or first theology and treated God as the Fi~st 
Being. The philosopher works under the genera l light of 
reason present in all men while the theologian, under the 
supernatural light of faith through which he "receives the 
revealed dogmas". In this way he distinguished between 
philosophy and theology. Through his dependence on the 
Aristotelian tradition he sees God as the "Unmoved Mover, 
pure act and the self-knowing intellect". To explain 
100 
T880153 
creation he used the emanation theory interpreted in the 
neo-Platonic tradition (Copleston, F., 1962). 
The view that the soul through its own consciousness could 
realize God (Avicenna), and that through contemplation of 
its consciousness come to realize its dependence on God 
(Bonaventure), are probably at the base of St Albert's 
view that both philosophy (reason) and theology have their 
part to play in the realization of God. Thus faith and 
reason have both a common goal. With this view in mind St 
Albert's interest in the physical and biological sciences 
can be understood: the world of creatures also contributed 
to knowledge of God. For him only experience could bring 
certainty as far as the investigation of the physical 
world was concerned. 
The physical world also influenced the animals themselves: 
he saw the relationship between habitat and adaptation 
I 
(thick white coats of Polar bears, etc.). He realized 
also that many observations made are in terms relative to 
the observer. Consequently, apriori arguments are not as 
valid as those from experience. His reliance on 
observation and experience and on the confirmed 
experiences of others, brings him nearer to Aristotelian 
views for like the latter he realized the value of 
scientific empirical research. 
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John of Salisbury had already in the Twelfth Century 
established a theory of science (refer Rauche, G.A., 1985, 
p.160). The work of St. Albert can be seen as an 
expansion of this theory. On the basis of this theory can 
be seen the development of the sci&ntific method in which 
observation and experiment are prominently featured. This 
method was further expanded by Roger Bacon till it emerged 
as a separate method or way for the investigation of 
nature. The expansion of this method in the Aristotelian 
tradition (with reliance on observation or experience) 
also led to God • . Consequently, both reason and faith were 
instrumental in the realization of God. 
The work of St. Albert thus shows that both reason and 
faith have their part to ~lay in attaining knowledge of 
God. Thomas Aquinas saw this also but wanted to use 
philosophy in theology without in any way disturbing the 
"essence and nature of theology", and to do the same for 
philosophy. 
Added to the changes in the philosophical climate from the 
Augustinian Period to the Thirteenth Century there was 
much developments in the social order resulting in a 
period of revival all over Europe. This was a direct 
result of the feudal and manoreal systems, which, although 
very limited, provided a basis for the development of 
small associations of men. These institutions provided 
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some measure of economic stability and prosperity and on 
these "basic patterns of organization, social control, 
thought and belief" (Harrison, J.B. and Sullivan, R.E. 
1975, p.207), men were able to constructively apply their 
energies. Their capabilities were directed towards a wide 
range of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic pursuits 
resulting in varied cultural achievements. 
This was largely a result of the loosening of those chains 
that held philosophy in bondage to theology. During the 
first half of the Mediaeval Period (the fideistic period) 
almost all activity and thought was subordinate to 
theology. During the second half, however, due largely to 
the works of the Arabian philosophers, Aristotelianism was 
adopted into philosophy or into philosophical argument. 
Consequently, experience and reason became extremely 
important in theological argument. This is evident in the 
works of Peter Abelard and Albertus Magnus. The reason 
I 
that had been used by these men to attempt a logical prodf 
of God's existence, c~uld now be used in attempts to 
understand natural phenomena. Consequently, along with 
the freedom of philosophy, scientific thought slowly 
emerged. Already Augustine had postulated his theory of 
"natural causes". These causes could now be studied 
scientifically in an attempt to understand the processes 
worked by God; to reveal the "glory" of his works. 
Natural phenomena could be investigated without being 
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directly attributed to God. Nature could be understood as 
working by processes within itself. An understanding of 
these processes could thus enhance the understanding of 
nature, removed from direct divine intervention. 
There was also much social change during this period. The 
most significant was the emergence of a wealthy middle 
class as a result of economic transformation. Being 
engaged in commerce and manufacture, they required greater 
recognition as a class and greater freedom, for on this 
their livelihood depended. Having more freedom and being 
~ble to accumulate wealth they became a major force in 
shaping the fortunes of Europe. They promoted other 
aspects of social life and consequently it was from this 
class mainly that the intellectuals and scientists 
emerged. Science, law, political theory and literature 
all took on a new form. The rise of new monarchies 
resulted in conflict for supremacy between Church and 
state. Political theory was therefore necessary, which 
would justify the powers both of Church and state and be 
so related as to promote the peaceful regulation of 
society. 
The emergence of philosophical and scientific thinking 
from complete subservience to theology, is also evident in . 
the broader and more open thinking of the people, as shown 
in their architecture. In contrast to the Romanesque, the 
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Gothic style of architecture emerged out of the new 
intellectual desire to develop a rational view of God. He 
was seen in terms of reason, light and proportion. 
According to Harrison, J.B. and Sullivan, R.E. "The Gothic 
Church was an attempt to leave behind the mystery-shrouded 
awesome world of the Romanesque, and move into the light 
and purity of paradise", (1975, p.267). 
It is apparent, therefore, that Mediaeval Thought also, 
expressed in Mediaeval art, was a quest for the light of 
truth beyond the world of men . This attempt to transcend 
the mind and imagination came from man's belief that his 
duty lay in knowing and worshipping God, for it was He who 
controlled the Universe. Thus the talents of artist and 
writer were directed to the service of God. 
The permeation of the Mediaeval philosophical milieu by 
Aristote1ianism thus resulted in changes in the 
philosophical and theological and consequently the ethical 
and social values of the era. The teleological and 
eudai~onistic ethics of Aristotelianism seemed to be 
misinterpreted. Since the end, telos, of mortality was 
happiness, for this ensured harmony, it was interpreted to 
mean harmony in this life as contributory to his happiness 
in this life, and of eternal happiness in the afterlife. 
Consequently, the tension between philosophy and theology! 
This tension in the unity of truth manifested itself in 
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the conflict between "reason and will, knowledge and 
faith" (Rauche, G.A., 1985, p.159), and consequently in 
the social and political fields. 
To "save the unity of truth" Thomas Aquinas saw that he 
had to establish a balance between philosophy (especially 
Aristotelianism) and theology, and validate the "use" of 
philosophy or Aristotelian reason in theology. Christian 
theologians, however, e.g. Bonaventure felt that reason 
could not reach the truth for, as truth was revealed 
(revelation to the Christian), it could only be reached 
through faith. Influenced by Aristotelianism, Thomas 
Aquinas felt that truth could be reached by rational 
argument and also accepted (on faith - Intuition) by the 
theologian on the authority of Scripture (Revelation). 
Thus the difference between theological truth and 
philbsophical truth was not that of content, but a 
difference as far as their formal aspects as concerned. 
Like that of Aristotle, the ethics of Thomas Aquinas is 
also teleological and eudairnonistic. Happiness or 
beautitude is the goal of man in his natural order. Sense 
experience is the ground of knowledge. Therefore, as far 
as Thomas Aquinas was concerned, the metaphysics of 
Aristotle could not lead man to perfect happiness. 
Aristotelian metaphysics was concerned with man's 
happiness in this life and Thomas Aquinas felt that 
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perfect happiness was not attainable in this life; only in 
the afterlife. For man in this life could attain 
knowledge only through his sense-experience, and since 
this knowledge was imperfect it could lead on~y to 
imperfect happiness or beautitude. Such knowledge was 
1-
natural knowledge since it was attained through sense 
experience and the love of God. Perfect natural 
beautitude is attainable only in the afterlife and 
consists in a "vision of the divine essence". And since 
man is always seeking the First cause the attainment of 
this vision is a natural desire in man. And those acts 
are moral which are directed to the attainment of this 
end. Moral acts also had to be perform~d of one ' s free 
will; as a rational and free being. 
According to Thomas Aquinas, the primary precept of 
natural law is the preservation of life, for on its 
fulfillment is dependent the attainment by man, of God. 
Like all other creatures, man has a natural incl i nation to 
self-preservation; this is evident in his acts of 
protecting himself, and also in his desire of species 
propogation by reproduction, and parental care for 
children. The reason reflects on this natural inclination 
and directs man's actions to the fulfillment of this 
purpose. As a rational being he is also inclined to seek 
the truth (God). Reason therefore, imposes an obligation 
- which is rooted in human nature itself. Moral law is 
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therefore rational and natural, having its basis in human 
nature. 
Since human nature is created by God and society and 
Government are "pre-figured" in human nature, government 
has a divine justification. Due to the "inequality of 
gifts", one of superior knowledge and righteousness should 
be allowed to rule and so exercise his knowledge and 
ability for the common Good. The Christianised 
Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas helped him avoid the 
view of Hobbes that the state is founded on "enlightened 
~ 
egoism" and that of Augustine that "sin" consitutes its 
basis. Being rooted in human nature the State and society 
were grounded in the Will of God. Consequently, it was an 
institution in its own right and functioned in a sphere of 
its own. This resulted in his not being able to hold 
extremist positions in regard to relations between State 
and Church. In this way the State became a "perfect 
society" with all the necessary requirements to attain 
this end - the common good of all the citizens. This 
would bring peace to the State, the activity of the 
citizens be given unified direction and provide the 
necessary conditions for the requirements of life. 
Consequently, the citizens had their "God-given" positions 
in life. To function properly the citizens of the state 
had to be divided into classes: peasants and artisans to 
work, nobles to rule and priests to pray and administer 
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sacraments. The ruler should idscover the principles of 
natural law so that he might rule society in accordance 
with divine order. Thus every individual had to play his 
part in the State so that the State as a whole be directed 
to the common good. 
Thomas Aquinas felt that sovereignity was given "to the 
people as a whole" who gave it to the ruler: thus 
sovereignity came from God to the people, who gave it to 
the ruler. Thus the people had the right to depose any 
unjust ruler; but this must be provided for in a 
constitution. He advocated a "mixed constitution" in 
which place is given both to aristocracy and democracy, 
where the people elect certain magistrates to "temper" the 
power of the monarch. Thus his political theory, based on 
his ethical views and his epistemology is characterised by 
"moderation, balance and common sense", which in the words 
of Rauche, would lead to the "conception of a Christian 
Cosmos" (1985, p.159). 
The doctrines of Siger of Brabant were also grounded in 
Aristote1ianism but he looked at this from an Averrocian 
point of view. God thus became the first creative cause -
not the Unmoved Mover of Aristotle. He followed Avicennia 
in his view that God operates through intermediate causes. 
Like the Arabian philosophers he also held the view that 
the heavenly bodies determine terrestrial movements. 
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Motion, therefore, was not eternal but had a cause and a 
beginning - and this was God. The Scientific nature of 
the thought of Siger of Brabant can be seen in his view of 
the relatedness of causes; as this was grounded in 
experience. 
The further development of scientific thought can be seen 
in the work of Roger Bacon whose philosophy was a curious 
mixture of science and theology. Since reason was also 
from God, its use could not be condemned. But theology 
held a dominating position among the sciences since all 
truth was contained in the Scriptures. Elucidation of the 
Scriptures, however, required the use of Reason. 
Consequently, although the Truth was given in the 
Scriptures (through revelation) it was philosophy (reason) 
that showed man the relevance of Scripture leading him to 
knowledge and service of God. This constituted the basis 
of moral philosophy. Thus the incomplete pgan speculative 
and moral science reached their completion in Christian 
theology and ethics. His justification f6r the use of 
philosophy in theology lay in the fact that it was 
revealed to the Patriachs. Human depravity had obscured 
revelation which was rediscovered, however, with the help 
of pagan philosophers (Aristotle, Avicennia, Averroes). 
110 
In the continuance of the use of philosophy, in theology, 
he saw the opportunity to maintain an d perfect the work of 
his predecessors. Truth led men to God. Therefore, 
studies that did not seem to have immediate relevance to 
theology should not be ignored, as all truth led to God. 
He also realized the importance of mathematics 
and considered it the "key" to the other sciences: it was 
presupposed by the other sciences since it was less 
dependent on experience. The Patriachs, Chaldeans and the 
Egyptians had also studied and used mathematics to good 
advantage. The Christians were still using much of the 
knowledge that they had inherited from their pagan 
forebears. 
Value of mathematics was evident from its numerous uses. 
Its use in astronomy showed the insignificance of earth to 
the other planets. It could also be used to correct the 
I 
calendar, which was based on the Julian Calendar and to 
help solve the chronological problems of the Scriptures. 
His works show a variety of interests in light and optics, 
eclipses, tides, spherical shape of the earth, geography 
and astrology and the basic unity of the Universe. He 
also felt the study of astrology relevant and important as 
the "influence and movements of the heavenly bodies affect 
terrestrial and human events and produce even natural 
disposition in human beings, but they do not deny free 
III 
will" (Copleston, F. 1962, p.168). All knowledge was 
thus important since it could be used to a purposeful and 
good end. 
His work in experimental science shows Bacon's leaning to 
Peter Lombard who did not accept a priori answers to 
questions, but insisted on "questioning" nature herself. 
Although reason could guide the mind to the correct 
conclusions there was no assurance of this save by 
experiment (resting on sense experience often aided by 
instruments). He also allowed spiritual exp~rience, but 
knowledge gained in this way could only come from Grace. 
Thus he allowed two types of knowledge. 
Bacon was of the view that whereas, philosophy, 
mathematics and experimental science were related to 
action (involving will, direction, etc.), moral philosophy 
was related to action that makes man good or bad and 
guides his relations with God, himself and his fellow-man. 
Moral philosophy is, therefore, related to theology. His 
work on civic and personal morality was based on the works 
of Greek, Roman and Moslem philosophers. Acceptance of 
the work of non-Christian philosophers required recourse 
to reason but the Christian religion was accepted on the 
grounds of faith in Revelation (Authority). Thus 
philosophy and science could lead to knowledge of the 
existence of God, his unity and infinity. 
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2,.4. Discussion 
The Mediaeval Period can be seen as a "melting pot" in 
which the ideas from the ancient world embodied in Greek, 
Roman and Christian theology were mixed with Islamic 
trends of thought. Non-Christian elements contributed to 
enrich Christianity so that it could be accepted not only 
on faith (fideistic period) but understood on a rational 
basis, (post-Arabic influences) effecting a reconciliation 
of reason and faith culminating in the Thomist synthesis. 
Reason and faith thus had an important part to play in the 
aquisition of knowledge , of the Truth. Experience (of 
nature - God's creation) informed of "nature's rational 
being" (Rauche, G.A., 1985) while reason pointed to 
(through higher stable forms - "mathematics and logic") 
the timeless One which identical with God could only be 
reached by intuition, based on faith. Thus reason led to 
faith. In this way the search for essential knowledge led 
to God. Belief, therefore, was grounded, not only on 
faith but on reason as well allowing for an acceptance of 
faith. 
Unlike the Greeks who attempted to gain essential 
knowledge of the universe on a rational basis, Mediaeval 
theologians found all essential knowledge in knowledge of 
God, on the basis of faith. However, just as essential 
knowledge had ethical implications for the Greeks, so did 
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it for the Mediaeval theologians. Belief, therefore, was 
grunded not only on faith, but on experience and reason as 
well. This provided the basis for the emancipation of 
philosophy from bondage to theology. Philo$ophy could 
thus investigate reality on a rational basis and not be 
tied to theology and used as a rational argument to 
confirm the existence of God or to corroborate what 
knowledge could be attained through intuition. The 
emancipation of philosophy from theology allowed the 
eventual emergence of scientific thought (empirical) 
(based on observation and experiment) from philosophy. 
Consequently, three different trends of thought, 
concerning knowledge, emerged from the Mediaeval Period: 
Knowledge based on faith (in Religion; and demonstrated by 
rational argument); knowledge based on rational intuition 
(philosophy) and knowledge based on observation and 
experiment (the contemporary concept of scientific 
knowledge) beginning largely in Baconian philosophy. 
I 
During the fideistic period, therefore, the tension 
between faith and reason was resolved in favour of the 
primacy of faith in the aquisition of knowledge, although 
reason played a prominent role in assuring its validity. 
It was on the basis of experience that reason demonstrated 
the primacy of faith. Thus the imperfect world of objects 
had its correlates in the perfect ideas in God. This 
view, however led to the controversy between nominalism 
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and realism. Abelard's view tht universals (or objects of 
reason) had an objective reference (in the world of 
objects) showed his anti-nominalist approach: the wOIld 
was therefore real; a world of real objects which could be 
investigated by the rational approach: constituting the 
basis for the emancipation of philosophy from its 
subserviant role to theology. 
To Augustine and Anselm the world could be understood 
because of belief (or faith in God). Without this belief 
in the basic unity and perfection of God, the world would 
be meaningless: God was the origin of the world. Abelard, 
Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and the Arabian 
philosophers, however, felt that it was unperstanding, 
that led to belief. An understanding of the basic order 
and unity of the world showed that belief in a supreme 
order or God was reasonable. It was on this view that 
Aristotle's philosophy could be introduced (by the Islamic 
philosophers) and be accepted by Christian theo1ogy, for 
it ~eemed to "prove" God's existence. It showed that 
reason led to belief: that an understanding and acceptance 
of the (real) world would lead to belief in God. The 
importance of this approach was that it showed the 
autonomy of philosophy: that it was through a rational 
inves~igation of the world (of real objects of the world -
scientific) that belief in God was justified. Mediaeval 
science thus "proved" the existence of God. 
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Although this approach showed God's supremacy and 
omnipotence and provided the justification for belief and 
faith, it also revealed the importance of philosophical 
thought for acceptance of faith. In this way the problem 
of reason and faith was solved, to show the relationship 
between reason and faith. 
The views of the post-fideistic theologians leading to the 
autonomy of philosophy also constituted the basis for the 
emergence of scientific thought (on the basis of 
observation and experiment - Roger Bacon) from philosophy. 
For, since philosophy showed the importance of a rational 
investigation and understanding of the world for the 
justification and acceptance of faith, it implied that a 
better and deeper investigation of the world would enrich 
the meaning of faith nd lead to a deeper understanding of 
God. This approach laid the foundation for an 
I 
investigation of the world, of the processes and 
mechanisms that maintained the order and harmony of the 
world: of the ways in which God maintained the order of 
the entire world. The value of such an investigation was 
that it would lead to a greater and deeper acceptance of 
God: Knowledge of the world was thus important for the 
understanding and acceptance of faith (ethical 
significance of knowledge). It was this investigation of 
the world, based on observation and experiment that later 
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came to characterize scientific activity. 
It was through Augustine, therefore, that Greek philosophy 
which contributed much to the development of the 
scientific attitude was saved and preserved during the 
Mediaeval Period. Its "absorption and utilization" slowly 
increased and was eventually at the foundation of those 
directions of thought that led to the emancipation and 
autonomy of philosophy from theology and to the emergence 
of science (from philosophy). In the development of 
scientific thought during the Mediaeval Period can be 
traced the change from the neo-Platonism of Augustine to 
the atoption of Aristotelianism (through the Arabic 
philosophers). The Thomist synthesis of the latter half 
of the Mediaeval Period, thus did not merely represent the 
substitution of Aristotelianism for Augustianism, but was 
a synthesis from the various elements of Greek and Arabic 
philosophers with the original ideas of Christian 
thinkers. The utilization of Greek philosophy and Arabic 
commentaries in the development of Thomist thinking also 
showed that the mind could reach an order of Truth 
independent of Christian Revelation. 
Abelard, and especially Albertus Magnus, building on the 
scientific theory of John of Salisbury, showed the 
importance of reason and experience in their development 
of the theory "Natural causes", whose understanding laid 
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the foundations for man's relationships with God. For 
with an understanding of these processes Man is no more in 
fear of God. He is in awe at the variety and intricacies 
of these processes by which God maintains the workings of 
the Universe. In this way man realizes the power and 
greatness of God, and also, the love that God bears him, 
having created him, in His own image and placed him at the 
head of Creation. God has endowed man with reason. 
Therefore, an investigation of the world through reason 
was justified so that in his understanding of nature he 
might realize his relationship to God not thEough fear but 
through love: that love that God has given him and which 
he owes to God. Man had thus to love God (through Christ) 
for that was his due to God. Consequently, the Reason 
through which man understands the workings of Nature, also 
affords him knowledge of the love of God; of the faith he 
ought to have in God, and consequently, of his 
responsibility to God. 
This relationship to God, however, was based on the I -
Thou relationship (Rauche, G.A. 1985) in which God was 
removed (distanced) from man. This was unlike the Greek 
view which saw man as an integral part of the Universe; 
God also was part of the Universe. The Christian 
theocentric attitude, however, saw God as outside the 
world. It is this view that contributed to the 
development of Universal mechanism of the Late Mediaeval 
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and Renaissance periods. Thus the reason that had led man 
to God, also served to alienate him from God. For in 
understanding the processes of nature without direct 
reference to God (through science) man has been able to 
remove God farther away from him. And as God was moved 
farther away from man, with him went the value systems 
that man received through Revelation, which had regulated 
Mediaeval society. 
However, although God was removed from the world, the 
Mediaeval scientist still investigated the world with a 
view to understanding the mechanisms that operated in 
nature; mechanisms that God himself had placed in Nature. 
Thus even though nature was investigated on a rational 
basis, through observation and experiment, faith in God 
still remained and served to maintain the unity of the 
various process in nature. Thus, although nature or the 
world could be investigated on ,a rational basis, this 
still led to support theology. Thus the variety of the 
world still derived from the mind of God a common origin. 
It also showed that all knowledge, secular or otherwise, 
pointed to God. 
The two-truth view of Averroes also supported the view 
that reason was just as legitimate a way to investigate 
and to understand the world as intuition (which led to 
God). His view that the value of religion lay in the fact 
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that it provided an understanding of the world for those 
who could not understand the way of reason, showed that he 
considered (the use of) reason as the more correct way of 
understanding the world. This, perhaps, led to the 
adoption of a more scientific (observation and experiment) 
outlook into investigations concerning the world, leading 
to an understanding of the world without recourse to 
religion - an understanding based on the separation, not 
the integration of the two world views. Since knowledge 
of the world through faith (God) also constituted the 
basis of ethics where man looked to religion for 
directives to moral conduct based on free will and 
responsiblity, the failure to integrate the two world 
views led to religion being seen as the basis of ethics 
while science provided only knowledge of the world 
(physical aspects of the world) or the understanding of 
the working of natural laws. Knowledge of these laws thus 
allowed their utilization for man's material benefit. 
Unlike Greek science which also had ethical implications, . 
placing man in meaningful relationship with the Universe, 
post-Mediaeval science assumed a utilitarian aspect as it 
had done for Mediaeval theology. Ethics seeme d not to be 
the concern of science, for that was regarded as being 
part of religious theory. For the Greek the problem of 
this separation did not arise as he did not have 
(religious) revelation to contend with. From a slight 
distortion of the two-truths (Averroes) could have emerged 
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the Western view that science ' is concerned not with ethics 
but with the acquisition and utilization of knowledge for 
the betterment of Man's material needs. 
Although Mediaeval theologians saw everything in the world 
leading to God, the separation they had effected removed 
God from any direct contact with the world. As a creator 
and legislator of the world, he prescribed rules for man's 
moral conduct. The basis for ethics thus no more lay in 
man's identity with the cosmos, but in man's intuition of 
God. Even though the rational approach (Greek) also 
identified man and the cosmos through intuition, it did 
not acquaint him with the personal God, as did religion. 
Thus, the rational approach was without any directives 
(from a personal God), for moral conduct. 
Beginning in the Fideistic period, the rational approach 
(during the Mediaeval Period) slowly gained ground till it 
attained equal status with faith, in the Thomist 
synthesis. Following this, it slowly increased in 
stature, till it ws emancipated from theology during the 
late Mediaev~l period. With the increasing rational 
approach, Nature began to be investigated on the grounds 
o~ observation and experiment (Roger Bacon). This led to 




THE REVIVAL OF SCIENTIFIC ENQUIRY 
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3.1 Introduction 
Scientific thought during the (theocentric system of the) 
Mediaeval Period was direct to "proving" the existence of 
God so that the Relevation could be accepted as the source 
of the true knowledge. The mediaevals realized that 
reason could not be ignored as a source of knowledge and 
therefore, pressed it into the service of .theology. 
Towards the close of the Mediaeval Period, however, reason 
became important as a source of knowledge and later, 
together with observation and experiment (Johti of 
Salisbury, Roger Bacon) formed the basis of the 
scientific method (in contrast to intuition). Whereas the 
contrast between faith and reason had characterised the 
Mediaeval Period, the era following it was characterised 
by the tension between the rationalists and the 
empiricists. This approach is closely related to changes 
in the historical and social development of the period. 
The voyages of discovery, coupled with the emergence and 
development of a strong middle class who depended on 
trade, the growing acceptance of the Copernican 
heliocentric theory and the developments in biological 
studies (already begun in the Mediaeval Period) evident in 
the work already begun by Galen (in the Second Century) 
and continued by Vesalius (De Corporis Humani Fabrica) who 
disproved the myth of the rib of Genesis all contributed 
to the revival in secular interests and the development of 
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scientific enquiry (empirical). 
These developments were important for the relationships 
between theology and philosophy, theology and science and 
philosophy and science. The "use" of reason to establish 
the existence of God (during the Mediaeval Period) showed 
that a scientific investigation could also establish an 
order of truth independent of theology. Thus although 
philosophy was at first subservient to theology, it 
eventually attained independence since it was felt that 
philosophy could also attain the truth. In this 
investigation, philosophy and science were identical in 
reason. However, science came into its own when 
observation and experiment were used in the investigation 
of natural phenomena which began to be expressed in terms 
of natural laws. 
3.2 The emergence of scientific autonomy 
With the emancipation of philosophy from theology the 
understanding of nature assumed a different form. This 
was significant as it permitted the freedom of the 
intellect which could apply itself to an understanding of 
nature unhampered by dogmatic authority. This allowed the 
development of scientific thought and its final breakaway 
from philosophy. 
Although it might not have been evident in the Sixteenth 
124 
Century, Galileo's view of scientific autonomy on the 
grounds that the expertise required being different from 
that of theology would result in the complete separation 
of science and morality (ethics). Science ' was directed 
towards an investigation of nature on the grounds of 
systematised experience. It was left to theology to 
develop those concepts that would guide the conduct of 
society. The development of scientific knowledge, 
however, increasingly challenged the authority of this 
guidance. Although Galileo had felt that the truths of 
science and theology could not be in conflict, science 
itself has negated this view. Developments in science 
have continually challenged theological explanations of 
the Universe so that theology has had to modify its views 
and science to evaluate its position in society. 
In the Sixteenth Century, therefore, as a result of the 
transformation in scientific thought, philosophical 
thought moved away from Aristotle. His "Physics" was 
considered as "qualitative"not ~athematical; it was 
teleological and functional, not exclusively 
mathematical" (Randall, J.H. (Jnr); in Durbin, P.R. 1968. 
p. 24). Thus, even though Aristotle's "Physics" had been 
preserved in the Thirteenth Century, though subserviant to 
Theology, it was unacceptable to Sixteenth Century 
philosophers. They regarded Pythagorean and Platonist 
mathematical physics and astronomy, a combination of 
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"atomism and mathematics", as "real science". 
By the close of the Sixteenth Century, that trend was 
evident that led to the later attempts to understand the 
Universe and nature in terms of "atomism and mathematics". 
Nature was thus expressed in mathematical terms. The 
investigation of nature (through experience) had passed 
from the holistic systems of the Greeks, through the 
theocentric systems of the Mediaeval Period, to the 
investigation and understanding of processes in nature, 
towards the end of the Sixteenth Century. 
Galileo had contributed much towards such an understanding 
of nature. This was due mainly to his use of the 
telescope to view the depths of space. Both Copernicus 
and Kepler thought that the solar system filled the whole 
of space. Bruno had thought that the "firmament" was 
infinite and that fixed stars were different solar 
systems. Although this view of his was partially 
incorrect, yet the idea of infinity ·and different solar 
systems, showed the belief in the vastness of the Universe 
and that it consists of more than one solar system. 
Galileo's observations contributed to enrich the 
Copernican theory. This was made possible by the help of 
"technology" - the telescope. Even from this early stage 
in the development of science it is evident that science 
and technology are complementary. And it is this 
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complementarity that is the life of increasing scientific 
knowledge. 
It is interesting to note, however, that this increase in 
knowledge which should enrich existing theories was viewed 
with mistrust by the Church (for its authority is 
challenged), and more surprisingly by scientists also. 
The old school of scientists felt that Galileo's 
discoveries endangered their tenets which were grounded in 
Aristotle. In a letter to Kepler Galileo says, "But what 
will you say to the noted philosophers of ou~ University, 
who, despite repeated invitations, still refuse to take a 
look either at the moon or the telescope and so close 
their eyes to the light of truth? This type of people 
regard philosophy as a book like Aeneid or Odyssey and 
believe that truth will be discovered, as they themselves 
assert, through the comparison of texts rather than 
through the study of the world of nature." ( in 
Reichenbach, H. 1970, p.23-24). Galileo. was also the 
first person to investigate the law of falling bodies 
which formed the basis for the science of mechanics, 
together with his conception of the Universe. 
Speculative philosophers, therefore, although not making 
discoveries, contributed much to the direction of enquiry 
and methods of research which resulted in nature being 
explained by the formulation of general principles. Lord 
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Bacon, for example, advocated the collection, examination 
and comparison of groups of facts in order to extract 
general principles in an effort to explain natural 
phenomena. The particular facts, objects Or phenomena of 
the world; the facts or objects that could be perceived by 
the senses, were therefore the basis for understanding the 
Universe. This meant that the world of objects could be 
considered as being real, in the sense that they could be 
perceived by the senses. Often, what could not be 
directly perceived by the senses was considered as being 
non-existent. Galileo's simple telescope, however, showed 
that the senses had their limitations (showing human 
limits) and that aids to them were often necessary. It 
was through these aids that man could supplement his 
senses and so enrich his understanding of the Universe, 
despite his limitations. In the recognition of these 
limitations lies the springboard for technology and also 
the basis for the realization of his ignorance. But so 
engrossed was Sixteenth Century science with' its 
discoveries and inventions that it did not realize that 
although it had enhanced the understanding (of the 
Universe), it did not mean that science could explain all 
aspects of the Universe or that its discoveries were 
"Truth". 
However, Galileo's work, built on the Copernican system 
showed that mechanical -laws governed even the remotest 
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reaches of the Universe. Harvey's discovery of the 
circulation of the blood, combined with its functions, 
produced a mechanical picture of the human being. This 
implied that those same laws that presided over the 
mechanisms of the Universe also governed the human frame. 
Thus was man brought, through the development of 
scientific thought, into the system of the Universe. No 
scientist had seen this but Rene Descartes who, on the 
basis of Galileo's theory, had combined observation with 
theory and saw this as a logical consequence of the 
theory. This was a result of Descartes' own . philosophy of 
the body as substance (by "accident") and of the mind as 
"pure substance" (Descartes, R. 1969). From his 
Meditations he also derived the idea of God who was 
responsible for the workings of the body. From his ideas 
of God, mind and matter, Descartes thus saw the body as 
matter and like all matter (in the Universe) as governable 
by those laws that governed th~ mechanisms of the 
Universe. Descartes greatly influenced Spinoza who 
reduced the Cartesian analysis of God, mind and matter 
into a single phenomenon, God, whose attributes were 
matter and spirit, thought and extension. The Universe 
was therefore, manifestations of these attributes. 
3.3 Development of the anthropocentric world view 
Consequently, developments in the natural sciences, 
especially physics, and to some extent biology resulted in 
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the rise of the anthropocentric world-view in contrast to 
the theocentric world-view of the Mediaeval Period and the 
beginning of the Renaissance. This world-view was 
reinforced to a great extent by the expression of the 
"natural laws" in mathematics. The mathematical form made 
these "laws" easier to understand and later, also to use. 
It also made it easier to interrelate "laws", showing that 
"natural laws" function in relation to each other. This 
showed how the different mechanisms operative in the 
Universe were separate mechanisms and yet interrelated so 
that the entire universe could function as a cohesive 
whole. Mathematics also gave what might be termed an 
"objective view" of the Universe. The world therefore 
became an object separated from man and subject to his 
investigation. Just as Christianity and Islam had 
objectified God, so now, did anthropocentricism objectify 
the world. The consequences of this objectification of 
the world are felt even in contemporary times. Completely 
changed was man's relationship to the cosmos. 
And in a world where man felt that he was able to extract 
and to express in a form clear to him the "laws" of 
nature, God became irrelevant to his understanding of the 
Universe. Where God was once the basis for understanding, 
or knowledge of God, was the basis of man's moral conduct, 
now there was nothing but mathematical formulae. These 
expressed processes or mechanisms in Nature. 
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3.4 The Classical mechanistic view of nature 
The advent of the Counter reformation changed the character 
of philosophy during the Seventeenth Century. Renaissance 
discoveries and inventions had led to the collapse of 
Mediaeval theocentric systems and the rise of 
Anthropocentricism. Man's interest in especially himself, 
. 
and the world around him assumed increased dimensions, 
resulting in "Renaissance animism" (Brehier, 196B). 
The counter reformation checked the "exuberant spontaneity 
that men like Bruno saw in nature" (Copleston, T. 1963, 
p.9). Authority and Reason thus became the grounds for 
the individual's belief in order and unity - with 
resultant waning of the "individualistic ardour" of the 
Renaissance. The "vital spontaneity" of nature was 
therefore lost in Galileo's theory of Universal mechanism. 
A large number of "laws" concerning functionalre1atins 
fo 
were drawn together by his synthetic method under a few 
formulae. Physics and mathematics preogressed together 
with the consequent rise of the problem of the 
relationship between nature which the mind interprets 
mathematically and the mind, or the author of mathematics. 
For Galileo, therefore, it was only the measurable that 
could be considered in any investigation into reality. 
Universal mechanics, being of a technical nature, was not 
grounded in the nature of mind. Galileo felt that 
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observation (sense perception) and experiment were basic 
in the aquisition of knowledge. No amount of argument 
could produce knowledge with the certainty of one 
experiment or one conclusive demonstration. Logic was 
serviceable only in ordering and ascertaining the validity 
of thought processes; it was, by its nature of operation 
inadequate for investigations of nature where "new truths" 
were being discovered. He distinguished between sensous 
and absolute qualities; the former being subjective, the 
latter, mathematical, and of consequence, objective. This 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities was to 
influence later philosophers like Hobbes and Locke. 
It is probably from such views of Galileo that subsequent 
concepts concerning the objectivity of nature and the 
absolute validity of experiment and their expression in 
mathematical form, take root. Also from Galileo arises 
the view that only the measurable is consequent in 
r 
scientific theory. The immeasurable was inconsequent. As 
its failure of being expressed in mathematics showed it 
was no more than subjective sense perceptions which were 
secondary qualities and therefore could have no part in 
the permanence of truth. Mathematical form, it was felt, 
had a permanence and therefore, was constitutive of 
reality, or of truth. 
In his insistence on observation as a ground for 
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knowledge, Galileo did not see that he was to an extent 
being contradictory. His support of Copernicus in "The 
Dialogues Concerning the two principal systems of the 
world" did not take into account that the supremacy of the 
Copernican over the Ptolemaic world-view lay in the fact 
that Copernicus broke away from traditional systems of 
thought, in that his theory was contradictory to immediate 
sense-perception. This alone was proof that sense-
perception or observations alone could not provide 
knowledge of nature. Knowledge was a function of both 
sense-perception and the constitutive faculty of the mind. 
The constitutive faculty of the mind itself was, however, 
also dependent on sense-perceptions. Experience was 
enriched by sense-perceptions so that understanding was 
operative above the level of sense-perceptions and the 
mind's constitutive faculty. The understanding, of 
consequence, penetrates beyond the physical world. 
Although the rise of anthropocentricism emphasized the 
individual's importance, the world-view of the Mediaeval 
P.riod, that nature is primarily the creation of God still 
influenced to some extent the scientific view of the world 
of the late Sixteenth and early Seventeenth Centuries. 
Kepler (1571-1630) wrote in the Mysterium Cosmographicum 
(refer Heisenberg, W. 1958) that God based the world on 
law and order. He endowed man with senses and a mind so 
that he might realize from his observations of nature the 
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"causes of their being and becoming" (Heisenberg, W. 1958, 
p.72). He felt that nature had been created (out of the 
void) for man out of God's love for him, ("The purpose of 
the world and of all creation is man", Heisenberg, W. 
1958, p.72). Nature was created for man's mind to 
investigate so that through a scientific understanding of 
nature man might contemplate the perfection of creation 
and so place himself in a meaningful relation with God. 
Man could thus accept his place in nature and his relation 
to the Creator. Kepler thus finds a purpose for 
scientific knowledge. This knowledge, however, was only 
an "accidental discovery of relations" and could not 
afford an understanding of nature, which could only be 
gained through intuition. Exper~ence thus afforded 
knowledge of the "works of God" and intuition, the 
"mathematical and intelligible laws, the "thoughts of 
God", (Heisenberg, W. 1958, p.84) or the relationship 
between qualities and geometric forms. 
I 
Properties of bodies could therefore, be confirmed by 
experiments: but these were confirmatory only of 
agreements between definitions and phenomena or "basic 
relationships between hypotheses and experiments. The 
mind evolves assumptions for the observations of nature, 
which must be valid mathematically and logically. 
However, this validity itself is no proof of the real 
existence in nature of the reality implied by the 
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assumptions. Only when the latter are used as empirical 
hypotheses and are proven by experiment, do they assume 
the character of natural laws" (Heisenberg, W. 1958 p.86). 
consequently, observations of nature are not of nature 
alone, but are guided by certain "definite rules of 
thought" or of mathematical formulations. Thus, 
experiments were only means of determining what agreement 
there was between theoretical concepts and observation. 
Kepler's empirical approach, therefore, is c9nsonant with 
the scientific spirit of the age: he attains knowledge of 
the world and of God from experience and mathematics (by 
which world-order can be expressed). Thus, although the 
natural sciences (through experience) provide knowledge of 
the material aspects of the universe they also constitute 
the basis on which peace might be attained through 
contemplation of natural order showing the eternal truth 
I 
of creation. In this way could man place himself in 
meaningful relation with God and understand his place in 
the Universe. Kepler's science thus provides the 
knowledge for man's moral relationships, with God and the 
rest of nature. In Kepler's science the influence of 
theology is still evident and is the reason for the 
distinction between science and theology. He however, 
relates science to theology and in this relation lies the 
basis and reason for man's moral conduct. 
135 
Galileo's views on science, however, differed from those 
of Repler. He gave to science a historical perspective, 
investigating phenomena from the viewpoint of artificial 
hypotheses. Thus the answers to investigations of nature 
were limited in that they were conditioned by hypotheses. 
Like Leonardo da vinci, the scientific method of Galileo 
proposed that observation and consequent hypotheses, 
guided by experiments and the results expressed in 
mathematical form, was the basis for man's understanding 
of the reality of nature. 
The ethical aspects of Galileo's views (on knowledge of 
the Universe) arise from the fact that he regarded God as 
"a mathematical mind" (Rauche, G.A. 1987. Personal 
communication). An understanding of the laws of the 
Universe led not only to understanding of God, but also 
to man's relationship with the Universe since he also was 
subjected to these laws. 
It was Isaac Newton, however, who combined the discoveries 
of Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo into a single 
astronomical system. He realized that the force of 
attraction (gravitation) perceived by Galileo was 
applicable to "all mass" and determined planetary motion 
and behaviour across cosmic distances. With this as a 
basis he was able to compute and predict other related 
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phenomena. He was thus able to incorporate into a single 
uniform system the fundamental facts discovered in 
preceeding centuries: the Copernican heliocentric motion 
of the planets, Kepler's laws about the orbits of the 
planets resting on the Galilean laws concerning falling 
bodies in a gravitational field. Newton thus gave a 
formal proof of Kepler's dream: "the harmony of cosmic 
motions". He established the Copernican conception of the 
world; where definite "laws" formed the basis of and 
governed a cosmic order. 
Newton therefore, systematized the empirical approach of 
Galileo. He felt that discoveries originating in 
observations of Nature showed that hypotheses were no 
longer arbitrary creations but formulated on close 
observations of Nature. From these, single relations were 
isolated and generalized in mathematical form. by 
application of the method of inductive generalization 
I 
hypotheses were drawn, based on observations and 
experiments. Experimental physics thus had both 
analytical and synthetical roles: a few phenomena are 
analysed in order to derive the laws governing them. 
These are synthesised and used as an explanatory basis for 
other phenomena. This can be seen in Newton's combination 
or synthesis of the theories of Copernicus, Kepler and 
Galileo into a single system (to provide a coherent 
picture of motion and gravitation). In this way Newton 
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laid the foundation for part of the theory of relativity. 
The other sources for the theory were provided by the 
phenomena of electricity and light. Thus long before the 
theory of relativity was even thought about t it 
foundations had been laid. The theory of relativity, 
therefore, had its roots in the rigid and "predictable" 
system of Newtonian mechanics; a system that was 
considered far from relative. Electrical and optical 
phenomena thus forced physics to go beyond the views of 
Copernicus, Galileo and Newton. 
Even from the development of scientific theory from 
Copernicus, to Galileo and Newton it is evident that 
progress is usually achieved through conflict between the 
thoughts (or systems) between two successive generations. 
Usually a "matter of fact" of one age is derived from a 
revolution in thinking of a previous age. According to 
Reichenbach (1970, p.30) "A school knowledge acquired 
I 
under the influence of one's environment (and) is believed 
and proclaimed with the certainty of everyday experience. 
Thus possible criticism to which even the greatest 
theories should be continuously submitted, is forgotten; 
thus we lose sight of the limitations holding for the 
deepest insights; and thus man forgets in his absorbing 
concern with the particulars to re-examine the foundations 
of the whole structure of knowledge". 
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Mechanics had been (after Newton) accepted as the ultimate 
foundation of knowledge. Thus the at t empt was made to 
comprehend light on the basis of ideas derived from 
astronomy and mechanics. But mechanics could not provide 
a suitable explanation for optical (light) and electrical 
phenomena. On the contrary these phenomena could be used 
to explain mechanics. 
Olaf Roemer's determination of the velocity of light in 
1676 introduced a new physical concept. Up until that 
time no one had thought that light requires ~ime to 
propogate. This is not perceived by immediate experience 
- because of the velocity of light. Roemer's discovery 
was obtained not from direct measurements of the velocity 
of light but from studies in astronomy. Already at this 
relatively early stage in science is evident the need for 
interdisciplinary dependence. Based on his mechanics, 
Newton explained light as the emission of particles so 
I 
tiny that they could pass through gases. This physical 
interpretation of light held the world for a century. 
The influence of Renaissance science thus had far-reaching 
consequences in determining the direction of philosophical 
thought in the Seventeenth Century. The studies of 
Galileo and those of Newton, showed that although God was 
regarded as having created the world, reference to him was 
not integral to the study of nature. The Renaissance 
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scientist considered Nature as a "divine original", and 
was interested in expression of the structure of the world 
and of its dynamic nature by mathematical statement. In 
this way, it was possible to express the functional 
relationships between natural phenomena. 
The original question asked by the Greek philosophers: 
"What is the essence of a thing?" now change to: "How 
does the thing function or behave?" or the nature of its 
relation to other things. The shift of emphasis from 
"essence" to "functional relationships" resulted in a 
complete change in subsequent scientific thought. The 
Greeks had sought to establish or attain essential 
knowledge of the Universe to that men might have some 
basis for an authentic relationship with the Universe and 
with one another. In the Middle Ages the Bible had 
provided this knowledge. With the development of science, 
the authority of the Bible was ~ubjected to question. 
This resulted in the Bible slowly losing its authority to 
the reason of scientific thought. 
The development of the physical science with consequent 
emphasis on the inductive and the empirical study of 
nature resulted in contrasting views between 
"theologically-minded metaphysicians" and philosophical 
scientists: the former laid emphasis on "final causality" 
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and the latter on "efficient causality" as revealed in 
mathematically determinable motion" (Copleston, F. 1963, 
p.20) The latter mechanistic view of the world resulted 
in an intensifying of empirical studies in natural 
phenomena. The mechanistic approach of the scientist 
raised questions as to whether man should fall wholly 
within the mechanistic system, resulting in the emergence 
of contrasting views. Extension of the scientffic 
conception of the world to include man only in this 
material universe would result in a loss of human freedom 
as mental processes viewed against a mechanistic 
background would be interpreted in terms of mechanical 
laws. Man would thus be denied his spiritual aspect with 
which he transcends mechanical causality. 
The implications of such a view are that man loses his 
"freedom" and with it, his "Will". If man's mental 
processes are interpreted as mechanical laws then he has 
no reason and consequently no choice. Man would thus 
become an amoral being for choice is the basis of ethics. 
With the loss of responsibility, ethics and society can 
have no meaning. 
With the mechanical and mathematical approach there is 
also a change in the nature of causality. Since it bears 
no more relation to Aristotle's original question, it 
assumes a functional character. The teleological aspect 
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of causality is now expressed by mathematically-expressed 
functional relationships of observation, description and 
accurate measurements. Mathematics becomes all-important 
in such an operational approach: for, if the relationships 
of natural phenomena could be expressed mathematically, 
they could be used to advantage, in the service of man. 
However, the belief that the structure of the world can be 
expressed in mathematical terms - as Galileo supposes - is 
consequent on the presupposition that all elements or 
entities in the Universe are real and in harmony - a view 
originating in the doctrines (monistic) of the Ionian 
thinkers. But unlike their investigations which were 
directed at the essence of matter, mathematical 
investigations could only express the relationships 
between the diversity of natural phenomena - which it 
expresses as "laws" which relate to "How?" and not 
"What?". Since mathematics expresses natural phenomena as 
"Laws" it presupposes that there is a basic unity in the 
experienced diversity of nature. Thus the scientific 
investigation of the physical universe and its expression 
in mathematical form is dependent on a metaphysical 
concept: that of the Unity of Nature. 
Galileo, however, felt that absolute mathematical 
qualities (figure, rest, magnitude, motion) or primary 
qualities constituted the basis of reality. A consequence 
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of this view was the development of a mathematical physics 
and eventually a "mechanical physics". According to 
Weisheipl, "The essential feature of this mechanical 
philosophy was the rejection of phusis or nature, as an 
explanatory principle in physical science. With this 
rejection also went potency and act, substance, formal and 
final causality, and even the ontological reality of true 
causality. In their place,' the Seventeenth Century 
philosophers substituted qualtified matter (corpuscular, 
atomic or continuous), mechanical agencies (impulse, 
attractants, repellents, adhesive forces and various 
energies and local motion." (Weisheipl, J.A. in Durbin, 
P.R. 1968, p.41). This gave to physics its mathematical 
basis and constituted the "new science" discovered by 
Galileo and developed by Newton. 
Although Galileo regarded the "Book of Nature" as being 
written in mathematical language he had no illusions that 
such a method could reveal the essence of reality. Like 
Zabarella, "following the Greeks" he regarded logic "not 
as a science but purely as an instrument" (Randall, J.H. 
in Durbin, P.R. 1968, p.46). Logic and mathematics were 
only useful in so far as they could systematize 
observational facts and determine their validity. 
Zabarella, and with him the whole new science, insisted 
that experience must be at first carefully analyzed to 
discover the principle or cause of the observed effects, 
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from which facts could be deducted. Only in this way (by 
application of analytical and synthetical methods) could 
new truths be discovered. This application of these 
methods necessitated the application of empirical 
techniques to experience. Experiments, however, are set 
under artificial or assumed conditions and are arranged by 
man. The truths of these experiments are valid only in so 
far as the limitations of both the experimental conditions 
and the experimenter are realized. 
Galileo's analysis of the concept of causali~y is 
significant in that it leads to a realization that 
resorting to God as a creator or director explains 
nothing. It serves only to evade the question that has 
through the ages guided philosophical thought towards a 
rational understanding of the Universe. Galileo, 
therefore, on the realization that his method could not 
provide any conclusive answer to the question asked by 
Aristotle, resorted to a mechanical explanation of the 
Universe on the basis of mathematics, by which he also · 
explained the mechanical law of motion or the "theory of 
dynamics", in contrast to the "static views" of motion of 
the Greeks. 
In Newton's mechanical view of the Universe, all bodies, 
be they planets, terrestrial bodies or atoms, are subject 
to the causal laws of mechanics operative in space and 
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time. Since these concepts ~re metrical, nature could be 
expressed in terms of mathematics. Such as expression of 
nature is grounded in the assumption of the Universe being 
in space and time. This constitutes the metaphysical 
aspect of Newton's mechanical causality: space becomes the 
basis of the extension of bodies and time that of motion. 
Newton had considered space and time as "absolute 
(regarded as God's sense organs)". For Kant, however, 
space and time are synthetical apriori, being necessary 
for perception or the experience of the Universe. His 
concern was not with whether knowledge was possible, but 
with how it was possible. For Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Century science, based on perception or experience, 
knowledge was inferential and the reality of the world was 
considered as being composed of "imperceptible particles 
or corpuscles", (Brittain, G.G. (Jr.) 1978, p.8) 
possessing spatial properties only. Colour, taste, etc., 
were considered as sense-subjective and therefore, not 
constitutive of reality. Consequently, there was a "gap 
between the world as it presents itself to our senses and 
untutored intelligence, and the world as it actually is, 
in the light of scientific investigation. If physics is 
taken to describe the world as it actually is, then it 
would appear, possibly with some additional assumptions, 
that its epistemological security can be guaranteed only 
if this gap is bridged or closed" (Brittain, G.G. (Jr) 
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1978, p.8). According to Kant such an epistemological gap 
did not exist; being not concerned with the justification 
of physics but with the establishment of its 
"objectivity". Kant's viewing of space and ,time as the 
necessary presuppositions for perception (synthetical 
apriori) makes objective observation possible. Natural 
phenomena thus become meaningful. 
Newton, however, did not view space and time in the same 
way as Kant. His viewing them as mathematical entities 
made even God mathematical in character. AS , far as he was 
concerned, he framed "no hypotheses". The term 
"hypothesis", he felt, should be applied to whatever is 
not deductible by phenomena. Experimental philosophy 
could not accommodate anything not deductible from 
phenomena be they occult or mechanical, physical or 
metaphysical. 
He therefore considered physics as concerned with "solid 
objects composed of atoms". This also implied the 
principles of "cause and effect", mass and energy 
conservation and static relations between sparie and time. 
Thus fixed mechanical laws governed the Universe, which 
were the basis of its predictability. Everything in the 
Universe was now explained in terms of "established 
natural laws". This meant that the motion of planets and 
stars was predictable, light could be "explained in terms 
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of mechanical waves of ether; Heat was regarded as a 
massless fluid called caloric. Elasticity and magnetism 
were deemed to possess fluidic properties and their motion 
could be explained by taking recourse to the dynamics of 
fluids" (Rauche, G.A. unpublished). This view greatly 
influenced Nineteenth Century physics. The view of the 
Greek atomists that matter is composed of atoms was 
supported by numerous viewpoints, involving both 
instrumentalist and realistic interpretations. Dalton (in 
Gardner, M.R. 1979) proposed his atomic theory (1803-1808) 
based on the assumptions that matter is composed of 
indivisible atoms, that all the atoms of a given element 
are identical and that the atoms of diffeIent elements are 
distinguished by their weights. This theory was supported 
by the laws of definite and of equivalent proportions and 
implied the law of multiple proportions. The kinetic 
theory of gases and the theory of Brownian movement all 
pointed to the acceptance of the atomic theory on a 
realistic interpretation. 
3.5 The biological implications of "Universal Mechanism" 
The diversity and the origin of life-forms had been the 
subject of much speculations from ancient times. 
Aristotle's studies showed in his system of 
classification, that there was a hierarchic order in the 
animal world. The mechanisms that produced these 
divergent forms could not be ascertained, however. 
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Christianity explained this quite easily by the theory of 
Creation. Among others, the anatomical works of Vesalius 
and Harvey questioned this theory and showed that it was 
unacceptable as given in the Bible. In the background of 
the emerging scientific theories, the mechanistic view of 
the world seemed to provide more acceptable answers. 
Galileo's mechanistic view of the world, expanded by 
Newton and based on "atomism and mathematics" was used to 
explain all natural phenomena. As atoms formed the "basic 
stuff" of the Universe, it was felt that all.natural 
phenomena should be grounded in atomism and explained on a 
mechanical basis. It was generally felt that all higher 
types were eventually derived from "formless stuff". 
Methodical studies in comparative anatomy showed that 
there was "something resembling" a basic plan or system in 
different groups of animals. The different groups also , 
seemed to be related to one another by the occurrence of 
vestigeal structures, (such as appendix, etc.) in 
different groups of animals. This showed relationships 
between different groups of animals leading to the view of 
a common origin for all life-forms from a basic prototype. 
The great variety of species was explained in terms of 
mechanical processes: by the "lengthening of some parts 
and the suppression and development of others". 
Consequently, there was a "graduated approximation" 
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between different classes of animals. Beginning with man, 
therefore, his lineage could be traced down to primitive 
mosses and lichens and finally to raw matter - and the 
atom. The properties of matter itself were therefore 
responsible for the production of the whole complexity and 
diversity of nature. Viewed against the background of the 
then current physical processes responsible in the 
production of crystals, were accepted as being operative 
in the production of the various life-forms. In this way 
an explanation was given of a continuous and connected 
relationship of all natural phenomena. 
Thus was man brought within the compass of those laws that 
governed the Universe. They were responsible for his 
emergence, and his subjugation. Such a view of the world 
was the basis for his relationship to the rest of nature 
that shared the world with him. 
The mechanistic view of the Universe, however, did not 
consider a purpose. It was concerned with an 
investigation of nature in order to understand the laws 
that governed it. However, the principle of purposiveness 
is embodied, even in the mechanistic view, although it was 
not seen. 
An investigation into the embryo1ogica1 development of 
life forms as well as the phyletic order leading to man, 
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reveal the idea of purpose. Even if phyletic change is 
viewed as mechanical adaptation to environment, the idea 
of purpose cannot be ignored: it leads from man to the 
atom. The introduction of the principle of _purposiveness 
into mechanics reveals the metaphysical nature, even of 
mechanics - for it shows that mechanics is guided by 
forces outside itself. The telelogical concept of 
purposiveness as it emerges from studies in biology is of 
moral significance as it releases man from the determinism 
of Universal mechanism (as expressed in the works of 
Aristotle, the Mediaeval thinkers for they atfirm man's 
will and responsibility, Kant, etc.). Purpose thus 
constitutes the basis of man's striving for knowledge of 
truth. Thus is his influence and relationship to nature 
and society, affirmed. Thispurposiveness also reveals 
itself in evolutionary theory (later) which constitutes 
the basis of his ethical and socio-political 
relationships. This concept is also important in an 
evaluation of genetic theory which would also impose a 
form of determinism, and an understanding of humans on the 
basis of a mechanistic theory. Purposiveness also 
introduces the ideas of will and responsibility without 
which ethical and social relationships would be 
meaningless. 
3.6 The Renaissance World 
The period preceding 1600 A.D. had witnessed a slow 
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revival of science. After this period, however, science 
began to take bigger strides. In 1645 the Royal Society 
was formed to consider philosophical investigations into 
"Physick, Anatomy, Geometry, Astronomy, Navigation, 
Staticks, Magneticks, Chymicks, and Natural Experiments; 
with the state of these studies and their cUltivation at 
home and abroad" (Clodd, E. 1897. p.91). Although the 
society was condemned by Dr. South (a famous Divine) as an 
"irreligous body" its scientists continued their 
experiments adding to the stock of knowledge. In all 
these studies theology was precluded. 
Although the earth's shape, movements, and relations to 
other heavenly bodies had long been studied, the theory of 
Creation in Genesis had served to arrest investigations on 
the earth, and also of its contents. Imprisoned by the 
Bible it was the last part of the inorganic universe to be 
freed by the investigations of scientific research. Such 
was the fate of man also, in the organic universe, till 
science compelled his release. 
During the Renaissance, therefore, the miasmatic currents 
of intolerence emanating from the dogmatic attitude of the 
Mediaeval Church had begun to dissipate in the wake of a 
greater perception of the depth of understanding of 
natural phenomena provided by advances in geology and 
biology. Thus the ignorance or wilful blindness which are 
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the breath of "rigid opinion" were slowly dying. There 
was a growing conception of the inter-relation between 
life-forms. The idea of a Cosmos supported by the 
Copernican theory was slowly being accepted. The advances 
in knowledge, contributed to and justified the freedom of 
the intellect (which had hitherto been imprisoned by the 
Church) which widened the conception of an "unbroken 
order". 
Yet, that "sanctity with which time invests old ideas" was 
not broken and the influence of the Church still prevailed 
- but altered was its character: the conception of a 
widening intellect that could understand the world not on 
the authority of scripture alone but in terms of 
scientific "laws" which itself was created from 
observations of nature, overthrew theocentricism and 
developed into a growing anthropocentricism. 
Consequently, the conception of man's inclusion in the · 
universal order was yet foreign, even to the minds of 
deepest insight. The idea of duality could still not be 
dispelled: supernature still over-ruled nature. It was 
not thought of as being part of nature. Animism 
therefore, still retained its essential character and was 
considered to be at the root of both good and evil. 
The Renaissance, therefore, can be seen as a period in 
which there was a change in Western European thought with 
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the intensification of the secular spirit. The Mediaeval 
emphasis on theology (concern with the nature of God) 
changed to an emphasis on the condition of man. Mediaeval 
Christianity had taught the enmity of "flesh" and "spirit" 
and the frailty of the intellect, as rational processes 
unless guided by "Christian inpiration", were useless in 
the perception of divine truth. Secular pursuits during 
the Renaissance, however, fostered in man the view that 
the intellect was capable of discovering truth. That 
which it could not discover, either did not exist, or was 
not worth discovering. Humanism was born of . this secular 
attitude focussing interest not on God, but on man in 
general and on the individual. Thus individualism was 
also a product of the secular spirit. The human form was 
therefore, placed on a pedestal to inspire artist, writer, 
sculptor and man in every walk of life. Mediaeval 
monasticism, in the baptism of the individual ego, had 
completely submerged it into the group. Mediaeval 
I 
Christianity was thus "collectivist": artists and writers 
often did not sign their names on their work, which 
contributed to the glory of God. The Mediaeval educated 
man was a specialist - theologian, administrator or church 
artist. 
The humanistic and individualistic aspect of the 
Renaissance manifested themselves in all aspects of human 
life, abandoning the Mediaeval Christian restraint. 
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Although of the late Mediaeval Period the Divine Comedy of 
Dante (1265-l32l) depicts vivid scenes (refer "Inferno") 
uncharacteristic of the Mediaeval Period. Boccaccio 
(13l3-l375) in his Decameron also abandons all Christian 
restraints showing open revolt against the Mediaeval 
ideals. 
In both private and social aspects, the development of 
scientific attitudes led to the concept of the non-moral 
state. Machiavelli, in the Prince emphasized the 
uselessness of Christian morals in the government. He 
felt that since all men were self-seeking, rulers, to be 
effective should be amoral and ruthless. Even conspiracy 
and treachery were not thought of as being immoral. 
Although his work was directed against foreign pillage of 
a divided Italy it also reflected the thought of an 
anthropocentrical secular age: the idea of the end 
justifies the means. 
The secular spirit of the Renaissance shone through in its 
art. Although the themes were predominantly religious 
like that of the Mediaeval period, the figures were human 
and alive the expression depicting thought and feeling, 
like that of the twelve apostles in Leonardo da Vinci's 
(1452-15l9) The Last Supper. Before Signorelli (+-1450-
1523) Hell and the "soul-weighing" by St Michael had been 
treated realistically and scenes showing fantastic and 
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horrible figures dragging the damned to Hell were common. 
In his Fall of the Damned (in Bazin, G. 1964, p.248: 
Fresco in Orvieto Cathedral, 1499-1505) his realization of 
man's inhumanity and cruelty is shown in his depiction not 
of any fantastic devil but of man with decaying flesh, yet 
filled with that violent energy that only humans are 
capable of in the "torture of their fellows". 
Michaelangelo's (1457-1564) devils however, are shown as 
humans deformed by their vices. Thus, from pre-Signorelli 
to Michaelangelo can be seen the humanization of the devil 
himself. 
The figures in most of Michae1angelo's work in the Cistine 
Chapel are unclothed showing the respect and admiration 
that Renaissance man had for the human form; its beauty 
and majesty mirror the Greek conception of man. Like 
Leonardo da Vinci and others the art of this period 
depicts the Renaissance conception of "universal man". 
Yet, although the Renaissance artist showed man in all his 
beauty and power and strength, he did not glorify him to 
perfection. This vas because of the realization of man's 
weakness in comparison with the Almighty: "the heroes of 
the Cistine Chapel are heavy with a strength which they 
know will never avail them in their struggle with the 
infinite. Thus unbalance gives rise to a despair which 
torments their bodies and darkens their faces" (Bazin, G. 
1964, p.272). Tintoretto's work also shows humanity's 
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attempt to be at "grips with vastness". 
Renaissance art is pregnant with the realization that man 
could not accept authority as his Mediaeval forebears had 
done. Yet he realized his position in relation to the 
vastness of infinity. Developments in scientific 
knowledge had brought this to him. Copernicus had shown 
that the earth was not the centre of the Unvierse as 
Mediaeval man had believed. No more than a speck it was, 
in the vastness of an infinite universe. 
Thus man came to realize through developments in 
scientific theory, and expressed in art, the fact that he 
was infinitesimal in comparison. Occupying such a 
position in relation to the Universe, man learnt his place 
in the Cosmos. This realization was the basis for his 
moral conduct. If he occupied so small a place, then his 
importance to the Cosmos was of like stature. His 
knowledge of the Cosmos was so little that he knew 
practically nothing with any certainty. Unlike Mediaeval 
man for whom the answer to all questions lay in the Bible, 
Renaissance man knew that he understood very little of the 
Universe. To develop a meaningful relationship with the 
Universe man had to gain some knowledge of its ways. This 
he was certain could be done through a scientific 
investigation - showing a confidence in his own faculties 
to understand the Cosmos. He placed implicit trust in his 
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observational faculties and his reason, convinced that 
these would dispel his ignorance. Scientific developments 
had forced man to see himself in a different light - a 
blending of the mechanical, the biological and the 
religious universe. 
3.7 Crisis of the mechanistic conception of Nature 
Towards the close of the Eighteenth Century nature was 
viewed against a mechanistic and materialist background, 
originating in the Universal mechanism of Galileo and 
expanding into Newtonian mechanics. Attempts were made to 
isolate and to explain all natural processes in terms of 
"laws", and the principles used were verified by the 
conclusions based on them. This was likened to the 
geometricians' proofs of their propositions based on 
"certain and indispulable axioms" (Heisenberg, W. 1958 
p.121). Thus principles could be viewed as axioms. And 
since nature was expressed in mathematical language 
(Galileo) based on "indisputable axioms", it was felt that 
the principles on which investigations into nature were 
conducted, constituted a true reflection of nature or of 
the processes of nature. Julien Offray De La Mettrie in 
his paper "Man as a Machine" says that "the human body is 
a watch" (in Heisenberg, W. 1958 p.135-136), made by 
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nature'S exquisite skill and technique. These views, 
among others, emphasised the mechanistic view of nature. 
But these views lacked the modesty of men such as Galileo, 
who realized that his investigations were made within the 
framework of "man-made hypotheses". 
Among others, men such as Heinrich Hertz (principles of 
Mechanics: 1876; in Heisenberg, W. 1958, p.152) realized 
that science could not produce a "world-view of nature as 
a whole or about the essence of things". The propositions 
of physics were expressive only of limited domains of 
nature. Eddington also expresses this view when he says, 
"We have found that where science has progressed the 
farthest, the mind has but regained from nature that which 
the mind has put into nature" (quoted in Heisenberg, w. 
1958, p.153). Unlike early Nineteenth Century 
philosophers who felt that their expressions of physical 
knowledge were assertive of nature as a whole, scientists 
and philosophers later realized that their propositions 
about physical knowledge were valid only within limited 
frameworks. 
Dalton's atomic theory had provided a view or a vision of 
a unified homogenous universe governed by the unchangeable 
laws of a mechanical view of motion. Science was 
confident that the riddles of the universe, even that of 
life, would soon be solved and explained on a physical 
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basis. It was thought that the physical reduction of 
nature to the immutable laws of physics sould form the 
basis of knowledge of the Universe. Physics was, 
therefore, attempting to understand nature by its 
reduction to its constituent parts. Metaphysics, however, 
was attempting to construct a rational concept of the 
Universe from experience of its constituent parts, so that 
the Universe might be understood in terms of a universal 
concept which could explain these parts. It seemed that 
the atomic theory of the Greek atomists and that of Dalton 
would converge onto a common point, the atom~ so that both 
its physical and its metaphysical aspects could be 
explained. 
However, Gay-Lussac's (1811) equal numbers rule, 
Berzelius' attraction theory and the Dulong and Petit Law 
(1819) among others all asked questions which Dalton's 
atomic theory cou1dnot answer to satisfaction. This 
I 
pointed to the conclusion that there was something wrong 
with the assumptions on which Dalton had constructed his 
atomic theory, and that on this basis the atomic theory 
could not be interpreted on a realistic level: the atoms 
were just not what they had been thought to be. Dalton's 
atomic theory was based on Greek atomism. With this as a 
basis, experiments were being devised to test the 
implications. But the investigations seemed inadequate to 
determine the nature of these elusive particles. 
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Consequently, they still had to be considered as 
metaphysical entities defying the methods that sought to 
materialize them as particles. 
Newton's particulate theory of light could not explain 
numerous optical phenomena. The mathematician, Huygens 
explained light as wave phenomena. As this theory posed 
problems in explanation of simple optical phenomena it was 
used only in explaining difficult optical effects. 
Consequently, so long as Newton's theory could be used to 
explain optical phenomena it is upheld. Additional 
experiments supported the wave theory, even though the 
results of some experiments were contrary to observation 
or experience. Newton's theory, for example, could not 
explain the fact that: 
light + light = dark. 
This phenomenon could be explained by the wave theory. 
Young (1801) had shown in diffraction experiments, that 
light consisted not of a stream of particles as Newton had 
taught but of a series of alternating light and dark waves 
alternating with each other. 
The idea of light propogation as wave motion pointed to 
the logical conclusion that the wave motion required a 
medium, ether, for its propogation. Experiments to 
determine the presence of such a medium were to no avail 
(Reichenbach, H. 1970). The results of these experiments 
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could be accounted for on the assumption that there was no 
ether! Thus science was in a rather peculiar situation: 
logic dictated that the conclusion following from the fact 
of wave motion was the existence of a medium. Experience 
(from experiments) showed that there was no such medium -
reason was thus opposed to experience. 
The contradiction from these experiments showed that ideas 
claiming absolute validity and even supported by logical 
argument, may not withstand deeper investigation. Such 
investigations lead not to the basis for the logical 
conclusions for concepts but to their origin. Common 
ideas "comprising the knowledge of nature such as 
substance, matter, wave or motion, have not sprung out of 
pure speculation, but out of primary experiences of daily 
life. And nothing is more dangerous than to forget their 
origin and to ascribe to them a necessary and 
unconditional existence. Quite on the contrary, it is 
important to comprehend that they have grown out of crude 
observations of nature, that they are hardly more than 
superficial generalizations concerning the world and that 
it has never .been demonstrated that th.se ideas are 
applicable to a finer understanding of nature" 
(Reichenbach, H. 1970, p.41). 
Although these ideas might not provide a "finer" or final 
understanding, they nevertheless do provide a basis for 
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concepts without which no discussions about nature could 
be conducted. And it is from these discussions that the 
diverse aspects about nature are revealed. Were it not 
for these concepts, discussions about nature, which are 
the basis for that knowledge that man needs for the daily 
conduct of his life, would not have been possible. 
It is, of consequence, an understanding of these concepts 
(for example, that of material substance), of their 
origin, and more important, of their purpose and use, that 
is the basis of knowledge. The understanding of one 
concept is related to that of another. Knowledge emerges 
from a realization of this relationship. This is 
adequately illustrated when the propogation of light is 
considered. 
"Material substance" is inapplicable to the propagation of 
light. This has been shown experimentally: light does not 
behave as though it needs a medium for propagation, 
whether in the inter-atomic or astronomical realm. Thus 
"macroscopic" ideas are inapplicable in "microscopic" 
dimensions. Progress made in electrical theory showed 
that optics did require new fundamental principles. 
Faraday's experiments showed that power and energy were 
related, not only to electrical current but also to 
electrical and magnetic fields in the atmosphere or in 
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space. Since they lack the property of impenetrability 
these fields cannot be considered as "substance", as the 
idea of "fields" would give to materiality a new meaning. 
Thus the concept "fields" had to be regarded as separate 
from substance. 
Basing his work on Faraday's experiments Maxwell reduced 
optics to electrical phenomena. Combining theoretically 
these experiments with those of Young, he unified 
electrical and magnetic forces and showed that light 
consisted of waves of electromagnetic radiation varying in 
wavelength. Mathematical formulations of the principles 
of electricity led to the conclusion that electrical 
vibrations spread through space. Light, it was assumed, 
was identical to these vibrations differing only in the 
very high rate of vibration, as compared to electricity. 
Stark's and Zeeman's effects also showed that light was an 
electrical phenomenon. Heinrich Hertz using electrical 
apparatus produced electrical vibrations, which though of 
lower frequency than light, had related properties. These 
radio waves were also propogated independ~nt of any 
material medium. "They are waves in which electricity 
continually alternates between "positive" and "negative". 
Yet they are not dependent on the ups and downs of small 
material particles but move quite independently through 
space (Reichenbach, H. 1970, p.45). 
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These waves became widely used in telegraphy and radio. 
Thus a discovery made purely in search of understanding 
natural phenomena was taken over by technology yielding 
enormous industrial benefit, never realized by the 
discoverer himself! 
The world of classical mechanical physics was itself 
shaken by Max Planck's quantum theory and shattered by 
the splitting of the atom. With the collapse of the 
atomistic world structure and uniformity of cosmic 
processes which hac served as the basis for the 
predictability of natural events disappeared, to be 
replaced by constantly changing events. This takes man 
back to the Greek world, but on a microscopic level, to 
ask again that question that the Greeks had asked over two 
millenia ago: "What is the essence of Matter?" 
The classical mechanical view of relationships based on 
static cause and effect principles could no longer be 
found. Events could, therefore, no longer be predicted 
with certainty. 
3.7.1. Contemporary physics 
In the deterministic view of classical mechanical physics 
the world was in time and space and comparable to machine, 
"which, once set in motion continues to run governed by 
immutable laws" (Heisenberg, W. 1952, p.22). It was 
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irrelevent to classical physics that this view was a 
product of the human mind. this resulted in a divided 
understanding of Nature, based on the understanding of 
"immutable laws". Science, convinced of the objectivity 
of its method and its consequent validity, felt that it 
was applicable to all of experience. Classical physics 
thus formed the centre of the scientific concept of the 
universe. This was considered a rational concept since it 
was based on the axioms of mathematics (which could be 
analysed on a rational basis). such an analysis, however, 
cannot be supported rationally, as it affords 
understanding of only certain particular aspects of 
experience. 
Through atomic events, nature has shown that the concepts 
of classical physics, although complete in themselves, are 
applicable neither to all aspects of nature nor to all 
aspects of experience. In this way atomic physics 
attempts to form a complete self-contained system which 
leaves classical physics untouched - in that classical 
physics despairs of success in the complete explanation of 
natural phenomena. 
Unlike tthe classical investigator of nature, the atomic 
physicist has come to realize that the mathematical 
formulations which purport to express the behaviour of 
atoms, express only man's knowledge or man's 
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interpretation of this behaviour. Perhaps, like the 
Ionian philosopher, men such as Bohr, see man not only as 
an observer, but also as a part of nature. 
contemporary physics, like Greek atomism, also conceives 
matter to be fundamentally particulate: the particles 
however, are sub-atomic and display definite patterns of 
behaviour. Therefore, modern physics also attempts to 
trace "all perceptible qualities of substances to dynamics 
of atoms" (Heisenberg, W. 1952, p.54). But when traced 
back to the fundamental particle, it is found that the 
qualities of substances are not found in the atom or in 
the elementary particle. The Greeks explained the 
qualities of substances by ascribing these to variable 
atomic arrangements in space. 
Modern physics also attempts to explain the different 
qualities of physical events in relation to varied forms 
of genetic theory. .To the Greeks geometrical 
configurations were the bass is of the qualitative variety 
of physical phenomena. Modern physics, according to 
Heisenberg (Heisenberg, W. 1952) presents the diversity of 
phenomena in the variety of mathematical forms. He ses 
the atom as being similar in form to the -1 of mathematics 
which does not exist among ordinary numbers, "yet the most 
important mathematical propositions only achieve their 
simplest form on the introduction of this square root as a 
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new symbol. Its justification thus rests in the 
propositions themselves" (Heisenberg, W. 1952, p .56). 
Contemporary physics thus shows that, in the same way, 
atoms cannot be considered as material objects. "Atom" is 
used as a concept which makes it possible to formulate 
mathematically, the laws which form the basis of physical 
and chemical processes. Heisenberg, thus sees the "atom" 
as a metaphysical "entity" which forms a basis for a 
unified picture of nature and also for the "purposeful 
and directive" forces of mathematica formulations. Thus, 
it is not geometric forms which are permanen~, but the 
laws governing movement. The new venture is thus 
characterised by much more modesty than classical physics 
in realization of its limitations. Consequently, it 
leaves open the question of the ultimate essence of 
"matter" or "energy". 
3.7.2. Atomic Physics 
Dalton's atomic theory held the classical view of the 
atom. Based on the deterministic view of classical 
mechanical physics, processes were considered as being 
continuous and predictable. This view was permanently 
changed, however, with the new atomic physics. 
In 1897 Thompson discovered the electron. Planck, in 
1900, showed that light or electromagnetic radiation from 
these electrons was emitted or absorbed not in continuous 
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stream but in discrete amounts (quanta). The 
"Photoelectric effect" showed that "photons" and "particle 
effect" could be understood if "light were made up of 
quanta having energy specified according to .Plancks 
prescription" (Polkinghorne, J.C. 1981, p.5). 
Diffraction experiments of Young (1801) had shown that 
light consisted not of a stream of particles as Newton had 
taught but of a series of alternating light and dark waves 
interacting with each other. Maxwell had interpreted this 
experiment theoretically. He unified the electric 
magnetic forces and showed that light consisted of waves 
of electromagnetic radiation varying in wavelength. 
consequently, the only certainty that could be known in 
physics was this wave-nature of light. Thus, there was a 
wave-particle duality. Louis de Broglie (1924) found that 
electrans which had been thought of as particles, also 
displayed interference patterns. Thus description of 
nature required a new rational framework. Such a 
framework was provided by Dirac in 1928 when he combined 
the wave and particle theories, without a paradox, in the 
quantum field theory. A combination of quantum mechanics 
and relativity theory thus provided a framework for 
explanation of much of atomic behaviour. Thus, the 
understanding of changes in the current analysis of matter 
required a new microphysical model for the age-old 
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atomistic tradition could not accomodate the emerging 
conceptual revolution. 
The "atom" of Lord Rutherford was split in 1939 by Otoo 
Hahn and Strassman releasing its immense store of energy 
and also numerous subatomic particles which could 
themselves be split or changed. Thus the neutron 
(Chadwick, 1932), the neutrino and numerous other 
subatomic particles wer discovered, some being neutral and 
having zero mass (neutrino). Einstein explained the 
existence of the neutrino by the relativity theory. The .. 
. similar behviour displayed by photons and neutrons led to 
their being considered as two modes of a single object, 
the nucleon or a multiplet (a collection of particles 
having common properties and behaving identically for some 
of the interactions in nature). 
This concept introduces again the idea of an underlying 
substance whose change is dependent on the type of force 
to which it is subjected. The photon which has been 
viewed as the basis for electromagnetic force can also 
exist as a "particle" (it displays "particle effect"). It 
would seem, therefore, that the photon is a concept in 
which' these different effects can be unified and utilized 
meaningfully. Consequently, the idea of force which is 
responsible for both the stability and the disintegration 
(radiation) of the particles of the microworld can be 
169 
viewed as a cause, or as an efficient cause, and as much 
be placed on a metaphysical basis: and with it its 
mediators, the neutrino and the photon. 
3.7.3 Atomism in crisis! 
The entire history of particle physics has been 
characterised by the development and adherence to view 
that substance is made up of atoms and that the basic 
constituents of these atoms are "elementary particles" 
(Weinberg, S. 1974). However, the absence of clear 
criteria for definition of the "elementary particle" leads 
to problems, (Schrader-Frechette, 1977) as it has been 
found that particles which have been defined as 
"elementary" are really unstable (Cline, D.B.,Mann, A.K. 
and Rubbia, C. 1976). This again leads to the question: 
"What is the fundamental particle?" "If 'fundamental 
particle' is a species name for entities sharing common 
characters, then it is unclear why some entities are 
particles and others not, and why allegedly elementary 
particles share no common characteristics, except that all 
particles of each type are said to be qualitatively 
identical." (Schrader-Frechette, 1977, p.41S). The 
language of quantum mechanics, however, is one of 
interaction and processes and not of attributes and 
properties (Jammer, M. 1966). Consequently, it is the 
"theoretical primacy" of relations that is important for 
high energy physics. 
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Observability, is also a problem in high energy physics. 
Information concerning the "particles" is obtained from 
scattering experiments and particle decays. Methods for 
detection of these processes are inadequate with the 
result that the properties of these "short-lived" 
particles are often left to conjectur~. It seems 
therefore, that unobserved virtual elementary particles 
are pbstulated in order to "balance the books" of 
conservation laws, to the point of applicability of the 
uncertainty relations, and constitute matter. These 
"particles" are therefore, used only to explain the 
properties of the proton-neutron system. 
Studies on atomic structure are often done on excitation 
state separation, but "excited states" are not referred to 
as elementary particles. The idea of multiplets also 
questions whether particles are fundamental. Recently, 
Quarks have been postulated as being the fundamental 
particles of matter. But there have not been found to 
occur freely. Nambu (1976) feels that quarks are 
permanently confined within nucleous. As they have 
fractional changes, they cannot be detected by their 
charge, for particles in nature have unit charge or 
integral multiples of the unit charge. But even if quarks 
did exist independently, the nature of the charges holding 
them together is problematic (Heisenberg, kW. 1976). 
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Their permanent confinement (Nambu, Y. 1976) and 
problematic detection seem to point to quarks being no 
more than postulations. That this is so emerges from the 
fact that quarks are an indirect result of the Group 
Theory (SU3) of mathematics. Ne'eman had found that 
experimental work on elementary particles showed that 
groups of these particles bore relations similar to 
mathematical Group Theory. According to Segre "The 
abstract mathematical results of (SU3) may be obtained by 
postulating the existence of subunits, called "Quarks" by 
Gell-man" (Segre, 1976). Although the quark hypothesis is 
the basis for the explanation of a wide range of phenomena 
besides (SU3) "Free quarks have never been seen" (Segre, 
1976). 
That quarks are fundamental particles is also expressed by 
Glashow (1975): "In one group are the u (upward) and d 
(downward) quarks and the electron and electron neutrino. 
These four particles are the only ones needed to construct 
the world; they are sufficient to build all atoms and 
molecules and even to keep the sun and stars shining 
(Glashow, 1975, p.50). Consequently, there is no need for 
other particles! 
Thus quarks, which seem to be the "building blocks" of the 
world have a basis only in the group theory of 
mathematics. The quark is a concept even used to support 
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the Group kTheory. Its being a mathematical concept and 
used in physics as a "fundamental particle" reveals the 
direct relationship between "particles" and mathematical 
concepts: in physics it is regarded as a particle, in 
mathematics, as a concept. And as a concept, it 
constitutes the metaphysical basis of the ultimate 
fundamental particle of physics. 
Marxists, however, do not see the dual nature of the 
electron and problematic and argue that it is the 
"idealistic" functional approach of Western thinkers that 
makes thee mathematical description an abstraction from 
concrete experience. The resultant is not an analysis of 
the nature of the atom. It is a piece-meal mechanical 
analysis and description of atomic events. They (the 
Marxists) see the electron as dynamic and self-propelling 
matter. 
The method of "dialectical materialism" (for the Marxists) 
has been responsible for that evolution that has produced 
man's mind, the 'highest state of matter". It leads also 
to the ultimate identity of nature, man and soci~ty, thus 
resolving all logical contradiction. According to Rauche, 
(unpublished) when this principle of identity is 
fulfilled, man leads an authentic existence, i.e., one in 
agreement with nature. "Dialectical materialism" thus 
satisfies both the epistemiological and ontological needs 
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of the Marxist. 
Consequently, on the basis of their (the Marxists') 
"understanding" of the dual nature of the electron, the 
Marxists draw the conclusion that there is an objective 
dialectical law in nature. But it is also probable that 
their construction of this "objective law" is a product of 
their reactions to the historical conditions in which they 
found themselves during the industrial revolution of the 
Nineteenth Century. Consequently, the objective, self-
propelling matter of the dialectical materialists, is a 
speculative metaphysical concept and rev~als the 
metaphysical nature of their physics. 
In contrast to the supposed objective nature of the 
Marxist dialectical natural laws, modern physics has a 
subjective aspect. This is evident in the use of the man-
made experimental apparatus used in the aquisition of 
scientific knowledge. It is also seen in the use of 
mathematical equations to reflect the relationships of the 
atomic events which thus become an abstraction from 
experience, fusing subject and object. 
Experimental apparatus can only measure what is measurable 
and what it has been designed to measure. This rests on 
the assumption that there is nothing beyond or besides the 
measurable, and it is felt that whatever can be measured 
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constitutes the whole of the "object". But, inherent in 
the apparatus are the limitations of man's ability. 
Therefore, there are aspects of an object that are 
unmeasurable experimentally. The expression of nature in 
mathematical ~erms, constitutes only what his apparatus 
allows man to express mathematically. 
3.8 Discussion 
The discovery of quantum physics and the splitting of the 
atom changed the world view bequeathed us by Newton. Thus 
at the contemporary frontier of science the What? -
question has again come to force in the Uncertainty 
Principle (Heisenberg, kW. 1963). Just as the imperfect 
world of objects had reflected for Plato, the rational 
world of the Forms, so the world of nuclear or sUb-atomic 
physics, is, for Heisenberg, a reflection of the form in 
mathematical symmetry. For Plato the love for knowledge, 
has through physics broken down the cosmos beyond its most 
elementary particle, to find there the form of symmetry in 
mathematical equations. The form of the mathematical 
equation is now seen as the basis for a new cause and 
effect relation that could rise to restore the basic 
homogeniety of the world. The basis of the world once 
more is the form (of mathematics), reminiscent of the Form 
of Plato, establishing yet again the metaphysical in 
physics. The mathematical form, however, lacks the 
ontological significance of the Form of Plato. 
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The mathematical form is the reflection of the world as 
constructed in man's mind. It is found to be deficient in 
explanation of those experiences of the Universe that 
cannot be expressed in mathematical e9uations. From these 
mathematical equations, Heisenberg finds the basis for a 
"new stability", which consequently rises out of the 
limitations of the ~cientific enterprise. Through these 
limitations, the metaphysical in physics provides a basis 
for the moral dimension of scientific theory. It also 
introduces the idea of evolution into physics, which 
continues into biology. But even here the metaphysical 
element cannot be denied its prominence and is needed to 
cross the physics - biology border. Biology, therefore, 
unlike chemistry, is not "physics writ large". 
Physics, therefore, cnanot yet discard its metaphysical 
basis if it is to survive the What? - question. Man 
realizes his limitations through the metaphysical in 
physics, which constitute the basis for new relationships 
between man and his environment. Heisenberg expresses 
this relationship in an address delivered to the studenis 
of Gottingen University on the Thirteenth of July, 1946, 
entitled Science and International understanding: "Take 
from your scientific work as serious and incorruptible 
method of thought and help to spread it, because no 
understanding is possible without it; and revere those 
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things beyond physics that really matter" (Heisenberg, W. 
1952, p.120). A similar view is expressed by Tobias 
(197l) when he talks about the evolution of the mind with 
" ," That which really its "intellect" and compass10n. 
l'S the metaphysical element in physics matters, therefore, 
which brought man out of the atomic particle. Endowed 
real1'zes that th~ basis of his moral with its energy he 
f the phys1'cal world of which he is a conduct comesrom 
part, and to which he is subject. 
Atomic physics thus shows that reductionism cannot produce 
a true picture of reality., for anything whole is more 
than just the sum of its constituent parts. This is amply 
illustrated in biology where attempts are made to reduce 
and to express biologica~ characteristics in terms of 
genes (biological atom- Rauche, G.A. unpublished). Just as 
studies in atomic physics ended in uncertainty relations, 
so it has been with the gene where studies in behaviour, 
anatomy and embryology have failed to demonstrate gene-
structure/behaviour correspondence. 
Under such circumstances the gene, like the atom,becomes 
a model on which certain features of biology and life in 
general, might be understood. Thus biological theory, like 
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any other scientific theory, becomes a model through which 
phenomena might be understood and must not be seen to have 
direct correspondence with reality. The uncertainty 
principle (of Heisenberg)applicable to atomic physics can 
thus "be applied to the " biological atom " 
Thus even though the status of knowledge becomes 
problematic, the social and ethical aspects of science 
become more apparent. And influenced by the humanistic 
attitudes arising from anthropocentricism scientific 
theory was interpreted in different ways under the 
prevailing histotical conditions. 
3.8.1 Social aspects of scientific theory 
The Baconian ideal of science as a gradual accumulation of 
knowledge through a co-operative venture consistutes a 
basis for the moral conduct of scientisits: co-operation 
being fundamental to the development and accumu l ation of 
knowledge. For Bacon, however, this knowledge was for the 
benefit of society. According to Kuhn (Kuhn, T.S. 1962) 
the search for absolute truth is beyond the scope of 
scientific investigation which was guided by a community 
of scientists sharing a common paradigm. Many scientists 
also feel that science should be directed only towards the 
solution of social problems. Science should therefore be 
planned to supply man with whatever "commodities" he 
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needed. Such a view is linked to the problem of defining 
what is good for man, bringing in personal, economic and 
political view-points. 
In such a climate science becomes utilitarian and 
investment in scientific projects is dependent on the 
priority of social and political requirements - often from 
a national point of view. This increases the investment 
of science to the solution of technological problems. 
Science thus becomes "mission-orientated". Consequently, 
the satisfaction of human needs, social, political and 
economic become important in the direction of scientific 
development. The practice of contemporary science is thus 
made possible through financial support from government 
and industrial complexes which support only certain types 
of research. These government and industrial projects are 
to a large extent unthinkingly accepted by the public 
which does not realize that it is assisting in financial 
support for the political, economic or social ideals of 
someone in government. The public, however, believes that 
science is objectively pursuing the truth which is 
important to its (i.e., the public's) existence. Science, 
consequently, has assumed an almost "religious 
significance". Believing science to be an objective and 
impersonal enterprise, its conclusions and directions are 
accepted, almost uncritically, by the public at large. 
The scientific community, therefore, becomes the basis of 
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the value systems, each regarded as being as good as the 
other - leading to intolerance of opposing viewpoints. 
Following the "Baconian ideal of dominion over nature", 
kowledge is identified with power. This directly affects 
ethics, leading to intolerance and aggression. The 
paradigm view of science and the community aspect 
(scientific community) of scientific activity (Kuhn, T.S. 
1970: Lakartos, I. and Musgrave, A. (ed.) 1979) with its 
"research programmes" all show the influence of social and 
political factors in scientific activity. Consequently, 
scientific activity reflects value judgements, projects 
being selected in accordance with these Judgements. 
The ideological use of science (science used to enforce or 
justify certain ideologies) has affected social life to a 
large extent. The unstable state of contemporary 
international affairs is largely due to the developments 
in science and in related technology. Differences in 
religious, social and political ideals based on different 
interpretations of religious scripture and scientific 
theory largely constitute the basis of the qualitative 
changes evident in national and international relations, 
with accompanying increased development in "science-
related military-industrial complex" (Richards, S. 1983). 
On such a basis "right" and "truth" are often supported by 
military, "social, economic and political power sustaining 
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(that) the truth claim", resulting in "the deformation of 
reality and the threats to human beings through 
confinement within fixed categories" (Singh, R. 1986, 
p.l). The consequent accelerated development in nuclear 
arms is justified by the different nations on the grounds 
of a "balance of power" in order to prevent global war. 
Little heed is paid to the fact that the human 
constitution of truth, even on a scientific basis is a 
reflection of the Zeitgeist. The constitution of truth 
is, therefore, limited by the particular "historical 
conditions" and the interpretation of the theory under ' 
such conditions. 
From a material point of view, science and technology have 
raised expectations of a higher standard of living. As a 
result of this relations have become strained between 
different groups in a country and between developed 
(technologically) and underdeveloped countries. This is 
largely due to the "disproportionate allocation and 
consumption of resources". Resources are concentrated in 
the production of "luxury goods and military equ ipment for 
the affluent few~, which protect this affluence with 
military support and social engineering. The affluent 
world has also imposed technological values on the 
underdeveloped countries resulting in requisite expertise 
being concentrated in ever fewer hands. Even though these 
(underdeveloped) countries might have democratic 
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governments, "fundamental democratic principles" - popular 
participation and control - are being undermined. Power 
remains and is militarily protected, in the hands of an 
affluent few. Historically, these conditons can be traced 
to their origins in early colonial policies and to 
political and social engineering based on social 
Darwinism. 
After the Second World War, governmental use of science 
for the war effort has tremendously increased. Although, 
during the pre-war years, science was relatively free from 
governmental influence, the war years convinced many 
scientists that they had to work for government in order 
to develop the military power needed to stem the threats 
of other governments who would destroy their religious, 
social and political ideals. Scientists thus were 
compelled to work for their governments if they wished to 
preserve their ideals. Thus g~vernment spending for 
scientific expertise increased and so either bought or 
increased scientific responsibility and obligation to 
government. 
The development of the hydrogen bomb raised the 
profoundest moral dilemmas for scientists. Dependence of 
science on the state jeopardized the scientific 
imperatives of universalism and internationalism: these 
were incompatible with the ideals of the state. The 
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scientist had become an instrument of the state. The 
individual scientist was thus faced with the dilemma on 
the one hand of loyalty to the "co-operative spirit of 
science" and on the other "to the competiti~e needs of 
nationalism". The scientist, suspicious of opposing 
nationalism, turned to the needs of his own. 
The development of the hydrogen bomb also introduced a new 
dimension in international relations. Due to the 
tremendous risks it entailed for the survival of man, The 
Panel ("U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, chaired by J.R. 
Oppenheimer: War time director of Manhattan Project's main 
laboratory; see Richards, S. 1983, p.169) opposed 
development. The decision showed that it was universal 
rather than narrow nationalistic concerns that were 
important. However, the government overruled the Panels' 
decision causing a division among the ranks of the 
scientists themselves. Those who dissented showed that 
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the "spirit of co-operation fostered by science was a 
matter of personal experience: a sense of internaiional 
community transcended the fear and aggrandizement which 
they saw as the springs of competitive nationa l ism" 
(Richards, S. 1983, p.170). Consequently, this incident 
also showed that universal concerns were not as important 
to scientists as the pursuance of their personal views and 
concerns. 
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Social interests, therefore, do have an influence 
on science: it (science) must "fit in" with other world 
views since it is also part of culture. This is in 
contrast to the view that science is egalitarian as a 
consequence of its objectivity. Structurally, science is 
a meritocracy and the structure of the scientific body is 
characterized by inequality and stratification, like any 
political system. A ielatively small group of scientists 
forms an elite which introduces increasingly difficult 
rules to keep others out, though they themselves might not 
have had to surmount the same rules they mete out to 
others. The scientific world thus becomes polarized. 
Women and non-white groups have thus historica l ly been 
considered to be naturally unable, because of their 
physiology and psychology (biological), to match the 
achievements of the male white group (Sayers, J. 1982). 
Although group and racial discrimination had a large part 
to play in this situation, science contributed to no small 
extent. Tests from which conclusions were drawn, although 
considered objective and scientific, were designed by 
white groups for white situations - defeating the view of 
the universality of science. 
Traditional values and cultural and ideological pressures 
have long served to keep women in certain roles (Sayers, 
J. 1982). Their biology was given as a reason for their 
confinement to certain particular roles which did not make 
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the demands on them to which males were subjected. Women 
occupied protected roles. 
Development of scientific theory under different 
historical conditions, however, has fostered a more open 
attitude towar~s women leading to their acceptance in 
roles which were in the past reserved for males. 
The development of scientific theory and the rapid 
advances in technology have resulted in the value of 
science and technology being viewed in the light of their 
~ 
social, economic and financial aspects. Ethics has, 
therefore, been left to religion, literature, etc., 
leading to a separation of science from religion, etc. 
This has led also to the separation of the scientific from 
other communities, resulting in their mutual 
incomprehension and distrust. The "arts" and religion are 
thus seen as "subjective" views of the world, incapable of 
producing a true picture of reality. 
The roots of this division lie in the separation of 
science from philosophy and of the understanding of 
science as "objective", attitudes which began in the late 
Mediaeval Period. It is, therefore, important to see the 
force of "imaginative experience"; that it plays as 
important a role in science as it does in literature and 
the arts. It is often felt that this can be achieved by 
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exposing young scientists to the world of literature and 
the "arts" to enhance their awareness of a world concerned 
with ethical sensibilities. But inherent in such a view 
is still the idea that science and the arts _do indeed 
occupy different worlds. It is because of such a view 
that many turn to religion in an effort to find peace and 
for moral premises to guide their lives outside the world 
of science. Such views, however, are still one-sided as 
they are based on incorrect premises. 
It is, therefore, important to see that like~ religion and 
the "arts", scientific theory also has its origins in 
experience of the world. And like religion and the "arts" 
it is also developed by humans to answer or to deal with 
questions concerning the world: about its origins and 
structure and about man's place in the world or his 
relationship to the world. In an effort to answer such 
questions, scientific theory cannot but be concerned also 
with ethical premises. 
To the Marxists, scientific theory constitutes not only an 
interpretation of the world but also the basis of a desire 
to change the world or to guide the evolution of man and 
society to, what is thought to be, its logical conclusion. 
Scien~e is, therefore, seen not as a "distinct subsystem" 
of society, but as one aspect of the process of social 
development. Their view that science is concerned with 
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the material world (like other views of this nature) sees 
material, and not social and religious values as important 
in social development. This view arose in the latter part 
of the Nineteenth Century, probably because of increased 
industrialization which necessitated social forms of 
production - creating a class of workers. For Marxists, 
therefore, scientific and technological innovations are 
promoted by historical and economic circumstances. 
Scientific theory is thus dependent for its development on 
social forces under particular historical circumstances. 
Pure and applied science cannot, therefore, be 
meaningfully separated (or theory and practice can have no 
meaningful separation because of their mutual dependence 
and reciprocal influence), as, it is in its application 
that the value of knowledge resides. 
Marxists thus accuse the "profit motive" of capitalism as 
prohibiting the application of science for the good of 
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society. They claim that not capitalism and democracy but 
a socialist science only, can promote the good of society. 
However, even though science is a source of innovation, it 
is also a force for social control. Thus both th~ Soviet 
and Western political schemes see science as utilitarian: 
science is thus used to satisfy the ideological needs of 
state and the technological needs of industry. In such a 
constitution science is used for the domination both of 
nature and humanity - for the furtherance of political, 
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economic and social ideologies. The skills of production 
workers are thus developed in specialized directions, 
determined by the machines they have to operate: they 
almost become part of the machine itself. Education is 
thus directed towards technology so that the individual is 
little more than a skillful worker designed for a 
particular machine: he becomes preoccupied with not much 
more than "working conditions, security and pay". The end 
products of such fragmented labour provide little 
satisfaction for the worker, who looks at progress only in 
material terms. 
Bacon had thought that "man's estate" could be improved by 
science. But "human progress" is now measured in terms of 
"technical progress". Nature's domination by science and 
the control of humanity by the power of science have 
replaced the Marxian vision of a harmony between humanity 
and nature. Social harmony and equilibrium are now 
I 
measured in terms of state stability achieved by 
propaganda and military control of society. Both Soviet 
and Capitalist society operate through management and the 
division of labour, in the scientific tradition, in order 
to increase economic productivity. Scientific rationality 
has thus both "justified and absolved" even destructive 
and oppressive features of the scientific enterprise in 
the intersts of what is termed "a higher standard of 
living" -measured in no more than material terms. 
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However, both Marxists and capitalists still argue that 
even though science might have been misguided in its 
exploitative (both of nature and of humanity) venture, it 
must eventually produce a true and beneficial "science for 
the people". Such views find support in evolutionary 
theory. They advocate the eventual emergence of the 
harmonious society through the present difficulties of 
political and social evolution, achieved through the 
scientific enterprise by "the people" themselves. It is 
evident, however, that political expediency is at the 
basis of such an interpretation of scientific theory. 
Thus if politics can be interpreted in terms of evolution 
and evolution in terms of politics, then evolution can be 
seen to be no less man-made than politics. It provides a 
way of interpreting both nature and human institutions in 
terms of "progress". 
I 
Since "progress" is measured in economic and material 
terms, optimum material comfort in a classless society is 
the goal of political evolution~ Capitalism also uses 
politics in the same light, but uses "democracy" instead 
of a classless society. Both systems, however,produce a 
classed society having both privileged and underprivileged 
classes. 
Scientific investigation of the world or, the scientific 
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method has as yet been unable to provide a unified and 
fundamental understanding of the world. scientific theory 
provides only certain particular perspectives in 
understanding the world, relying as it does .on the "piece-
meal" nature of empirical science - based on "facts", 
"objectivity" and "reason". A single comprehensive answer 
thus cannot be provided to such questions as "The purpose 
of life!", which humans often ask. The "essential unity" 
of the "mind" is thus broken by the scientific approach in 
its separation of knowledge from values. Science is thus 
often seen as an accumulation of factual knowledge about 
the world although it has always been acknowledged that 
"acts of knowing and of being are inseparably linked" 
(Richards, S. 1983, p.188). In its "progress" science 
reduces values to "commercial imperatives" and 
specialization makes people "one dimensional" experts. It 
is therefore necessary to unite knowledge and values - if 
scientific theory has to have any meaning in a socio-
I 
ethical context. 
The absolute and unchanging authority of revealed 
religious doctrines is constantly challenged by the 
evolving scientific world view. Galileo's observational 
data had been seen as a threat to the Bible and 
Aristotelian cosmology. Some two hundred years later the 
Darwinian hypothesis raised controversies concerning 
Creation and the origin of species; man in particular. 
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Since science uncovered natural causes for "wordly 
effects", the need to postulate supernatural causes 
declined together with the authority of religion; and God 
was "brought in" only to "fill the gaps". 
This problem was solved in different ways. Fundamentalist 
theologians built around them an impenetrable wall of 
"scriptural literalism". Others saw in evolutionary 
theory a "divine natural law of progress", evolution being 
viewed as a God-directed force. Any new scientific 
evidence was seen as supportive of this position. 
In an effort to reconcile science and religion to some 
extent, their methods and subject matter were construed as 
belonging to "different worlds". This introduced the idea 
of different levels of truth. "Explanation" was also 
given different meanings which were considered 
"complementary" not "contradictory". Although science 
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explains different organisms through evolutionary theory 
with life emerging ultimately from inanimate matter, it 
says nothing of Existence, the explanation of which is 
left to religion. 
The "Big Bang" theory of the origin of the universe also 
takes for granted the "source and status" of matter and 
the power to explode. Science can say nothing more about 
this: it depends on a metaphysical explanation. 
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It is argued, however, that creation is for science the 
temporal relation between cause and effect. For religion, 
creation concerns the "meaning of existence" (which is 
bound to redemption) and the relations between God and the 
world. Science, therefore, cannot penetrate Revelation. 
Existentialists see God operative in a sphere of 
"selfhood" (subjective involvement) while science operates 
in a "sphere of nature" (objective detachment). 
However, contemporary views see scientific observations as 
being "theory-laden" since scientists are committed to 
particular paradigms (Kuhn, T.S. 1970). Although the 
paradigm, the falsification (Popper, K. 1959) and the 
research programme (Lakartos, I. and Musgrave, A. 197~) 
views of science do not provide an adequate view of 
scientific theory and its . development, although they do 
show the social aspect of the development of scientific 
theory. The gap between "objective science" and 
"subjective religion" is thus closed to a considerable 
extent. The use of models in both science and religion 
(Barbour, I.G. 1970) also show the similarities between 
science and religion as systems explanatory of experience 
of reality. Consequently, science is no longer described 
in terms of infallible fact, but in terms of observations 
and models. Science is thus seen as proceeding not by the 
accumulation of facts, but by the "creative involvement of 
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the imagination, which interprets empirical experience 
according to preconceived ideals in much the same way as 
it does with religious experience" (Richards, S. 1983, 
p.l92). Both the scientific and religious communities are 
also committed to honesty, co-operation and universalism 
and envisage a comprehensive world view, based on a 
totality of experience. 
3.8.2 Ethical aspects of scientific theory 
Although scientific theories are not characterised by 
absolute objectivity, impersonal criteria and 
universality, being products of particular "historical 
conditions" and entering into "critical relationships with 
each other", (Rauche, G.A. 1986) they do provide some 
basis for the moral conduct of their practitioners and 
also for society at large. The formation, development and 
inter-relationships of scientific theories show that "the 
individual must act always for the common good, for he 
himself has benefitted from the communal efforts of his 
predecessors, as Newton himself acknowledged in his famous 
remark 'If I have seen farther, it is by standing on the 
shoulders of giants.'" (in Richards, S. 1983, p.104). 
Nationalism or ethnocentralism might be operative in the 
use of scientific theory for the benefit of particular 
groups. Scientific theory itself, as history would show is 
transnational, and transcultural. No scientific theory 
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stands on its own. Nor has any scientific theory 
developed within a particular group exclusively. Each 
theory is built on and depends on several predecessors 
which have provided both the theoretical basis and been 
directive in the development of any particualr scientific 
theory: each scientific theory has provided the impetus 
for another. 
Besides the ethical dimensions of scientific theory that 
arise out of the interdependence and interrelatedness of 
scientific theories, scientific ethics, also .. arises from 
the community aspect of scientific practice. This 
regulates the behaviour of scientists among themselves by 
the observance of certain ethical norms, for example, the 
acknowledgement of the help and use of the work of other 
scientists, the truthful reporting of results, etc. 
The impact of the Second World War showed that science 
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could not be separated from society for what happened in 
the world of science had a direct bearing on society. 
Thus there could be a clash between the interests of 
science and the interests of society. It is this 
interaction between science and society that is of the 
profoundest importance in contemporary times. Since 
scientific practice is funded to a large extent by 
government, eventually by society, science is obligated to 
society. The social aspect of scientific theory also 
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affirms the relation of science to society, the scientific 
society and also society at large. It is often the case 
that the actions of government and society are not in 
agreement with each other or these actions might be guided 
by ethnocentralism and nationalism. Such actions raise 
dilemmas as far as scientific responsibility is concerned. 
In such cases it is, perhaps, important for the scientist 
to see that although not absolutely so, he, in his work 
attempts to uphold the criteria of objectiveness, 
impersonalness, and universality. The multicultural and 
multinational nature of the origins of scientific theory 
and practice point to its transcultural and 
transnationalness. "Scientific reality" is expressed in a 
universal language, mathematics. Rules of biological 
nomenclature including the use of Latin and Greek, are 
drawn up by choice and agreement at international level 
(International Union of Biological Scientists). Although 
there are different scientific ~ommunities at disciplinary 
and national level, their mutual need for a comprehensive 
picture of reality, in which scientific theories "enter 
into a critical relationship with each other" (Rauche, 
G.A. 1986) also point to the multidisciplinary and 
multinational nature of the scientific enterprise. The 
social and ethical aspects of scientific theory also arise 
from these aspects of science. The scientific community, 
in its attempts to be rational and democratic favours 
individual freedom through mutual trust. This also 
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constitutes the basis of scientific responsibility. 
In such a view, scientific knowledge seems the model on 
which an ethical basis for society might be built. It 
becomes the responsiblity of the scientist from his 
experience of reality at the multidisciplinary, 
multicultural and multinational level, in the development 
of his theory, to communicate to society the 
contingentness of experience and the transdisciplinary, 
transcultural and transnational nature of the scientific 
construction of reality. In this context, the question 
posed by Richards concerning the ethical issues between 
science and society and the loyalty of the scientist on 
the one hand to society and on the other to the scientific 
community, becomes significantly relevant: 
"Should he pursue the "truth" as dictated by science, 
no matter where it may lead, no matter what the 
consequences for society, 0; are there circumstances 
where his responsibilities as citizen must transcend 
his obligations as scientist?" (Richards, S. 1983, 
p.137). 
"Is there something unique about the scientific enterprise 
which makes it a desirable model to be copied by society 
itself? Or would a purely scientific society drain out 
the warmth and beauty that might ideally be at the very 
heart of human experience?" (Richards, S. 1983, p.137). 
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Scientists following the Cartesian ideal see science as 
"truth institutionalized". They thus tend to emulate the 
scientific community which they see as being "rational", 
"disinterested" and "democratic", retaining individual 
freedom on the basis of mutual trust. Science thus seems 
a model on which an ethical basis for society might be 
built. The scientific method thus seems worthy and 
reputable, its results possessing a special and 
unquestionable value. Scientific results thus ' become 
idealized images of truth or reality, becoming a source of 
authority, and ethics, a "function of science". Thus, the 
empiricist traditon feels that "an objective truth lies, 
as it were, 'out there' waiting to be revealed by the 
rules of scientific method" (Richards, S. 1983, p.138). 
The social aspect of scientific theory, however, shows 
that scientific theory rises out of the needs and 
/ 
conditions of particular historical periods, and as such, 
is constituted from human experience. Reality thus 
becomes a construct from experience, a guide to human 
action. According to Monod (Monod, J. 1971) objective 
truth and ethics (theory of human values) far from being 
in conflict, are linked to each other through action 
(knowledge and ethics are linked through action). In such 
a view, objectivity is the basis and condition of true 
knowledge. But this in itself involves an ethical choice 
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making objectivity the "axiomatic condition of 
authenticity for all discourse and action" (Monod, J. 
1971). Monod's view is that "objective knowledge" will 
guide the evolution of the modern world, once it is 
accepted and understood, for it is this knowledge that has 
"created" the modern world. This view constitutes an 
authentication of the present scientific method as the 
only way of obtaining authentic knowledge of the world, so 
that man might live an authentic existence. However, the 
subjective elements in scientific theory and the fact that 
objectivity is a construct by agreement, qu~st i on Monod's 
view of scientific objectivity. They also open to 
question the view that the study of evolution would reveal 
the patterns that constitute the "natural basis" for the 
direction in which man must develop society in order . to 
achieve the best possible world. It is felt that since 
human community is part of the natural world, 
"evolutionary progress" directed by man is "good" for this 
community. Inherent in these views is the idea that 
evolution is perfection-directed, thus making evolution a 
value in itself. However, the views of Herbert Spencer, 
T.H. Huxley, Waddington and Julian Huxley show, among 
others, that evolution can be interpreted in ways that 
would negate the views of Monod. 
Since neither religion nor scientific theory can provide 
an authentic picture of reality as each puts the reality 
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of the other to question, a synthesis or an investigation 
of both in the light of a common background might seem 
legitimate. Religion has changed under changing 
(historical) conditions of life so that different 
denominations within any practice or religion look at that 
religion from different perspectives. Also, although 
converts might follow the general principles of their 
adopted religions, traces of their original beliefs are 
always evident in the practice of custom and ritual. 
Scriptural literalism is thus never the only basis of 
religious practice. The practice of religion and the 
interpretation of scripture are also dependent on the 
changing conditions of life. And in the changing of these 
conditions, scientific theory has played no small a role. 
The development of scientific theory also has been 
dependent on the changing conditions of life. It has also 
been, to a large extent, depend~nt on religion's 
interpretation of reality, and has had to resort to the 
metaphysical in order to formulate a coherent and 
comprehensive picture of reality. Consequently, both 
religion and science have evolved in that in their change 
they have incorporated the new with the old and have 
interpreted the old in the light of the new. 
Consequently, evolutionary theory might provide the 
grounds on which religion could be understood on a secular 
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basis. Evolution, as a comprehensive theory, sees the 
world in a state of constant change, as an interacting 
whole. It is thus in a constant "state of becoming", of 
"being and becoming". Evolution can thus b~ seen as a 
cosmic process with the emergence of forms of different 
levels of organization, to suit different conditions of 
life. Thus evolution can be seen as the change of "matter 
to life, of life to consciousness and from consciousness 
to society, in one vast continuum". With this change 
emerges ever greater awareness which constitutes the basis 
of freedom. And with this freedom, chance and 
indeterminacy have an important role to play, for they 
allow voluntary (choice) and selective reactions (action) 
to the vast potentialities of the world. 
Since experience of the world is the basis both of 
religion and science and since religion has long been 
looked upon as the basis of ethics, it becomes important 
I 
to determine whether, in the absence of some religious 
experience which the individual might interpret as a 
relevation of God, He does indeed exist. This is 
important as the holy the world over maintain that such 
experience is the source of infinite peace, and can even 
change lives. However, neither can the mystic prove God's 
existence nor can the sceptic repute it since such 
experience transcends the level of rationality (the 
"rational mind"). At this level, however, where the 
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mystic lays claim to absolute knowledge, the scientist 
cannot, for he relies on rational argument: the three most 
important arguments being the cosmological (relying on 
cause and effect), the ontological and the teleological 
(the argument from design) . 
On the cosmological argument which relies on the 
principles of cause and effect, it is interesting to note 
that in atomic physics, the notions of cause and effect 
are of "uncertain status". However, to understand the 
meaning of creation it is important to understand the 
meaning of explanation in this context (for explanation 
might not include actuality or reality). Scientific 
evidence seems to have a closer impact on the teleological 
argument: (biological evolution being seen as a striving 
or drive to perfection). Science also accepts the world as 
an order consequent on design. Haeckel, for instance, saw 
a unity or an order in nature (Haeckel, E. 1899; 1910; 
Degrood, D.H. 1965). Many scientists find in this 
observation "support for their pre-existing belief in God" 
(Richards, S. 1983). Other scientists, however, support 
atheism, emphasizing the "wastage and suffering of the 
natural world". However, on such a view is evident the 
attribution of certain qualities to God, which constitute 
the absolutization and perfection of certain human 
attributes. And since "wastage and suffering" do not 
conform to the qualities attributed to God, His non-
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existence is concluded as a consequence. This view, 
however, does not take into account the fact that these 
qualities have been attributed to God by man! 
Even though the Nineteenth Century Darwinian hypothesis 
undermined the teleological argument, it could be said 
that natural selection represents the mechanism used by 
God. However, the uncertainty of genetic interactions -
not following directly the Laws of Mendel - introduces the 
Uncertainty Principle into biology, like that of Werner 
Heisenberg, in atomic physics. 
Since the teleological argument leads to Deism, it 
embraces the cosmological argument w~ere God becomes the 
first cause. Consequently, "faith" is the only other 
explanation that can be used to uphold the belief in God. 
Scientists also work with preconceptions that cannot be 
"proved" on a rational basis. The metaphysical aspects of 
I 
scientific theory show that an "intuitive leap", for 
example, has to be resorted to in "formulating a 
scientific view of the world" (Richards, S. 1983). Logic 
also has an "internal consistency" and premises have to be 
accepted as true or correct, before inferences can be made 
as to their validity. Science also has to have faith in 
the ability of human reason. These "fundamental acts of 
faith" are necessary for, daily living, and the 
formulation of scientific hypotheses. It is these "acts 
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of faith" that seem to give purpose and meaning to life 
and are experienced despite and not because of rational 
arguments concerning God's existence. Faith is thus 
operative at a level beyond reason. Like revelation it 
transcends the rational faculties of the mind - and 
dispells "psychological insecurities". 
Thus although science is operative on the rational level 
and no amount of scientific evidence has power to persuade 
beyond this level, the formulation of scientific theory 
concerning reality cannot proceed without an "act of 
~ 
faith": faith in the rational faculty of the mind; faith 
in the data of experience; faith that the mind can 
penetrate to a reality beyond its rational capacity and 
faith in the rational faculty of others for it is through 
such faith that one can compare and modify one's 
construction of reality in relation to that of others, so 
that it attains greater authenticity. It is the 
realization of one's position in relation to that of 
others that constitutes the real ground of ethics and 
demonstrates the social nature of scientific theory. It is 
this realization that rules out the relativity of 
different views for it allows the evaluation and synthesis 
of one's view in relation to those of others. This leads 
to an understanding and tolerance of the views of others, 
in science, in religion, in every walk of life. Thus, the 
"Other" (Singh, R. 1986) is indispensable in the 
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constitution of one's reality or "truth". From this 
obligation to the "Other" emerges the idea of one"s 
responsibility to the "Other": for the authentic 
construction of reality, truth in the construction of 
one's own reality (theory) is imperative. 
In such a view of . scientific theory a narrow two-
dimensional logic (with "right" or "wrong") is 
insufficient for the construction of theories towards 
reality. A multidimensional logic is necessary. The 
history of science has also shown that theor~es (of 
reality) are neither "right" nor "wrong": they are the 
products of particular historical conditions, which depend 
on the state of scientific knowledge of any particular 
period. And these theories constitute the necessary basis 
for the origin and development of other theories. 
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PART 11 
THE EMERGENCE OF BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 




4.1 Pre-Darwinian evolutionary theory 
Alongside theories concerning the physical universe 
theories developed involving its biological aspects also. 
A~d like the former, the latter theories take root in 
Grecian soil. They are dependent to a large extent on the 
epistemological views of the period, concerning the 
Cosmos. For the basic substance of the Universe would 
also constitute the basis of the biological world. 
Anaximander had proposed the origin of life from water 
vapour. His evolutionary approach to biology is evident 
in his view of man's "fish-like" origins and of the 
inorganic origins of life. This showed a continuity 
between the organic and the inorganic world and 
consequently the relatedness of all life-forms. The 
Atomists also provided a physical basis for life (fire 
atoms). Aristotle provided a metaphysical basis for the 
theory of evolution with the view that all entities in the 
cosmos strive for perfection. Lucretius endorsed the 
views of the atomists and also showed that it was through 
physical struggle with the environment that man was able 
to learn from and about the environment and so emerge from 
primitive savagery. 
During the Mediaeval Period evolutionary ideas are evident 
in the views of Augustine. Faith constituted the 
foundation of the desire to reach God or perfection 
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(striving and teleology). Since this desire was dependent 
on free Will, it represented the individual's striving to 
perfection; to reach goals beyond the compass of 
contemporary experience. Abelard and John of Salisbury 
endorsed Augustine's views, asserting the importance of 
individual experience for the aquisition of knowledge and 
the development of the individual towards knowledge of God 
or to perfection. St Albert's interest in both the 
physical and biological sciences shows his view of the 
interdependence of the physical and biological worlds: 
encompassing the idea of evolution in the relationship 
between habitat and adaptation. 
However, since the Bible (in Genesis) accounted for all 
life-forms, the seeds of evolutionary theory sown in Greek 
soil were not allowed to grow freely under the weight and 
authority of Scripture. It is ironic however, that men of 
the church themselves preserved evolutionary thinking 
I 
(Augustine, Abelard, John of Salisbury~ St Albert, etc.) -
so long as it led to God. They also recognised the value 
of experience as the basis of knowledge. For experience 
showed the relationship between change and adaptation and 
the importance of environment as the basis for adaptation 
-showing the need for interrelationships. 
Although the biological speculations of these times had 
not been systematised into theories, the hierarchical 
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taxonomic system of Aristotle had already embodied the 
idea of the relationship of the different groups of 
animals through their graded com~lexity. The development 
of biological theory is closely related to the development 
of philosophy and its emancipation from theology, during 
the late Mediaeval Period, with subsequent emergence of 
scientific theory. Although scientific theory served to 
explain the physical aspects of Nature, the explanation of 
the living world was left to theology: to the explanations 
of Scripture. 
The development and the final emergence of scientific 
method (from philosophy), resulted in many challenges to 
the authority of Scripture. Avicenna had already begun 
(during the Mediaeval period) to explain the formation of 
the earth's crust and other geomorphological phenomena in 
mechanical terms (refer Afnan, S.M. 1958. pp. 220-222). 
The geological work of Buffon (1751) also showed the 
evolutionary nature of change in the physical environment 
and the agents responsible for these changes. Like 
Buffon, Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802) saw in the gradations 
in anatomy between different species a challenge to the 
authority of Scripture concerning the separate creation of 
species. He viewed differences in the light of selective 
breeding and adaptive radiation. From this he concluded 
the common origin of all life forms and presaged the 
accidental (not teleological) nature of change in animals 
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and their natural habitat. To Lamarck is attributed the 
view that change in both the organic and inorganic world 
is a result of Law and not miraculous intervention or 
accident. He laid the foundations for a theory of descent 
-an independent scientific theory -which constituted the 
philosophical foundation of Biology. Dependent on Law he 
saw life as a physical phenomenon in which mechanical, 
physical and chemical causes, inherent in the nature of 
matter itself, were active: forces which determine an 
organism's growth by its needs, determine the growth of 
organs in proportion to their use and transmit the new 
developments to their offspring. And since he had a 
physical view of evolution, the transmission of these 
developments was probably by particles. Lamarck's views, 
therefore, contradicted those of the Bible: whereas the 
Bible accounted for the legless condition of the snake, 
for example, on moral grounds, Lamarck showed that its 
adaptation to its habitat caused it to lose its legs. 
Others who lent support to the theory of evolution were 
Meckel (1811) and von Baer, who showed that the "lower" 
forms, as transitory stages, were present in the 
embryology of the "higher" forms of animals. 
Von Mohl also showed that the basic material,protoplasm, 
of both plants and animals, was the same. All these views 
were in direct conflict with the idea of Creation. Robert 
Chambers, in Vestiges of Creation (Chambers, R., 1844. In 
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Clodd, E. 1897) tried to preserve the idea of Creation, 
and attributed the movements of the solar system to 
uniform laws which were the expressions of divine power. 
The development of animals and their different forms was 
attributed to an "inherent impulse imparted by the 
Almighty both to advance them from their several grades 
and to modify their structure as circumstances required," 
(In Clodd, E. 1897 p.llO). This view of Chambers' was 
interpreted by the Church to mean that the direct 
intervention of the Creator was replaced by the "action of 
secondary causes," (or Natural Laws). Chambers had tried 
~ 
to find a "compromise" between evolution and Creation, but 
this was not acceptable to the Church, as it undermined 
the direct intervention of the Creator. 
Not only the Church, however, opposed evolution. Amongst 
its antagonists were scientists of the stature of Lyell 
and Cuvier. Creation was sufficient (it was felt!) 
explanation for much of the observed phenomena till the 
beginning of the Eighteenth Century; so long as the world 
was considered as static and unchanging and created in 
about 4004 B.C. The hierachic organization of plants and 
animals was considered the "ladder of perfection" (or 
God's plan). Nature and her diverse phenomena were 
therefore, accommodated within a "literal interpretation 
of the Bible". Lyell's work, in geology, however, showed 
that physical forces were responsible for the sculpturing 
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of the surface of the earth. Different geological strata 
also revealed distinct fossil fauna. This was explained 
in terms of a number of special creations. And where 
general laws were required to account for phenomena, it 
was postulated that such laws had been instituted by the 
Creator (Divine intervention). In the maintenance of this 
static world view dependent on Creation, philosophy also 
played a role. The first half of the Nineteenth Century 
was dominated by typological thinking or "essentialism" 
(Popper, K.R. 1945). Based on Platonism (eidos) and 
entrenched in Western thinking through Thomi~m it slowed 
down the acceptance of evolution. Reality and permanence 
were attributed only to ideas which were also discrete 
(discontinuous) from each other. Creationism, supported 
by essentialism led to the development of Lyell's static 
species concept. And it was this concept that was at the 
heart of the controversy: according to creationism it was 
fixed and commitable while, evolution meant that one 
species could give rise to another, thus introducing the 
idea of continuity into evolutionist thinking. Studies of 
the earth's surface convinced him that "vicissitudes" had 
shaped the earth's crust, which also ensured that no 
species could survive continually. Owing to 
"microcatastrophisms" (at different places on the earth's 
surface at different times), old species had to be 
completely and continuously replaced by new creations. 
Lyell considered species as "fixed morphological entities" 
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created at specific times to suit the changing conditions 
on the earth's surface. 
Consequently, Lyell had a "steady-state" concept of the 
world - "Uniformitarianism" - the "perpetual intervention 
hypothesis" which meant in effect that the same forces and 
causes that had shaped the earth's surface in the past 
were still effective. Lyell, however, applied this 
concept only to the inanimate world. Others, applied the 
concept to the animal world as well - so that the forces 
that changed the earth's surface were effective agents in 
the animal world also. 
The general feeling among many of the naturalists of this 
time was that their task was to prove the existence of 
God. They felt that although many plants and animals had 
been present on earth before man, they had been endowed 
with the qualities they possessed because God had for seen 
that these qualities would be necessary in the service of 
man. This led to the idea of design and predestination: 
all of creation was in the service of man. In this way 
the relationships of animals, plants and man was 
explained. This natural theology pervaded much of the 
scientific work of this period (Mayr, E. 1972). 
4.2 Socio-ethical aspects of evolutionary theory 
Despite the mass of evidence that seemed to weigh against 
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creationism (Lyell's geological theories, and those of 
Lamarck and Erasmus Darwin) it remained a dominant 
doctrine till about 1830 at the height of the Industrial 
Revolution. Thomism (with its idea of class distinction 
in the state) coupled with creationism (with its ideas of 
the acceptance of God's creations and of their 
immutability) and the species concept (of Lyell) could 
have contributed to urging the working class or the 
labourer to accept his position in society for it had been 
ordained by God. Even the changes that .occurred were 
brought about by God. It was, therefore, th~ moral duty 
of man to accept his position in society. Thus, at the 
height of the Industrial Revolution while the Middle Class 
was getting richer, "the poor working man was exploited 
unmercifully and the goodness and wisdom of the Creator 
was emphasized constantly to smooth guilty consciences. 
It became a moral obligation of the scientist to find 
additional proofs for the wisdom and constant attention of 
the Creator (Mayr, E. 1972. p. 983). Most of the 
scientists themselves were from the Middle Class. Many 
were naturalists who felt that their "task is ••• complete 
as soon as they (we) have proved His existence." (Agassiz, 
L. 1857, Essay on Classification. In Mayr, E. 1972). 
The relationship between animals and plants was also 
explained together with the harmony of nature as the basis 
for the justification of belief in God's design and 
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predestination. Lyell saw animal and plant extinction in 
the light of the "static species concept": that these 
species had been created for certain specific conditions 
and places. Extinction was seen as the animals and plants 
having completed their "allotted term" on Earth. New 
species were thus seen as new creations (by God) to suit 
the changing conditions. This was all part of God's plan. 
The entire world of nature was a reflection of the harmony 
of God's plan or design. Harmony could only be maintained 
if this design were accepted on faith. The Bible provided 
the basis for this acceptance: 
26: "And God said, let us make man in our image, after 
our likeness: and let them have dominion over the 
fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and 
over the cattle and over all the earth, and over 




The Bible itself was the justif(cation of Lyell's views. 
The idea of design with predestination provided a 
justification for the status quo exorting man to accept 
His "allotted term" and place on earth. On such an 
interpretation, man, backed by "scientific evidence" could 
find justification and foundation for his moral condition. 
Creation showed that everything on earth had a place and 
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that the harmony of God's design could only be maintained 
if it were accepted - on faith. The Bible also stated 
that God had given man "dominion" "over all the earth". 
This was interpreted to mean that man was answerable only 
to God for his actions, for from Him had he received his 
estate. And since God had created everything for man, 
this was interpreted as justification for whatever 
attitude man adopted towards his fellow-creatures; or, for 
his exploitation of Nature. 
Scientific theory interpreted in the light of Creation, 
also provided a basis for the maintenance of the social 
structure of the time. It justified the hierarchy of 
social organization and the acceptance by the different 
classes of their estate and place in society - for so had 
it been ordained by God! Both science and religion, 
therefore, provided justification for the social order, 
and for the beginnings of class exploitation. They also 
I 
provided a basis for the exploitation of Nature, to the 
service of man. such views were further intensified by 
the Darwinian hypothesis, as it seemed to place these 
views on a firmer scientific basis. 
4.3 The Darwinian Hypothesis 
Evolution had been a theme for both philosophical and 
scientific study long before Charles Darwin. A phenomenal 
amount of facts had been amassed on the subject, but none 
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before him brought these facts within the compass of a 
single theory. This was largely because they were looking 
at the individual not the population as the evolving 
sUbject. 
Buffon, Lamarck, and his own ancestor, Erasmus Darwin, had 
contributed much to the development of the field. About 
the most important contribution, however, came from 
geology in the form of the works of Lyell. His works 
showed the unimaginable antiquity of the earth and the 
role of natural forces in the sculpturing of her surface. 
It is ironic, however, that although Lyell could 
appreciate the action of these forces on the earth's 
surface, he did not consider them as agents of change as 
far as life -forms were concerned. Thus there was a vast 
amount of facts concerning the earth and the creatures on 
it. The fact of the antiquity of the earth was the fact 
that Darwin required on which to build his thesis: it was 
tenable on this fact alone! Coupled with this was his 
experience of the varied types of animals, (inc l uding man) 
and their behaviour, and plants in different parts of the 
world, during his voyage on the Beagle. A.R. Wallace had 
also had a similar experience in the East Indian 
Archipelago (Wallace, A.R. 1897). This helped reinforce 
Darwin's views and both his and Wallace's papers were read 
at a meeting of the Linnean Society (on the 1/7/1858) 
under the title: 
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On the tendency of species to form varieties and on 
the perpetuation of varieties and species by natural 
selection. 
The following year, marshalling the facts from the diverse 
branches of science, especially geology, Darwin unified 
them into a single synthesis to, firstly, establish the 
fact of evolution and, secondly, to elucidate the 
mechanism of its operation. The result was 
The origin of species by means of natural 
Selection (1859) 
Darwin had drawn this conclusion from his observations 
that organisms produce a large number of offspring. This 
resulted in a "struggle for existence" with consequent 
"survival of the fittest." Wallace, who had also done 
much work in this field shared Darwin's views in every 
respect concerning the descent of man but could not agree 
on one aspect, " ••• that natural selection explains the 
origin of man's spiritual and intellectual nature r " since 
it has its origin in the "unseen universe of spirit" 
(Wallace,A.D. 1897. In Clodd, E. 1897 p.l33). 
Since many other prominent men held views similar to this 
it became necessary for the Darwinian theory to show that 
psych ism is savage animism "writ large," and that it can 
be accounted for by the "theory of continuity:" that basic 
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human characteristics could be traced through non-human 
ancestors (apes) to the "lower" forms of life. This meant 
in effect the disposal of the doctrine of the immutability 
of species, on which "creationism" depended. Both 
instincts and corporeal structure show a gradual 
development from the more primitive to the advanced types 
and so "tend to corroborate the theory of natural 
selection." (Darwin, C. 1859 p.237). Darwin's theory 
thus favoured the theory of "blending inheritance" and 
"phyletic gradualism." 
Darwin's "Origin" was received open-mindedly by 
Naturalists, but clerics condemned it as a "brutal 
philosophy," with no God. Some clerics, however, such as 
Archdeacon Wilson, were sympathetic to Darwin's views as 
they did not see Christian doctrine like orthodox 
Christians; but as a creation out of Christ's teachings, 
" ••• a philosophy of life to suit man's needs." (Clodd, E. 
1897). Consequently, although the content remained 
unchanged, the interpretation of the Bible changed 
continuously with man's changing intellectual environment. 
Lyell (influenced by Creationism) could not accept the 
inclusion of man, in evolution, "body, soul and spirit, 
"as the outcome of natural selection. 
Darwin's views had a profound effect on the Church, which 
has endured into modern times. It shook the very 
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foundations of religion - the dogma of Creation and with 
it the ethical precepts embodied in Christian doctrine. 
His views were interpreted to mean that there was no God. 
Such a negation of the whole religious system was not 
acceptable, for it implied that the belief in man's 
origins and in the ethical precepts in the Bible had no 
foundation. Those who accepted Darwin's thesis turned 
from the Bible, for they felt that the views expressed in 
it were not in accord with scientific theory. The 
appearance of the "Descent of Man" (Darwin, C. 1871) 
further strengthened Darwin's theory for geology brought 
to light fossils that seemed like transitory stages in 
development towards the human. 
Although Darwin himself did not directly apply his thesis 
to society, it had a tremendous impact on society in 
various spheres. It had a direct impact on the question of 
destiny and human relationships, which had an impact on 
ethics and society. In the light of Darwinian theory it 
seemed that the supernatural had no place in (the theory 
of) evolution. The belief in a single everlasting truth 
was also undermined, destroying the grounds for man's 
belief in the 'traditional dogmas of man's fall and 
redemption; of human sin and divine forgiveness." Darwin 
himself held the view that the increasing evidence bearing 
on evolution shows that " ••• the more we know of the fixed 
laws of nature, the more incredible do miracles become." 
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(Darwin, C. 1871: in Autobiography of Charles Darwin by F. 
Darwin, 1942 p.40). 
Darwinism, thus, touched human interests in all its 
manifold spheres. Although the Copernican, Galileian, and 
Newtonian theories had revolutionized thinking of the 
universe, and contributed much to the dissolution of the 
theocentric world view, they were concerned more with the 
inanimate world and the forces of nature. Man was still a 
"special creation." His relation to the rest of the animal 
world was no deeper than the fact that he too had been 
fashioned by the same God. Darwinism, however, obviated 
the need for the direct intervention of God. It placed 
man in the same mechanistic stream as the rest of the 
universe so that he was considered also a product of 
natural law (Natural selection) and subject to the general 
laws of the universe, of which he himself was the product. 
In the background of this mechanistic view, natural , 
• 
selection fitted in as another "law of nature". 
Everything concerning man was derived from the lower 
groups of animals. Even consciousness was derived from 
the beginnings of the nervous system in the lowest forms, 
to its highest form in the "self-consciousness of man." 
Man is, of consequence, continuous with the rest of the 
animal world, even his consciousness. In the "Synthetic 
Philosophy", Spencer, "dealing with all cosmic processes 
as purely mechanical problems, interprets the phenomena of 
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life (excluding the quesiton of its origin), mind, and 
society, in terms of matter and motion." (In Clodd, E. 
1897 p.172). Material and spiritual controversies were 
therefore considered to be a "mere war of wards," as 
material or mechanical terms were sufficient to explain 
everything. Analogies were also drawn between individual 
and social organisms and between man (as an individual) 
and society in order to explain the relationship between 
the individual and society. It was felt that since man 
was derived from the lower" forms of animals, his 
behaviour in all its forms was explainable in terms of 
"animal" behaviour; from which it was thought to be 
derived. 
T.H. Huxley's lecture on The relations of man to the lower 
animals (1860. In Huxley, T.H. 1911) attempts to push the 
Origin of Species to its "logical" conclusions: that 
everything human, even the highest faculties of man, could 
I 
be traced through the ape to the lower animals. His 
reliance on what he called "philosophical faith" is 
evident in his conviction of the fundamental unity of non-
living and living, through the evolution of protoplasm 
from non-living matter. He thus gave a physical basis to 
life. 
Huxley's conclusions, viewed as "gross materialism" by 
theologians led to their view that scientific conclusions 
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were hopelessly at variance with Biblical teachings. 
Reverend, J.A. Zahn, however, felt that the only logical 
conclusion of the animal origin of man would be to modify 
the traditional view of the origin of Adam: .to look at 
Adam from the biological and not only the Biblical point 
of view. For, just as the Council of Churches was inter-
preting Revelation, so was science interpreting the facts 
of experience. This led to his conviction that, in the 
ultimate analysis, the phenomena of Nature and knowledge 
were only "facts of consciousness". Reality thus becomes 
a "construct of consciousness" dependent on ,xperience. 
Consequently, the views of Huxley, based on the "evidence" 
of Darwinism resulted in marked revision in theological 
thinking. Numerous passages in the Bible were now looked 
at from a symbolic point of view: "dust of the earth" 
could mean that man was made from pre-existing material. 
The term "breathing" suggested that the soul was God's , 
direct creation. Thus, even if the body of man was 
"animal", his soul was God-created and divine and eternal. 
Some theologians believed that man, though created mortal, 
was endowed with a free-will to prevent his being an auto-
mation. Man was, therefore, himself responsible for his 
subjugation to death, like the lower animals - as the 
result of his fall at the temptation. Sin was construed as 
being transmitted by the "natural effect of heredity". It 
was thus man's responsibility to restore, {through belief 
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of Christ) the eternal life he had forfeited. In this 
view is evident the relationship of free-will and moral 
responsibility. Since Darwinism showed 'that man differed 
from the lower animals only in degree, not in kind, free-
will and responsibility would be absent in the Darwinian 
man, according to Wallace. In "Darwinism" (1897) he 
discusses the origin of the "mathematical faculty" 
(Wallace, A.R. 1897 p.464-467) and argues from the 
"Origin of the musical and artistic faculties" (Wallace, 
A.R., 1987 p.467-472) that these could not have developed 
under the Law of Natural Selection. Thus the intellectual 
and moral faculties are unique to man and for their origin 
and explanation, one must seek for an " ••• adequate cause . 
in the universe of spirit." (Wallace, A.R., 1897 p.478). 
Wallace also held the view that natural selection ceases 
to be operative in man when social and sympathetic 
feelings and moral and intellectual faculties become 
developed. At this stage, his mental faculties and moral 
nature combine to select and accumulate through reaction 
with adverse circumstances those features which would be 
suited to the increase and spread " ••• of the better and 
higher specimens of our raCe ••• the lower and more 
brutal would give way and successively die out, and that 
rapid advancement of mental faculty would occur which has 
raised the lowest races of man so far above the brutes 
although differing so little from some of them in 
structure, and in conjugation with scarsely heritable 
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modifications of form has developed the wonderful 
intellect of the European races." (Wallace, A.R. 1871 
p.316-317). He was also of the view that the well-
developed brains of "savages" are disproportionate to 
their needs. 
Thomas Huxley did not agree with such views and felt that 
the knowledge a "savage" needs to survive and his language 
are even more complex than a European could understand or 
master. Their way of life is adapted to the dictates of 
their environment. They, therefore, represe~t, not a 
"fall" from the "primeval purity of Eden" but a condition 
out of which other races have emerged. Races the world 
over have similar stages in their developmental history. 
The differences encountered are due only to their mode of 
adaptation to their specific environments. Adaptations or 
advancements in physical or material aspects have their 
parallels in intellectual and spiritual advance. 
I 
Anthropological studies show advancements from animism, 
through mythology to the higher conception of deity: a 
progress marked by "bewildering guesses to assuring 
certainties". They also showed that the doctrine of 
Redemption, one of the central doctrines of Christianity, 
had its origins in ancient religions long before the birth 
of Christ. Its origin in non-Christian religions, led to 
its being questioned. 
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Consequently, the comparative method, developed to a 
higher degree in biology (Comparative anatomy, comparative 
embryology, etc.) was extended to the product of man's 
intellectual and spiritual nature. Although the method as 
applied by biology and anthropology "starts with the 
assumption of differences in things, ••• it equally starts 
with the assumption of resemblances, and in every case it 
has brought out the fact teat the differences are 
superficial and the resemblances are fundamental." (Clodd, 
E. 1897 p.23l). Darwin's investigations, together with 
the discoveries of geology and anthropology and in other 
branches of science, led to a slow but steady 
relinquishing of the Bible as the basis for man's ethical 
conduct. Those initiated in the knowledge uncovered by 
scientific discovery often saw in scientific theory a 
literal interpretation of truth as they had been 
accustomed to accepting the precepts of the Bible. 
Science seemed to present concr~te evidence to support its 
theories - which were accepted as truth. 
Interest in the Bible as a source of knowledge began to 
wane. Huxley, however, advocated the resumption of 
Biblical studies for he saw in it invaluable literature on 
the passed "History of civilized man". Huxley saw in the 
Bible the evidence of man's "gradual ethical and spiritual 
development." Darwinism thus greatly influenced Huxley 
and Spencer. There was a transfer of the foundation of 
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Ethics from a "theological to a social" basis. But while 
theological ethics urges man to contemplate the 
supernatural, social ethics looks to earth and concerns, 
not what is due by man to God (worship, rituals, 
thanksgivings, etc.) but what is due by man to his fellow-
man, and viewed in evolutionary perspective, to his fellow 
creatures. Ethical foundations thus shift from belief in 
the supernatural to "social instincts" (which were 
believed to have come from the animal world or non-human 
world - genetically inherited). In this sense sin is not 
a falling away from God, but an anti-social act. 
Darwinism, to a large extent, in the hands of Thomas 
Huxley, constituted not a readjustment but a revolution in 
ethics. Theology lost some of its appeal to human 
obligation to God with the result that secular interests 
became the incentive to social action. The physical, 
r 
mental, and moral aspects of deeds should thus form the 
foundation for injunction to action: thus resting on a 
stable basis, on change itself, and not on a changing 
theology. The dogmatic aspects of Christian theology are 
therefore being "shelved" and attention is being given to 
the social aspects of Christ's teachings. Some 
theological views are thus slowly falling in line with 
evolutionist thought. 
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In Huxley's view evolution is both cosmical and ethical. 
Cosmic evolution has produced the universe with its 
contents, living and non-living. Nature, however, is 
selfish and in the "struggle" only the "fittest" survive. 
But man sets limits to this struggle in that, in social 
progress, selfishness is checked by the recognition of 
common rights so that men might live together in harmony. 
The instincts of emotion and affection shared with the 
lower social animals constitute the basis of the "Ethical 
evolution" which at a higher level leads to the 
development of family, society, tribal and n~tional life. 
These ties are of the utmost importance for the stability 
of national life since their weakening leads to a 
"struggle for existence". In this way, ethics becomes an 
integral part of cosmic evolution (Huxley, T.H. 1911) 
The views of Schurman (Schurman, J.G. 1888) are very 
similar to those of Thomas Huxley. He sees in the 
Darwinian doctrine that the lif. forms on earth are the 
result of "gradual changes in pre-existing and similar 
forms", (Schurmann, J.G. 1888 p.42) the Greek view that 
everything is in a state of Becoming~ so ~sserting the 
"essential unity of existence." Darwinism is thus similar 
to Greek evolutionism in that it accepts the Greek belief 
that ~an is of immeasurable antiquity~ that there is in 
the life of nature a progressive movement, with the 
"survival of the fittest" and that since all things are at 
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bottom the same, new species of animals could arise from 
free-preexisting groups. And since change is the essence 
of cosmic processes they are all directed to stability and 
harmony in nature. Viewed in this light Dar~inism has 
metaphysical implications: according to Schumann, "Every 
system of ethics is affiliated to a metaphysics expressed 
or understood; and every system of metaphysics carried 
with it a definite ethics." (Schurmann, J.G. 1888 p.114). 
According to Darwinism, habits are ensured through the 
repetition of serviceable actions which are gcted upon by 
natural selection. The "production" of these actions are 
assumed to be accidental and are due to heritable causes 
innate in the organism. But the assumption that the 
causes of variation are unknown and accidental is 
problematic since repetition and perpetuation of chance 
variations cannot occur in subsequent generations. Also, 
natural selection does not "form" or "produce" structures· 
I ' 
it - can only select what is already present. Natural 
selection thus seems to presuppose "design" since 
development seems to occur along certain "pre-determined 
lines of modifications," and only nweeds out" the inferior 
competing forms. Natural selection therefore seems to be 
teleological. According to Schurmann (Schurmann, J.G. 
1888 p.113-ll4). Darwinism is independent of a 
mechanistic philosophy which in fact is a precondition for 
the ethical examination of Darwinism for it obviates the 
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generation of an utilitarian ethics. 
However, Darwinian natural selection assumes a utility on 
which to act and biological utilitarianism may be egoistic 
or communistic. The human, therefore, has developed with 
useful modifications for individual or social benefit 
advantageous over others. The sympathetic feelings in 
man, fidelity, trustworthiness, truthfulness, obedience, 
etc. are features useful for social survival. These 
features are thus self-preserving and self-perpetuating 
and are evident in the transition from the simian to man. 
By the accumulation of these useful modifications in the 
"struggle for survival" biology assumes an ethical nature: 
utility, therefore, governs him in conduct and has led to 
the generation of species in which it is manifest (leading 
to a utilitarian ethics). According to Schurmann "In the 
evolutiono-utilitarian theory of morals, the process which 
nature has blindly followed in the development of life 
I 
comes ~o a consciousness of itself, and is recognized as 
the norm of human conduct." (Schurmann, J~G. 1888 p.123). 
Moral rules thus becbme the adaptations to the social 
life, which after many trials has proved to be of service 
to groups of humans in their struggle for survival. Thus 
moral life as produced through natural selection is the 
ability to live harmoniously in that society that was 
necessary for the "origin of a species of moral beings." 
Like the teachings of Christ and the Spencerian view 
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morality is the sum of those acts that are concerned with 
the well-being of society. Although it might seem that 
evolution is a mechanical process and "mechanical 
evolution" cannot talk of the end or the ground of 
morality, it is yet assumed that morality had a mechanical 
origin; just as intelligence has been generated in 
unintelligent beings in the course of reaction between 
organism and environment. In this way also, through their 
experience, an "accumulation of modifications" in amoral 
and unintelligent animals produced a behaviour or system 
of Conduct among individuals so that they came together in 
a society and were thus able to establish a "victorious 
existence." The emergence of intelligence is seen as the 
consciousness of the relationships already established 
between the organism and the environment; the recognition 
of that utility that has promoted the emergence and 
evolution of man. The evolution of man (selfconscious and 
moral man) is thus referable to "physical causation." 
I 
Since the organism's actions or its behaviour is useful in 
the "struggle for existence" it cannot be random, as it is 
indicative of purpose. The moral nature of man thus 
becomes merged with (or inherent in) the "mechanism of 
Nature." Purpose, however, shows intelligence and can be 
referied to the Greek concept of the Cosmos. It would 
seem that morality has a "mechanical origin" yet 
conscience drives man so that he considers it his "duty" 
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to obey the moral laws. Spencer, however, feels that 
moral obligation is entrenched in fear, e.g. of sodial 
ostracism or hell. Conscience and duty thus show that 
society exists on a moral basis. 
Evolutionists, however, attempted to explain the idea of 
duty or obligation to the moral consciousness in terms of 
"race-accumulated experiences of utility." (Schurmann, 
J.G. 1888, p.148). But even though circumstances are 
changed, no experience or experiental theory has been able 
to explain the origin of the "ought". Natural selection 
is only selective but is not aware of the nature or 
essence of what it selects. It uses morality, but takes 
no account of its content and meaning and is thus 
indeterminate with regard to the constitution or 
production of the material on which it is operative. 
Darwinism thus makes morality something purely relative to 
man's circumstances. Schurmann (Schurmann, J.G. 1888) 
argues that evolutionary ethics has no support from 
evolutionary science for it does no more than combine 
utilitarianism with speculative metaphysics and "discovers 
the ground of mind and conscience in an antecedent 
' physical or nervous mechanism" (Schurmann, J.G. p.160). 
Thus it lacks support from evolutionary science. 
4.3.1 Ethical speculations of Darwin 
As Darwin himself recognized, the greatest obstacle to his 
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theory of natural selection was the "high standard of 
man's intellectual powers and moral disposition." He 
wanted to show that mental faculties differ not in kind, 
but only degree from that of the lower animals. 
consequently, man's superior intellect has its correlate 
in his moral attainments. Just as there are gradations in 
anatomical development between animals on the evolutionary 
scale, so with mental dev~lopments. 
However, whereas the basis for sociality in animals (apes, 
bees, ants, etc.) is instinctual, the sympat~etic impulses 
in man are grounded in experience and reason which are 
guides to conduct. Being social, man is largely 
influenced and limited by the wishes and opinions of his 
fellow-man. The sympathetic impulses, selected (natural 
selection) for the good of the community could be the 
origin of moral sense or conscience. The persistence and 
continued selection of these impulses over others presents , 
them in the form of a moral law. Man's ability to regret . 
his actions is attributed by Darwin to his superior mental 
powers which- allow reflection, and so compariso'n with the 
past. From this comparison the "ought" emerges which 
"seems merely to imply the consciousness of a rule of 
conduct, however, it may have originated." (Schurman, J.G. 
1888 p.175). 
According to Darwin, "the moral sense or conscience is by 
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far the most important ••• it is summed up in that short 
but imperious word 'ought', so full of high significance" 
(Darwin, C. 1901 p.148). Schurmann contends (Schurmann, 
J.G. 1888 p.188) that Darwin's inconsistent use of 
"conscience" in The Descent of Man (Chapter 4) is 
problematic since he provides no definition. 
Consequently, its origin cannot be determined. Schurmann 
feels that Darwin is tracing not the origin of conscience 
(in Chapter 4 of The Descent of Man) but of remorse 
(Schurmann, J.G. 1888. p.19l) and assumes the continual 
presence and persistence of social instincts!. But 
according to Darwin's theory of Natural selection, the 
only "omnipresent impulse is the egoistic one of self-
preservation." He therefore compares a "whole class with 
some of the individuals" and arrives at the primacy of the 
social instincts, which are non-moral: and from the non-
moral, Darwin arrives at the moral. But many agree with 
Darwin for his conclusions, "express a fact of their 
own experience. But they overlook the all-important 
difference that they are already moral beings, and that 
the highly intelligent animal tiarwin speaks of is not. 
Why then should this non-moral intelligence experience 
remorse? (Schurman, J.G. 1888 p.194). But even though 
"ethical science" might show that the family and family 
morality might have had a "historical growth", it does not 
lessen the value of morality in a civilization that has 
absorbed it. 
233 
Like Schurman, Wallace also disagreed with the Darwinian 
view that "moral, intellectual and spiritual (faculties) 
have been derived from their rudiments in the lower 
animals, in the same manner and by the action of the same 
general laws as his physical structure has been derived." 
(Wallace, A.R. 1897 p.461). In The Descent of Man 
(Chapter Ill) Darwin discusses the basic rudiments of 
intelligence and morals and traces their origin to the 
lower animals - even to the extent that the deep love and 
submission a dog shows his master being the rudiment of 
religion! And in Chapter IV he discusses the faculties of 
savages saying that they are little more advanced than 
those of the higher animals (Darwin, C. 1901 p.46) and 
inferior to those reached in the civilized races. 
However, Darwin himself seems to contradict this argument 
as he does say that he was "incessantly struck whilst 
living with the Fuegians on board the Beagle, with their , 
many little traits of character showing how similar their 
minds were to ours" (Darwin, C. 1901 p.276). The 
Fuegians, therefore, had the same faculties as the 
"civilized races." Thei~ expression (i.e. of the 
'faculties') is dependent, however, on the environment. 
The Fuegian "delights to torture his enemies, offers up 
bloody sacrifices, practices infanticide without remorse, 
treats his wives like slaves, knows no decency, and is 
haunted by the grossest superstitions" (Darwin, C. 1901 
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p.946) probably because of the savage environment in which 
he lives. 
Both the Origin of Species and the Descent of Man do show 
the physical adaptations to the environment and the 
emergence of different forms through these adaptations. 
But the mental faculties are much more dependent on the 
environment for their expression. Natural Selection 
therefore, could not be alone responsible for the 
development of man's mental faculties (intelligence, 
etc.). Wallace feels that to support his theory, Darwin 
had also to show that these faculties (mental) have come 
from lower animals. According to Wallace, "Because man's 
physical structure has been developed from an animal form 
by natural selection, it does not necessarily follow that 
his mental nature, even though developed pari passu with 
it has been developed by the same causes only." (Wallace, 
A.R. - 1897 p.463). His view is that the abili~y to 
develop mathematics, music, art, etc. is not derived 
through natural selection largely because it exists in 
only small proportions of people. Wallace argues that man 
has a Spiritual aspect also for it is only on the 
acceptance of iuch a view that the "agony" that martyrs 
have borne, (e.g.), is explainable. For Wallace, the 
whole purpose of evolution was the "development of the 
human spirit in association with the human body" (Wallace, 
A.R. 1897 p.477). For it is struggle and effort that 
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strengthens and perfects the noblest faculties of man and 
enables in him the qualities of justice, mercy, humanity, 
etc. And it is the environment that to a large extent, 
plays its part in this development and has resulted in the 
"wonderful intellect of the European races." Wallace thus 
sees the development of man and of the different races of 
man on a "spiritual level." 
Schmidt however, had already in 1883, probably influenced 
by Darwinism and the Principles of Mendelian inheritance 
(of 1860), seen the development of races on ~ . purely 
physical basis: "The psychical capacities of each 
individual bear the family type, and are determined by the 
laws of hereditary. For it is simply untrue that, 
independent of colour and descent, each man, under 
conditions otherwise alike, may attain a like pitch of 
mental development". (Schmidt, O. 1883 p.296). He is of 
the view that even though some individuals of other races 
I 
have "reached" abilities of the European, they are on the 
whole " ••• behind the average individuals of the advanced 
races," and believes in there being "inferior human 
r ace s ,n ( S c h mid t, o. 18 8 3 p. 29 7). T his he at t r1 but est 0 
the theory of descent and Natural Selection. 
However, European (colonial) expansionism seems to have 
been at the basis of these views. Their contact with 
other races made them feel superior since these, (the 
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other races), to them, did not seem to have reached the 
level of civilization that they (the Europeans) felt they 
had reached. They did not take into account that many of 
the races they encountered, e.g. in the Eas~, had already 
reached the zenith of their civilization and were now on 
the decline. They saw evolution proceeding 
unidirectionally. This influenced the way they treated 
these races (i.e. in the colonies). 
4.3.2 The influence of Darwinism 
Evolution had been unacceptable to the Eighteenth Century 
naturalists, largely because, to them, it implied the 
"Scala naturae" (ladder of perfection). Lyell's studies 
had shown that besides the appearance of mammals before 
birds, rather diverse types all occurred in the fossil 
record at the same time, and therefore, he thought, 
refuted the theory of evolution. Darwin, however" did 
not postulate a "drive to perfection": he merely 
I 
postulated change, which was the basis for the appearance 
of new species. Essentialism, coupled with creitionism 
had been the "stumbling block" as far as the species 
concept was concerned. The solution to this problem was, 
to a large extent, important to the understanding and 
acceptance of the evolutionary theory: for on the 
interpretation of this concept lay the understanding of 
the relationship between the past and the present - of the 
animal world with man, having implications for both social 
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and ethical theory. It showed that man is related 
organically to the non-human animals and that he had 
appeared in a time long before that postulated by 
creation. Adding to the discoveries and conclusions of 
the physical sciences, it destroyed the anthropocentric 
concept of the Universe and so caused a major upheaval in 
man's thinking. Although it constituted a major 
revolution in man's thinking, it was long in gaining 
acceptance. This could probably be related to the fact 
that evolutionism had had a long history and what Darwin 
did was only to present a more precise formula t ion of the 
theory and supply the biological facts essential to such a 
formulation. His work does constitute a revolution in the 
sense that " •.• not simply the acceptance of one new 
theory was involved, as in some other scientific 
revolutions, but an entirely new conceptual world 
consisting of numerous separate concepts and beliefs and 
not only were scientific theories involved, but also a 
whole set of metascientific credos" (Mayr, E. 1972 
p.987) • 
Darwin's work not only relied on but also gave scientific 
support to the geological and other scientific theories 
concerning the vast antiquity of the earth. This had 
kaleidoscopic implications. It also led to the refutation 
of catastrophism and the victory of the evolutionists 
(Lamarck, etc.) over the progressionists and over Lyell's 
238 
"steady-state" theory. Darwin also showed that evolution 
did not consist in a steady "upward advance" but in 
adaptation to the constantly changing environment - a view 
unpopular with many non-biologists and with -the schools of 
evolutionary anthropology of Bergson and de Chardin. 
Evolutionists, (Lyell, etc. ) and anti-evolutionists had 
both allowed for divine intervention. Darwin's theory, 
however, showed that divine intervention was superfluous 
in evolution. It seemed to separate God from the world 
replacing a planned theology by the "haphazard 
processes" of "Natural Selection". Religion thus needed a 
new basis and God a new concept. The fact of 
anthropocentricism placed man in the some evolutionary 
stream as other animals. Darwin's theory thus had a 
greater relevance outside science than inside the physical 
sciences. Although physical science theories had both 
social and ethical implications, the Darwinian revolution 
showed man in a different perspective than that of the 
Church. 
Many held that it degraded man by linking him to the apes, 
and so destroying all distinction between the physical and 
the moral. It was felt that Darwin had destroyed the 
basis of ethics that resided in the Bible; so affecting 
man's personal beliefs, and raising questions anew in 
religion and ethics. Many scientists accepted the theory 
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only in part. Darwin's theory thus "meant the replacement 
of one entire Weltanschauung by another and it involved 
all aspects of life including religion, philosophy and 
humanism. 
4.3.3 Social Darwinism 
Darwinism greatly affected the religious outlook on the 
world. It pushed God farther into the background, so that 
religion greatly lost its significance as a way of life. 
Some, however, saw in Darwinian theory the conclusion that 
God did not exist. This had · a tremendous influence, for 
where religion had previously provided a basis for ethics, 
Darwinism was substituted. In some instances it was even 
used to complement the religious outlook on ethics. The 
changed outlook provided a justification: or an added 
justification for the attitudes of one group towards 
another. Instead of looking at different cultures or 
people in the light of cultural relativism, Darwinian 
evolutionism provided the basis for looking at culture as 
developing along unidirectional lines: and not as adaptive 
to particular times and places. In this outlook, 
technology played a paramount role. 
The roots of social evolutionism are embedded in the Age 
of Enlightenment where the Classical doctrine of the Chain 
of Being constituted the basis of the view that there was 
a close relationship between the concepts of sociocultural 
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and organic evolution. This became a "major intellectual 
assumption." The development of humanity was thus viewed 
as progressing along a single "unidirectional course". 
cultural evolution was closely linked to social evolution, 
and involved transformations in technology, social 
institutions, religious beliefs, value-systems, etc. 
After the "Origin of Species" (Darwin, c. 1857) biological 
evolution (Kuhn, T.S. 1962) became the paradigm for the 
study of social evolution; the paradigm, however, was 
slightly modified by the sociologists. Like 'biologists 
they saw existing human culture and institutions as having 
descended from animal antecedents by "gradual 
modifications". To many this also implied that cultural 
traits are transmitted through heredity (even though it 
has been shown that culture is acquired). 
In their assumption of a unilineal development of culture 
and society, sociologists and cultural anthropologists 
felt that all cultures passed through similar stages in 
their development: "savagery, barbarism and civilization". 
In ·this view ·was also prevalent the idea of the "ladder of 
perfection" that had dominated early evolutionist thinking 
(Dobzhansky, T. 1962). Based on these assumptions 
(unilinear development and "ladder of perfection"), no 
satisfactory answer could be provided for this type of 
evolutionary change: it was therefore declared a "property 
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of human nature." 
Growing populations and complex economic arrangements that 
followed the movement away from simple food-gathering 
economies had eventually led to greater disparities in 
wealth. Consequently, the development of social status, 
depended to a large extent on wealth. This is seen 
clearly during the Industrial Revolution when, in the 
Nineteenth Century cities of Europe and America, the 
extremes of poverty and wealth existed side by side. This 
accumul~tion of wealth had also led, earlier. to the 
"carving up" of the world into colonial empires, where 
most other groups became - subject to European rule. These 
"subject races" had to be" ••. uplifted and perhaps even 
civilized; the pedagogic method was to put the subjects to 
work for their white masters. If some of the latter felt 
a need to put their consciences at rest, a church hymn 
solved the problem: 
The rich man in his castle, the poor man at his gate, 
God made them high and lowly; He ordered their estate" 
(Dobzhansky, T. 1962 p.119). 
Darwinian evolutionism was used to complement the 
religious reason and so "scientifically" justify their 
views. It was tacitly assumed that Darwin had not only 
discovered the laws of biological evolution but also that 
of society as well. Thus it was the phraseology, more 
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than the essence of Darwinism that was put to use by 
social Darwinists. The "struggle", in the "struggle for 
life" was taken to mean "contention" and consequently 
"aggressive assertion" - to the benefit of individuals or 
portions of society: "to the victor, the spoils" become 
the ruling idiom. The "Natural" of "natural selection" 
was taken to mean pre-manmade changes in the environment. 
Technology was taken as the measure of advance from 
primitive (less technical) to advanced (more technical) 
societies. "Natural selection" was considered as a law 
that governs advance~ Therefore, whatever advance there 
was technologically was considered "natural" and so, 
justified. 
Social Darwinists did not really consider the "subtleties 
or qualifications of Darwin's theory. They equated 
affluence and occupation of the seats of the mighty with 
biological fitness, and common laissez faire, cut-throat 
I 
competition and rivalry with Natural Selection." 
(Dobzhansky, T. 1962 p.ll). Thus success in business or 
war was taken as the "measure" of a person's worth - which 
was considered as a measure of biological fitness. 
Natural selection can therefore be seen as the bastion of 
American Capitalism. Some American ideologists (e.g. 
Summer, [1840-1910]. Dobzhansky, T. 1962) even felt that 
the terms "strong" and "weak" were meaningless unless 
"strong" was equivalent to "industrious" and "frugal" and 
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"weak" to "idle and extravagant". Consequently, 
millionaires were the products of the action of natural 
selection on the whole body of men to select those who 
could "meet the requirements of certain work to be done. 
John, D. Rockefeller (Sr.) himself agreed that "The growth 
of a large business is merely the survival of the fittest. 
It is merely the working out of a law of nature and a law 
of God." (In Dobzhansky, T. 1962). Such views seemed 
to glorify "rugged individualism", and the effects of such 
thought are evident in politics, business, etc. 
Ultimately, this type of "understanding' of ,cientific 
theory led to the belief that struggle and competition are 
the demands of progress - between individuals, social 
classes, nations, states and races. 
Success, in terms of material wealth which formed the 
basis of progression, in terms of technology, and survival 
in terms of aggression, easily fostered the idea of the 
I 
existence of a biological master race, the nordics. This 
is evident in Hitler's attempt to subjugate the rest of 
the world for the "Master Race" or the Aryans. His 
attempt to se~ure the world for the "master race" can be 
seen in his aggressive policy of elimination of "inferior" 
races. The effects of such views are also evident in his 
social policy, for in this way, he felt that he could 
develop and populate the world with the "master race". The 
eugenics policy of Nazi Germany was also based on 
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Darwinian and genetic theory, but, interpreted to 
accommodate social and political ideals. Consequently, 
marriages (artificial selection) were allowed only between 
those who could prove themselves "Aryan" which was 
considered a "pure race". It was felt that "defects" 
would not be able to infiltrate the development and spread 
of "pure strains" as natural selection would constantly 
eliminate them. 
The English view was slightly different. They felt that 
it was God's will (Dobzhansky, T. 1962) that the English 
and the Teutonic races had been prepared for a thousand 
years (based and justified on Darwinian theory) to conquer 
the "inferior races" of the world, to administer them and 
to develop them culturally along Western or English 
standards. Thus the subjugation of the "inferior races" 
would be to their benefit, (i.e., to the benefit of the 
subjugated) • 
In the background of commerce and technology and based on 
the comparative method, European and particularly English 
culture was held up as a standard towards which all other 
cultures should progress. And if others did not wish to 
"progress" towards this standard, it was because they were 
ignorant; they therefore, had to be taught, by force. 
Religion also played a role in the "educating" and 
"uplifting" process. Since the religion of the "higher 
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race" was ipso facto better than that of the "inferior 
races" it should be spread among the latter. Their, 
mostly "polytheistic" religions accompanied by 
"blasphemous" and "barbaric" rites, provided no way for 
them to be "saved" -in the Christian sense. They, 
therefore, had to be converted. This led to numerous 
other social and ethical consequences. 
The education systems used (or imposed) in conquered lands 
were also a reflection of the view that the conquered 
peoples were inferior. It was argued that the conquered 
peoples would not be able to "match up" to the education 
of the conquerer: since they were considered inferior, 
their intelligence ,also must be inferior! And indeed, 
early "intelligence tests", based on Western education, 
did "prove" this! Consequently, education was mostly 
confined to the development of technical skills which 
I 
would be useful in industry - and would eventually be to 
the profit of the occupying nations. 
The "superior-inferior" view, coupled with the need for 
skilled technical labour, also led to the segregation of 
education. For it was argued that mixed education would 
result in the "inferior races" being an impediment to the 
education of the "superior races", or that the former 
would not be able to "match up" to the latter. 
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Thus, the benefits that the superior conquerers wished to 
bestow on the "inferior" conquered, were reduced to 
exploitation of subject peoples and destruction of their 
culture (either by eliminating them to a large extent, as 
in America and Australia, or by virtually forcing a new 
culture on to them). This was often replaced by the 
culture and government of the conquering races. 
In the interests of economy, much of the natural resources 
of colonies had also been exploited, resulting in the 
disappearance of animal and plant life. Where indigenous 
people have killed (animals) only for food, the colonial 
masters have killed for sport and the acquisition of 
trophies to "prove" their supremacy. Indigenous peoples 
in many parts of the world have therefore dwindled 
considerably in numbers and are treated as "endangered 
species" to "develop" in reserves where their habits and 
cultural artifacts have become objects of tourist , 
curiosity and anthropological study which sees them as 
primitive. 
Mu~h strife and uncertainty has also "developed" 
indigenous peoples because of the infiltration of their 
religion by religions and systems of thought foreign to 
them. The younger generations, being educated in schools 
provided by the foreigners have often found it easier to 
adopt foreign religions and think of their own religions 
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and systems of thought as outdated and even primitive. 
The adoption of new religious thought has also resulted in 
changed values with subsequent friction between older and 
younger generations. This has led to much cpnfusion in 
younger generations. Many customs which had formed the 
basis of certain value systems, have consequently been 
abandoned with resultant loss of those value systems: 
their ethics therefore has also changed considerably. 
Religious infiltration has also resulted in "new strains" 
of religion being set up consisting of a "mixture" of 
traditional (indigenous) customs and beliefs being changed 
and adopted into the "new" religion. Thus, in order to 
bring personal peace and avoid uncertainty and fear, a 
complete break from traditional faiths has been avoided. 
In this way religions have carried into them and with 
them, customs which can be traced to origins foreign to 
certain religions. These origi~s are often forgotten in 
claims for the "true religion", when these are expounded 
as the basis for systems which could bring peace and 
understanding. 
Religion, education and medicine have often been used by 
colonial powers to justify their presence in conquered 
territory. They felt that their "superior" culture was 
beneficial to the indigenous people. But while 
humanitarians were supposedly civilizing the people, their 
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land, which had been claimed in the name of the conquering 
government, was often sold to individual enterprise which 
stripped the land of its natural resources. The 
indigenous people thus became landless and were reduced to 
a labour force, their worth being defined in terms of the 
amount of work they could do. But this has also 
concentrated the labour force into a single powerful unit. 
Basic value systems, or ethical systems have in this way 
been changed, leading to changes in social structure and 
in government. These new systems, however, which were 
t h 0 u g h t to ben sup er i 0 r", wit h a b a s is ins c i en t if i c ' 
theory, have still not been able to provide peace and 
stability. This is largely because the "new" systems are 
unsuitable. This is borne out by upheavals in former 
colonial countries, now turned "republic" - especially, in 
what have been termed "third world countries". 
Technological advance was thus considered as the basis to 
I 
progress. Those societies or people who were more 
dependent on technology, a technology that also brought 
them greater wealth, considered themselves as advanced. 
And since they were more advanced technologically, 
European society saw itself as being destined for the 
enlightenment of mankind. In such thinking was also 
embodied the idea of the superiority of Western concepts. 
These have consequently been foisted on "primitive" 
peoples to educate them and so alleviate their miseries 
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and lead them to freedom (in the religious sense). Thus, 
while the "primitive" people were exhorted to look 
heavenward to happiness and freedom, their "teachers" 
enjoyed the fruits of their labour (i.e., the labour of 
the "primitive people") on earth. This has to a large 
extent contributed to much of the discontent in the 
developing "Third World countries". 
4.4 Discussion 
Darwin's theory, coupled with the lines of thought that 
emerged from the Eighteenth Century, formed the basis of 
the European view that progress was a "mechanistic 
compulsion" inherent in the "nature of things." 
Enlightenment thought, however, was focussed on the " ••• 
discoveries and possibilities of science and technology 
, 
proceeding along a progressive path. This 
evolutionist thrust into the future ••• was not grounded 
in the critique, but in the optimistic acceptance of 
evolving industrial Capitalism. Progress was seen as 
inevitable; social ills and disorder were simply 
attributed to inadequate technology." (Diamond, S.and 
Belasco, B. 1980. In Rossi,I~(ed.) 1980. p.543). "Social 
engineering" was therefore important in order to maintain 
order in society - the development and maintenance of 
particular classes for certain particular purposes (which 
goes back to Plato's Republic), evident in the colonial 
social and education policies. 
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Although it has been shown that cultural evolution is not 
dependent on any biological component, and consequently 
has no (biological) "necessary connection" with biological 
racism, social scientists among others, seem to have 
disregarded the context (whether deliberately or not) in 
which Darwin enunciated his thesis. The consequences of 
such disregard are evident even in the present. When 
Darwin spoke of Natural Selection he was concerned with 
natural processes where "natural" was used as an antonym 
of "artificial", (in artificial selection) • .. The "struggle 
for existence" and the "survival of the fittest" were 
concerned with "differential reproduction of carriers of 
different genetic endowments owing to their adaptedness or 
shortcomings in a given environment". (Dobzhansky, T. 
1962 p.ll). The "fittest" in the "struggle for survival" 
was not a victor from any aggressive act; but more likely 
a "prolific parent". 
The biological approach to man was dominated prior to 1940 
by many varieties of social Darwinism. During the War and 
post-war years, however, popularity in the field declined 
because of its identification with Nazism and other racist 
policies. Despite this it has survived, but has assumed a 
different form and basis. The war years did increase the 
awareness of the use of "counterfeit biology" and to the 
dangers of the use of scientific theory - without a proper 
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understanding of the basis and tenets of the theory. Some 
dangers of the use of social Darwinism and the use of 
genetic theory are evident in the "negative eugenics" 
policy (Tobias, P.V. 1969) of Nazi Germany. 
Studies in hominid evolution show that the emergence of 
the hominid stock and its progressive changes from 
Australopithecus through Homo habilis and Homo erectus to 
Homo sapiens is correlated with the progressive increase 
in the number and quality of cultural artifacts and also 
the increase in cranial capacity. From the !tage of Homo 
habilis "the human line is culture-bound and culture 
dependent" (Tobias, P~V. 1979 p.90). The Homo erectus 
stage is marked by the global spread of man from his 
cradle in East Africa (Leakey, R.E. and Lewin, R. 1977; 
Tobias, P.V. 1973). Artifacts found with his fossils 
(Tobias, P.V. 1969) show the beginnings of ritual and its 
correlates, symbolism and ideology. "The era of ritual 
evolution that he had pioneered was about to give way to 
the epoch of artistic, linguistic, and spiritual evolution 
that has been the hallmark of modern man" (Tobias, P.V. 
1979 p.91); over a period of some three million years. 
With the emergence of symbolism and ideology ("The Second 
Transcendence" - Dobzhansky, T. et. al. 1977), the rate of 
cultural evolution increased towards domestication, 
agriculture, religion, writing, medicine, language, etc. 
From this stage on, man's development was rapid and 
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directed for it no more depended on chance (mutations). 
The trend towards technology and social organization 
increased. The pattern, however, was not unidirectional, 
but like the non-human evolutionary patterns, mosaic, or 
similar to "adaptive radiation". In such a view, 
"progress" is problematic, and "civilization" assumes a 
meaning different from that which is embodied in 
"unidirectional views". 
It was felt (Diamond, S. and Be1asco,B., 1980. In Rossi, 
I. (ed.) 1980) that culture depended on "mental 
differentials ••• which were quantitative not qualitative 
variations." This view, also held that the "chain of 
common experiences" is correlated with the "mental 
evolution" of society. According to David and Be1asco 
(1980), Tylor's and Morgan's views also lead to 
ethnocentricism and racism. It was assumed that all 
cultures follow a common course. Culture is also seen as 
an extrabio1ogic phenomenon, (Diamond,S.and Belasco,S.1980. 
In Rossi,I.(ed.) 1980) but dependent on organic evolution 
of the brain and its capacity for symbolism. Cultural 
evolution thus emerges as a self-generating process which 
is "continuous, cumulative and progressive", making 
culture an extension of Natural history. 
Ethnocentric theories are characterised by "evolutionary 
determinism" and embody "mechanical materialist concepts". 
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"They reduce symbolic intervention to an exclusively 
material imperative -technology, population pressure, 
environment, etc • ••• and there is no dialectic evident 
between human and human, human and nature an.d human and 
culture" (Diamond, S. and Belasco, B. 1980. In Rossi,I. 
(ed.) 1980) p.561). Thus the h i storical aspect of culture 
is not emphasized; the human constitution of history is 
ignored. 
Opposed to these deterministic views is the concept of 
dialectical evolution (Karl Marx) embodying interactions 
as constitutive of a "social totality". Culture and 
society are thus understood as concrete, not abstract 
phenomena. Change is seen as an historical process where 
human relations, including nature, play a vital role, 
together with cultural or historical inheritance. 
Thinking and acting thus become a single process where 
human experience and action "repct intentionally in 
unexpected ways". Cultural evolution must therefore be 
seen in the light of "human purpose and volition" 
determined in certain particular environments or 
situations. In this perspective, evolution is not moving 
towards determined goals. This indeterminism gives to 
"success" and "progress" a different meaning from that 
which they assume in Western civilization. In the 
deterministic view Western civilization is assumed to be 
the peak of progressive development: as a beacon towards 
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which all other social evolution must progress . 
Western civilization, although constructed by man, is 
viewed as a "reality" and seen as being unavoidable since 
it is based on man's view of the evolutionary process; 
modelled on biological evolution: that it cannot be 
controlled. And if evolution is viewed as being 
progressive, it lends support to "imperialism that 
diffuses by socio-economic and political conquest, mirror 
images of the domestic experience of alienated Europeans" 
(Diamond, S. and Belasco,B.1980. In Rossi,I. ~ (ed.) 1980. 
p.565). In "primitive" societies, the individual 
progresses through experiences in society which is also 
changed by his development. There is thus a "dialectical" 
unity of people and their total environment. 
The unidirectional view is not an authentic picture of 
cultural development as culture spreads, diffuses and 
I 
develops in various ways. Different cultures do not exist 
in isolation but mutually affect and influence each other 
through conquest, commerce, etc. Different 
comtemporaneous cultures or societal organizations (e.g., 
tribal organization) are seen as being in different stages 
of development towards civilization (where European 
culture, technology, etc., of the time, was taken to 
represent civilization) or, evolving towards civilization 
at different rates. This view provided an easy foundation 
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for biological racism of the late Nineteenth and early 
Twentieth Centuries" "some people are by nature incapable 
of progressing beyond tribal savagery, (tribal 
organization and ways of life of indigenous people of the 
European c~lonies), while others are superior and 
develop civilizations" (In Dobzhansky, T. 1962 p.9). 
Dobzhansky, however, did not agree with such views for he 
found no necessary connection between biological and 
cultural evolution. Such views do not consider the fact 
that all civilizations have also passed through different 
stages in their development (to their present condition). 
Tribal organization must not be seen as the "inability" to 
progress further, for this would mean that the tribe 
cannot develop further. It must be seen rather as an 
organization that is sufficient for the needs of a 
particular group of people at a particular time: 
sufficient for their social, economic and political needs, 
etc., for certain particular "historical conditions". 
I 
History has shown that an organization will change under 
changing circumstances. Thus it is not any mental 
capacity, etc., but also prevailing historical conditions 
that determine change. 
Since man is also a product of biological evolution, it is 
felt that his behaviour is also derived from non-human 
animals - that aggression, ,etc., can be traced to these 
animals. Ethnology and sociobiology are attempts to link 
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human and non-human behaviour through genetic theory. An 
investigation of genetic theory, however, shows that it 







Sociological or anthropological accounts of ethics deal 
only with human behaviour and seek the origin and 
explanation of such behaviour in ancient custom and 
tradition. Sociobiologists however, attempt to find the 
roots of behaviour and of customs and traditions 
themselves, in animal behaviour. Based on biological 
theory, sociobiologists give an account of behaviour in 
terms of the survival value of behaviour. Thus 
individual behaviour was felt to be directed towards 
individual survival. This view was based not only on 
Darwinism ("survival of the fittest") but also on the 
"selfishness" of the Gene (Dawkins, R. 1976), a view which 
itself had origins in the Darwinian hypothesis. 
Sociobiologists find the roots of ethical behaviour in 
altruism and kinship relations of animals. Sahlins 
(Sahlins, M. 1976) view is that/since kinship relations 
are different in different cultures, it could not be a 
natural basis for ethics. Singer's (Singer, P. 1981) 
view however, is that Whatever form these relations might 
assume in different cultures, they could provide a basis 
for ethics, for men do not care for their own relatives 
only, but extend this feeling to others as well. They do 
begin however, by looking to the needs of their kin before 
that of others. This does result, often in strife, in 
multiracial societies where aiding or seeing to it that 
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one's own race or ethnic group has the best before 
attending to the needs of others, meets strong resistence. 
Social reformers often attempt to extend tha family 
tendency to all society so that the needs of the community 
are attended to like the interests of the family. 
(Communist manifesto, Israeli Kibbutz system and some 
monastic settlements). Despite the view of social 
reformers who try to develop a social good by suppression 
of family life, family bias does provide the basis for 
assisting others. Reciprocal and group altruism is thus a 
strong feature of human social behaviour. This is evident 
in Hitler's use of group altruism to stir up nationalistic 
feelings and Stalin's use of the notion of "Mother 
Russia". Human ethical codes thus reflect group feelings 
leading to patriotism - which can be seen as "group 
selfishness", when extended to nationalism. 
Thus Singer feels that "cultural and biological factors 
interact is something that should be borne in mind 
throughout our discussion of the biological basis of 
ethics. Biological and cultural explanations of human 
behaviour are not inconsistent unless, foolishly, we try 
to insist that one of these is the sole cause of a ctimplex 
piece of behaviour" (Singer, P. 1981 p.52). Thus culture 
can change "genetically based tendencies". 
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Sociobiology must therefore be examined in the light of 
the Darwinian hypothesis, and the genetic theory. It must 
also be found to what extent these theories are 
determinative in human behaviour. The exten·t of cultural 
influence must also be examined in such behaviour or 
whether culture is an extension of animal behaviour. In 
such an evaluation the importance of the genetic theory of 
inheritance cannot be overestimated. For if human 
behaviour is genetically based and determined from animal 
behaviour, then the ideas of free will and responsibility 
so necessary to moral action or conduct, will be in 
question. Moral conduct is dependent on choice. It is 
therefore important to investigate the extent to which 
genetics is determinative in this choice. 
5.2 Sociobiology 
Sociobiology is the attempt to explain diverse social 
systems and human behaviour in terms of biological theory. 
Just as the Darwinian hypothesis attempts to explain the 
emergence and evolution of the human from non-human 
ancestors, sociobiology explains or derives human 
behaviour and social systems from these ancestors through 
natural selection. The genetic theory is considered as 
the basis of this derivation. Although man has changed 
much from his simian forebears, it is felt that he still 
shares many behavioural features with them, although in 
modified form. Trends in social organization, e.g., 
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"behavioural scaling" which primates utilize for 
adjustment of "aggressive and sexual interactions", has 
in man become multidimensional. Sociobiology (Wilson, 
E.O. 1980: Sociobiblogy to sociology) is the search for 
the "human biogram" (Count, E.W. 1958; Tiger. L. and 
For, R. 1971) or the identification of behaviours through 
which society is manipulated by individuals so as to 
increase their "Darwinian fitness". The plasticity of 
this "biogram", (considered a phylogenetic vestige) is 
evident in the varied types of culture man has developed 
to dominate the environment, including the human and non-
human inhabitants of this environment. No non-human 
social organization (even that of the insects) manifests 
this plasticity, which is probably due to the absence of 
interspecific competition. Using the "Insect Societies" 
(Wilson, E.O. 1971) as a basis Wi1son attempts to develop 
a unified theory of sociobiology (Sade, D.S. 1975) 
integrating all fields of biology of a range of animals 
I 
from bacteria to humans. Like Wynne-Edwards (Wynne-
Edwards, V.C. 1963) and Barash (Barash, D. 1979) Wilson 
examines evolutionary rules that could have universal 
applicability for behaviour. Wilson's view is that 
evolution has produced societies. To understand societies 
and social behaviour, therefore, the processes by which 
natural selection, operating on genetic variants, could 
have brought about these societies, have to be 
investigated. Wilson defines society as a "Reciprocal 
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communication of a co-operative nature, transcending mere 
sexual activity, is the essential intuitive criterion of a 
society" (Wilson, E.O. 1980 p.7). Society, therefore, 
constitutes more than just simple aggregative behaviour, 
territoreality or sexual behaviour, although these do seem 
to characterize social behaviour. A society is also 
characterized by a hierarchy, usually measured in terms of 
superiority in aggressive behaviour. Wilson explains the 
origin and rapid development of human society through the 
use of the "multiplier effect" (Wilson, E.O. 1980) which 
he asserts increases phylogenetically in correlation with 
intelligence. This view shows that Wilson sees evolution 
as proceeding in a single direction towards higher and 
more intelligent forms, culminating in humans. 
According to evolutionary theory traits that are adaptive 
will be selected to the advantage of the population. Non-
adaptive traits can, therefore" be seen as features that 
are inflexible in environments not usually encountered by 
a species. Environmental changes can also render 
previously adaptive traits, non-adaptive: for natural 
selection determines only those classes of traiis that are 
of adaptive advantage to animals. Consequently, those 
traits will be selected; which would serve the animal in 
different environmental conditions. Ethologists, like 
Conrad Lorenz believe that behaviour and social structure 
can be studied as "organs", their structure and function 
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being determined by genes. Wilson's view is that "Social 
evolution is the outcome of the genetic response of 
populations to ecological pressure within the constraints 
imposed by phylogenetic inertia" (Wilson, E.O. 1980 p.20). 
This is evident especially in the insect world where 
eusociality has originated some twelve times; but only 
once in an order outside the Hymenoptera, i.e. in the 
termites. 
Wilson also (l980) sees reciprocal altruism, frequent in 
human behaviour, as being consistent with genetic theory, 
although it is not the general rule in infra-human 
behaviour. He attributes this to the fact that 
relationships and memory are not very enduring in animals. 
Anthropoids, however, do show it to varying degrees. 
Wilson thus feels that "a single strong thread does indeed 
run from the conduct of termite colonies and turkey 
brotherhoods to the social behayiour of man" (Wilson, E.O. 
1980 p.63). 
It has also been found that as the animal advances on the 
evolutionary scale it depends increasingly less on its 
genes. At the human level, behaviour is more dependent on 
tradition and culture. Through teaching and learning, 
specific forms of behaviour are passed from one generation 
to another. As tradition is enriched, its effectiveness 
is accelerated and is often initiated or altered by an 
264 
individual. Its effect is cumulative and its spread 
rapid, often within a single generation. The uniqueness 
of tradition and its application to specific places and 
individuals results in its fast divergence in families, 
societies and populations. culture, Wilson feels, differs 
from "animal tradition" "only in degree" (Wilson, E.O. 
1980). Changes to the environment by humans has also 
resulted in changes in behaviour patterns of animals, 
especially .primates. Studies of such shifts in behaviour 
patterns resulted in the belief that the genes responsible 
for these patterns could have been inherited .from lower 
animals. In the pre-Pleistocene era two or more hominid 
species did exist together: Australopithecus africanus and 
Homo habilis. But only one of them survived the 
Pleistocene. This species, it seems possessed a 
plasticity that could accommodate numerous changing 
conditions. "The hypothesis to consider then, is that 
genes promoting flexibility in ~ocial behaviour are 
strongly selected at the individual level. But note that 
variation in social organisation is only a possible, not a 
necessary consequence of this process" (Wilson, E.O. 1980 
p.273). The variation in social structure could be due to 
" ••• lack of competition from other species" (ecological 
release). Unlike animals that are "tightly packed" in 
the ecosystem leaving little room for experimentation, man 
is not subjected to the constraints of interspecific 
competition. He is, however, subject to cultural 
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competition. And cultural traits can change within a 
single generation: "Culture is not inherited through 
genes, it is acquired by learning from other human beings 
In a sense, human genes have surrendered their 
primacy in human evolution to an entirely new non-
biological or superorganic agent, culture. However, 
this agent is entirely dependent on the human genotype" 
(Dobzhansky, T. 1963). Certain features of human 
behaviour do have a high heritability. The predominance 
of these characteristics have been responsible for the 
predisposition of societies towards cultural~ifferences. 
Anthropological genetics have also attempted through 
phylogenetic analysis to compare man to other primate 
species in order to identify basic primate or genetic 
traits. Such analyses attempt a derivation of human from 
infra-human behaviour patterns. Ethologists such as 
Konrad Lorenz (On Aggression), ~obert Ardrey (The Social 
Contract), Desmond Morris (The Naked Ape) and Lionel Tiger 
and Robert Fox (The Imperial Animal) have all in their 
works called attention to man as a biological species and 
have discussed his behaviour as adaptive to particular 
environments. They showed that the extreme behaviourist 
view of Man's mind as an "equipotent response machine was 
neither correct nor heuristic". Ethological handling of 
the problem, however, was also inefficient and misleading. 
"They selected one plausible hypothesis or another based 
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on a review of a small sample of animal species, then 
advocated the explanation to the limit." (Wilson, E.O. 
1980 p.275). Their work advocates a direct continuity 
between subhuman (espec ia lly pr ima te) and hu-man behaviour. 
And the same or similar reasons are attributed to human 
behaviour, which are attributed to behaviour in subhuman 
groups. This is taken to signify the presence of genes 
for particular types of behaviour. 
Close examination of these views and of genetic theory 
shows that such genes are not forthcoming. Human 
behaviour, therefore, cannot be derived directly from 
animal behaviour. Although Wilson postulates "genes 
promoting plasticity" the genetic theory does not support 
the existence of such genes. If such genes did, in fact, 
exist, they would have to be derived frqm the animal world 
in which "genetic plasticity" would be problematic. 
5.3 Methodology and links with other theories 
In the first part of Sociobiology (Wilson, E.O. 1980) 
Wilson analyses post-Darwinian evolutionary theory and its 
relation to social evolution. The genetic structure of 
the population is used as the basis for the definition of 
the group or society and the individual. Genetic 
isolation and in-breeding raises the coefficient of 
relationship in the population. Thus through kin 
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selection the evolution of altruistic behaviour is 
enhanced. The concept of "inclusive fitness" developed 
especially by Hamilton (Hamilton, W.D. 1963) is perhaps 
the central concept of Wilson's theory. Inoividual 
genetic fitness, therefore, is measured in terms of the 
survival and reproduction of individual and offspring, and 
also by "fitness" enhancement of relatives sharing these 
genes. Consequently, the development and evolution of co-
operative or altruistic acts is facilitated - even though 
these would be detrimental to the individual's survival. 
Altruistic behaviour would consequently increase in the 
population of animals bearing similar hereditary traits. 
Altruism, and consequently, kin selection, is therefore 
central to Wilson's Sociobiology. 
The second part of the book includes reviews of social 
mechanisms (group size, reproduction, time-energy budgets, 
social symbiosis), their evolut~on and adaptation to 
ecological pressures, and the optimization and use and 
development of the "caste" system of insect societies. 
Using models, he shows that the relatively stable tropical 
environment has the most numerous and specialized 
development of insect "caste" systems. 
The third part of Sociobiology deals with the behavioural 
adaptations of social animals, including micro-organisms 
and man. Sociobiology thus becomes" a systematic 
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study of the biological basis of all aspects of social 
behaviour, particularly of animal societies, but also 
encompassing the social behaviour of early man and the 
organization of the more primitive contemporary human 
societies" (Waddington, C.H. 1975. In Chaplan, A.L. 1978 
p.253) • 
In Wilson's view colonial invertebrates seem to constitute 
the most perfect societies. Having identical genes, 
colonial members exercise an "extreme degree of altrUism". 
Individual freedom and interest is subordinated to the 
advantage of the colony whose members are specialized for 
specific tasks (e.g. colonial coelenterates). As in 
insect societies, there is morphological differentiation 
towards specialization and division of labour between 
castes - conducive to the altruistic behaviours that help 
maintain the colony. Sociobiology is therefore defined as 
"The systematic study of the biological basis of all 
social behaviour ••• Its central precept is that the 
evolution of social behaviour can be fully comprehended 
only through an understanding first, of demography, which 
yields the vital information concerning population growth, 
and second, of the genetic structure of populations, which 
tell us what we need to know about effective population 
size in the genetic sense, to coefficients of 
relationships within the societies, and the amount of gene 
flow between them. The principal goal of a general theory 
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of sociobiology should be an ability to predict features 
of social organization from a knowledge of the population 
parameters combined with information on the behavioural 
constraints imposed by the constitution of the species" 
(Wilson, E.O. 1980 p.4-5). Integrative neurophysiology 
could then become the framework within which " .•• whole 
patterns of animal behaviour could be explained, in the 
terms of functional and evolutionary biology." Lewontin 
seems to support such a view saying that "natural 
selection of the character states themselves is the 
essence of Darwinism. All else is molecular ~biology." 
(Lewontin, R.e. 1972 p.18l-l82). 
The sociobiologist view that earlier stages in human 
evolution have borne behavioural determinants, sets 
constraints on human behaviour. Wilson's view is that 
recognition of these constraints makes the "approach to 
social behaviour realistic and effective." He even goes 
f 
so far as to suggest that a foundation for ethics can be 
found in an understanding of the functioning of the neural 
systems of the brain, (Wilson, E.O. 1980): "The biologist, 
who is concerned with questions of physiology and 
evolutionary history, realizes that self knowledge is 
constrained and shaped by the emotional control centres in 
the hypothalamus and limbic systems of the brain." 
(Wilson, E.O. 1980). 
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With the development of the theory of Natural Selection 
(the modern synthesis, based on genetics) explanations of 
human characteristics are sought in animal behaviour, at a 
genetic level. Following this trend, Wilson _ (Wilson, E.O. 
1975a pp.l08-110) declares that ethical behaviour can be 
explained, like altruism in animals, on the basis of 
natural selection of inherited traits. Sociobiology, 
therefore, provides a new perspective on ethics: that 
ethics should be "biologized". Sociobiologists are of the 
view that the basis of ethics or moral behaviour can be 
found in kin selection and altruism. In the . chapter on 
"Morality of the gene" (Wilson, E.O. 1980) Wilson says, 
"The biologist who is concerned with questions of 
physiology and evolutionary history, realizes that self 
knowledge is constrained and shaped by the emotional 
control centres in the hypothalamus and limbic systems of 
the brain. These centres flood our consciousness with all 
the emotions, hate, love, guilt, fear and others, that are 
I 
consulted by ethical philosophers who wish to intuit the 
standards of good and evil • ••• The hypothalamic limbic 
complex automatically denies (such) logical reduction by 
countering it with feelings of guilt and altruism. In 
this one way the philosopher's own emotional control 
centres are wiser than his solipsist consciousness, 
knowing that in evolutionary time the individual organism 
counts for almost nothing. In a Darwinist sense the 
organism does live for itself. Its primary function is 
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not even to reproduce other organisms; it reproduces 
genes, and it serves as their temporary carrier. Each 
organism generated by sexual reproduction is a unique 
accidental subset of all the genes constituting the 
species . ••• As more complex social behaviour is added to 
the genes' techniques for replicating themselves, 
altruism becomes increasingly prevalent and eventually 
(appeared) appears in exaggerated forms." (Wilson, E.O. 
1978 p.3). 
Wilson thus feels that ethical behaviour should be seen as 
biological adaptations and that the content of "beliefs" 
should be examined with reference to the "emotional 
control centre." Ethical claims then rest on "biological 
empirical claims" and are not only emotive responses. 
Wilson asserts that if this interpretation is correct then 
men do have innate rights that take root in the drives for 
survival and self esteem. Consequently, they do not have 
to be validated by "ad hoc theoretical constructions 
produced by society." Wilson thus seems to sugge&t that 
ethical constructs (since they are biological adaptations) 
are justified by biological claims, validating the 
derivation of human rights from sociobiological fact. 
Dawkins (Dawkins, R. 1976 p.2l) holds a view similar to 
that of Wilson: genetic constructionism is taken as an 
explanation for all aspects of human anatomy as well as 
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behaviour. His view is that "Our genes swarm in huge 
colonies, safe inside gigantic lumbering robots, sealed 
off from the outside world, communicating. with it by 
torturous indirect routes ••. they created u~ body and 
mind; and their preservation is the ultimate rationale of 
our existence." (Dawkins, R. 1976 p.2l). 
Sociobiology can, in this perspective, be seen as an 
extension, on a genetic level, of "Social Darwinism". 
Genetically based or biologistic explanations are given 
for human behaviour and institutions. The close links 
with the Darwinian Hypothesis (of Natural Selection) is 
based on claims of a close relationship between the 
"social" (or what is interpreted as such) behaviour of 
animals and the nature of human social institutions and 
behaviour. Such a view sees human nature and institutions 
as determined by such characteristics as "territoriality", 
"indoctrinability", "reciprocal altruism", "aggression", , 
etc., inherited from non-human ancestors. This would mean 
that, although modified or intensified to some degree , 
these characteristics are the same as those of animals, 
whence they have been inherited. Modern Euro-American 
culture sees these as basic qualities of human nature. 
Ignoring historical and ethnographic perspectives, this 
claim is founded on the evolutionary view that existent 
social institutions have superior adaptability. This 
would mean that existent human behaviour and institutions 
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are as they should be (because of genetic determinism) and 
are appropriate for the existing conditions. 
Such a view would tend to justify existing social 
institutions as the product and outcome of natural 
tendencies. Present behaviour patterns or moral conduct 
would also be justified as natural and a transitional 
stage in the development towards a better society. Thus 
existing social systems and codes of behaviour and 
relationships between different people should be 
maintained and accepted as natural processes -have selected 
the present form as best suited to the circumstances. 
Emphasis on the determinist view of biological theory thus 
tend to justify the status quo. This is reflected in 
social and political policies and institutions and 
determines the relationships between people and between 
different groups of people. 
5.4 The implications of sociobiology 
Sociobiology has through its genetic and biological 
hypotheses influenced the ~evelopment of social as well as 
political policies. Natural selection has been claimed as 
the primary agent for the development of social and 
political policies, (AlIen, E. et all resulting in a 
deterministic view of behaviour. Consequently, a genetic 
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basis or explanation has been sought for such problems as 
crime, alcoholism and even for racial differences in 
intelligence. They also provide a genetic justification 
for the privilege of certain groups according to class, 
race or sex. They have, for example, provided ft basis 
for America's "sterilization" and restrictive immigration 
laws (1910-1930). 
Sociobiology has thus served to "reinvigorate" the old 
theories attempting to show that man's behaviour is due to 
evolution, in the same way as organic evolution: all 
behaviour would thus be explicable and understood in terms 
of biological theories. Sociobiology would therefore, in 
the light of modern genetic theory, reinforce Social 
Darwinism and support eugenic policies. 
The determinist element in sociobiology sees the present 
state of society as the result of biological forces 
I 
(genetic determinism, natural selection, etc.) and the 
biological nature of humans - over which no conscious 
control is possible. Present social and political 
conditions can therefore be justified on biological 
grounds as being selected naturally for the present 
conditions - which are also products of "biological 
imperatives." Past and present social institutions are 
thus legitimized and aggression, competition, the defence 
of national territory, individualism and the present 
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hierarchical order of society are viewed as being 
inevitable. It has long been felt that "evolutionary 
imperatives" have determined human social behaviour. This 
has been seized upon and widely entertained not so much 
for its alleged correspondence with reality as for its 
more obvious socio-political value. In the background of 
modern social dynamics sociobiology seems to promote the 
acceptance of present situations as they appear the world 
over. For it would consider these situations as natural 
since the processes that led to these situations were 
genetically determined. Of consequence, they are the best 
situations for the present since they have been brought 
about by natural selection. It justifies the status quo 
which is further maintained by (in certain societies) 
discriminative legislation, social injustice and 
militarism. Discrimination is often on grounds of race, 
colour, creed, religious beliefs, etc. Sociobiology, 
therefore, not only accounts for but also promotes the 
I 
present state of things. 
The environmentalist view that culture is the basis of 
human behaviour also shows culture as directive in human 
behaviour. Adherents of this view use their position to 
erect barriers against social change in order to defend 
established social institutions. If people are plastic, 
then those with a claim to knowledge would feel justified 
in their claim to authority over others. This could lead 
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to dictatorships. Thus if human nature (psychologically -
as opposed to genetically) is a product of history and 
"given social relations" it could result in the removal of 
barriers to manipulation by the powerful. Both determinist 
and environmentalist attitudes thus lead to similar 
positions. 
5.4.1 Socio-political implications of sociobiology 
Sociobiology has implications for the question that has 
plagued man for over two and a half millenia: What is the 
nature of political man? Is man inherently good or evil? 
Or, is man political by nature? Unlike the view of 
Rousseau (The Social Contract) who saw man as solitary in 
the "natural" state, sociobiology would advocate that man 
is social and thus political. The question of man's 
. inherent goodness or evil is also important from a 
religious point of view as the Bible sees man as having 
"fallen" and in need of "redemption". 
; 
Kropotkin (1903) along with other anarchists, asserts that 
man is inherently good and that humans are inherently good 
by nature. The state, therefore, is not necessary and 
evil. Hobbes (Leviathan), however, sees man as selfish 
and self-centred. A strong state is therefore needed to 
regulate society and curb the selfish tendencies of man. 
Marx and Owen see man as neither good nor evil. Human 
nature is, therefore, a "reflection of the objective 
277 
conditions under which humans are raised and live", it is 
thus a reflection of society. According to Aristotle, man 
is by nature a political animal (Aristotle - Politics). 
Locke, however, felt that man learns to be pnlitical as 
reason demonstrates the necessity of political life. 
Locke (Two treaties of government) was of the view that 
people are by nature in different groups. Thus people 
should perform those duties and responsibilities for which 
they have been equipped by nature. 
Human nature, however, had to be developed, in, for, and 
by the state. The nature of man has thus provided the 
foundation on which political theorists could develop 
their political philosophies. Competing political and 
social ideologies also find a basis in human nature, as 
classical conservatism assumes that people differ in 
intelligence and ability. For social order or stability 
to prevail, it is necessary to pave a strong ) state or 
tradition to counteract the imperfections of human nature. 
However, it is unwise to change individuals through social 
engineering as the consequences of directed social change 
cannot be comprehended by man's rational capabilities. 
In contrast to this view is Liberalism which feels that 
man desires freedom and to this end is rational. He can, 
therefore, using his rational faculties effect deliberate 
political change. The individual then becomes a 
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manifestation of purpose or duty. This raises questions 
as to whether the rulers or the ruling group is servant or 
master: if servant, they would carry out the wishes of 
society: if master, they would direct society. It can 
only be assumed that they would know the correct course 
to pursue, in order to achieve the desired freedom. 
Basically, the course would be that directed by human 
nature. If the individual is conceptualized as "economic 
man", the application of a cost benefit calculus to 
maximize economic gain" would result in Capitalism. 
Based in reciprocal altruism, if man is seen as being, or 
as capable of becoming essentially co-operative and 
nonaquisative, society can be seen as being essentially 
Socialist. In such a society man can happily and 
effectively share the means and the output of production. 
Socialism, however, assumes many forms but central to its 
thesis is the view that only through a "collective, social , 
ownership of the means of production", can a morally 
justifiable foundation be laid on which a society can be 
built. The anarchist view, however, (Kropotkin, P. 1903) 
also based on altruism maintains that a political society 
is unnecessary, as man is inherently good and co-
operative. Depending on the convictions, therefore, about 
the nature of political man, diverse ideological schools 
emerge. 
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From a sociobiological point of view, and since altruism 
has a genetic basis (Wilson, E.O. 1978) human nature is 
seen as being inherently good: for, consistent with 
genetic theory, reciprocal altruism is part of human 
nature (Wilson, E.O. 1980). And since it would be 
advantageous to human survival, it would be selected for, 
in evolution. The opposite, however, is also applicable: 
aggressiveness, since it can enhance reproductive success, 
can also be selected. Sociobiology, therefore, gives 
credence to divergent views, in support of a s i ngle 
phenomenon. 
For sociobiologists, behaviour is a product of 
evolutionary adaptation and as such "is designed" (since 
it was selected for in evolution) for the maintenance of 
social stability. The emphasis on natural differences 
raises the consequent need for "subordination and 
sup.erordina tion" in soc ial and pol i t ical science. Var ious 
I 
insect castes are taken to represent social 
differentiation. And, even though primates are distinct 
from insect species, it has been hypothesized that their 
(primate and subsequently human) social organization 
displays a genetic basis for class distinction. Such 
distinctions have been used to justify the ideas of "ruler 
and subject", of "subordination" and also of a natural 
"division of labour". Reciprocal altruism can be seen as 
being advantageous in such a position. Wilson suggests 
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that money and the free exchange of goods are also forms 
of reciprocal altruism, (Wilson, E.O. 1980). This leads 
Sahlins, M. 1976) to charge sociobiologists like Trivers 
(Trivers, R.L. 1971) and Wilson (1980) of adyocating 
"possessive individualism". The fact that 
Australopithecus africanus, Homo habilis and also Homo 
sapiens spent much of their time in collective bands 
(Leakey, R.E. and Lewin, R. 1977, Tobias, P.V. 1973) like 
the lower primates, is taken by sociobiologists as a 
justification for the evolution of sociality in man. 
Socialists seize upon this fact as the justification for 
their advocacy of the "collective control of the means of 
production." 
Viewed in sociobiological perspective, despite the 
effects of altruism, human tendencies are towards 
aggression and violence in both national and international 
affairs. This would seem to be the result of political 
I 
socialization, analogous to the genetic determinant view 
of territoriality and group btinding and imprinting. This 
leads to the problem of whether the causes of, e.g. war, 
should be sought in human nature, the nature of states or 
in the structure of the international system. 
Political and social institutions behave like organisms, 
adapting to changing environmental conditions. "Genetic 
selfishness" is counteracted by the development of social 
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and political norms for altruism which is developed not 
through biological, but through social evolution. 
Processes analogous to natural selection are responsible 
for the development and evolution of socio-political 
institutions. Organic evolution has thus not kept pace 
with social, political and economic institutions. Thus, 
it is possible that man has no "genetic fit" with the 
social environment he has created for himself. 
Consequently, individual predispositions which are 
genetically influenced will be at variance with social 
norms and political structures for it is within these that 
the individual has to fUnction. A balance, therefore, has 
to be restored and maintained between social and political 
structures and genetically influenced individual 
predispositions. 
This argument of Peterson and Somit (Peterson, S.A. and 
Somit, A. 1978. In Caplan, (eo) 1978) would suggest a 
non-genetic basis for human altruism since it is "derived" 
from the conflict between individual predispositions and 
political structures. "Genetic selfishness" is thus 
controlled by political and social institutions. In its 
attempt to adapt to these institutions the individual 
effects changes in them, which in turn changes the 
individual: thus genetic control is not complete! This 
results in the process of continual change in the 
individual and the institution. Genetic theory would not 
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allow such changes since mutations are basically the 
elements of change. And genetic mutations occur neither 
as quickly nor as frequently as changes in socio-political 
structures. A genetic basis for these chang~s is also 
unacceptable when viewed in the background of evolutionary 
theories such as "phyletic gradual ism" or "saltatory 
evolution" which themselves are problematic when viewed in 
the background of genetic and evoiutionary theory. 
Individual reason and culture therefore, overrules genetic 
predisposition and guides the individual. Since there is 
a continual interaction between the individual and 
political and social institutions, a "genetic fit" cannot 
be achieved; also because the individual is not under 
complete genetic control as hypothesized for the non-human 
world. Consequently, both the individual and socio-
political institutions continue to evolve, but in 
directions guided by forces within institutions . 
themselves. 
This would seem to support the view that culture is the 
primary determinant in the development of socio-political 
structure. Rawls, for example, in A Theory of Justice 
(1971) says, "In a just society the liberties of equal 
citiz~nship are taken as settled; the rights secured by 
justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the 
calculus of social interests" (cited in Caplan, (ed) 1978) 
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p.299). Individual rights, therefore, cannot be 
transgressed by anyone, including the state. 
These premises lead to different prescriptions. The 
approach of Rawls would permit a rigid social control so 
that it might be possible to distribute equally the 
rewards of society. Nozick (Nozick, 1974) however, sees 
the control of the state only in a minimal capacity -
state's function should be primarily one of protection of 
its citizens against force and fraud. The rewards of 
society should also be distributed .equally. Unlike Rawls, 
Nozick accepts a meritocracy, unless the communities 
decide to experiment with egalitarianism. This, however, 
could lead to problems as it would require the 
constitution of a body to prescribe moral precepts. If 
social behaviour is "learned and transmitted by culture", 
social policies would be created by culture and thus 
decision-makers would validate the status quo. Such a 
view of social policy, consequent on the premises of , 
environmentalism has been rejected by The Study group of 
Science for the People (S.S.G.S.P.). 
Wilson (1980) therefore falls back on "human nature" with 
the human genotype imposing restraints upon "human 
nature". An understanding of their significance 
therefore, requires a reconstruction of the evolutionary 
history of the mind alongside cultural evolution. This 
also provokes the question: "To what extent should the 
284 
censors and motivators in the emotive centres of the brain 
be obeyed? Given that these centres deeply and 
unconsciously affect our moral decisions, how faithfully 
must they be consulted once they have been defined and 
assayed as a biological process? The answer must confront 
what seems to be the true human dilemma." (Wilson, E.O. 
1975 In Caplan A.L. 1978 p.30l) They cannot be followed 
blindly. Their structure and genetic components are the 
products of millions of years of prehistory evolving in 
conditions that no longer exist. Even so, it is these 
processes that have guided human mental processes to the 
state where they are able to appreciate the necessity to 
choose consciously among the inherited emotional guides, 
if man is to decide how human he wishes to remain, in the 
ultimate biological sense. Wilson thus leaves man with a 
freedom of choice and yet reminds him of his biological 
position. 
Consequent on this dilemma, a sense of reserve is 
advocated when proposals are made for social change -
"based on utopian intuition". If biological 
interpretation is correct, then men possess innate rights. 
These are embedded in the drives for survival - which are 
independent of validational procedures like ad hoc 
theoretical constructions of society. If the creation of 
human rights is based on culture, as advocated by the 
environmentalist position, then, the withdrawal or removal 
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of these rights can equally well be validated by culture. 
Alper (Alper, E. 1976) agrees with the S.S.G.S.P. 1978) 
and with Wade (Wade, M. 1976) that Sociobiology is a 
political issue attempting to justify "biological 
determinism" as the basis of "human social existence". He 
however, feels that the efforts to biologize sociality are 
based not in biology, but in particular social and 
political perspectives. This is clearly evident when the 
S.S.G.S.P. takes issue with Sociobiology as being 
deterministic in providing a biological basis for sex 
roles in society, based on genetic theory. However, this 
bias exists in both agricultural and industrial societies 
and although Wilson (Wilson, E.O. 1980) lacks the proof 
for interpolation from insects or any other animal to man, 
he feels the position justified on the grounds that it has 
evolved to this state through natural selection. He 
therefore feels that society shpuld not be "steered" 
(social engineering, eugenics, etc.) as the stresses and 
strains that society undergoes are the processes that give 
society its Darwinian edge. Thus, in a genetic sense, 
social control would not be able to adapt to changing 
circumstances - and this could be deleterious to its 
survival. 
This view also regards society as an organism and sees the 
"Darwinian hypothesis" as the basis and guiding force of 
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its evolution. Stress on the societal gene pool would 
therefore result in the survival of the best genes. Such 
a _view would also justify those forces that are disruptive 
to society in whatever form. And the results of the 
disruption would, therefore, be looked upon as good and 
beneficial to society. Sociobiologists would see such 
positions as being natural and as the maximization of the 
genetic potential of the population. Their position that 
society should not be "steered" is contradictory as the 
"stresses and strains" of society are the results of 
society being "steered" by different economic and socio-
political ideologies. Such views are also supportive of 
an ethics that is "self-centred", both at the individual 
and at societal level. 
5.4.2 Ethical implications of sociobiology 
Philosophers and scientists have long argued on the 
"relationship between empirical scientific knowledge and 
moral or value beliefs", or ethics. Science and ethics 
are generally separated with the result that the 
formulation of moral prescriptions on the ba$is of 
empirical science has not been ac~eptable. However, it is 
equally obvious that scientific findings directly 
influence the sorts of moral (or ethical) prescriptions 
held to be valid at any given moment. The notorious feuds 
at the beginning of ths century between those who believed 
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ethics to be reducible to the empirical properties 
discovered by science and those who denied that any such 
reduction was possible, have produced a "schism between 
these two camps that few participants in either group seem 
willing to acknowledge, much less bridge." (Caplan, A.L. 
1978 p.3l2). 
Evolutionary theory (Darwinism) based in genetics concerns 
a drive for species survival. All else in behaviour, 
would thus, of necessity, be directed to this drive. Seen 
in the background of Darwin's theory, this woul d mean a 
"struggle for survival" with consequent "survival of the 
fittest". Darwin's theory concerned those genes that were 
best able to survive environmental changes. Dawkins 
(Dawkins, R. 1976) attributed this survival to the 
"selfishness" of the gene in its attempt to maximize its 
potential and so perpetuate itself. Behaviour among 
animals is considered from this viewpoint. And that 
behaivour is considered proper and appropriate, in the 
circumstances in which an animal finds itself, which 
result~ in the survival of that animal and consequently in 
the survival of its genes. Since genes are be11eved to be 
to a large extent both prescriptive and directive of 
behaviour, the animal is viewed only as a means to the 
survival or only as a vehicle in which the genes may 
realize their potential for survival and proliferation. 
This narrows the field for the search for ethics or for 
288 
the basis of morality to those aspects of behaviour that 
are genetically controlled, or rather, all behaviour is 
seen in terms of genetic expression. 
Sociobiol~gy thus sees ethics as subservient to the 
preservation, proliferation and perpetuation of the gene. 
Natural selection and molecular genetics are thus combined 
to account for "self-oriented" behaviours by classical and 
individual selection, and altruism, by kin selection (to 
relatives) and by reciprocal selection (to non-relatives). 
The adaptive advantages of dominance, hierarchy, 
territoriality and other features of present animal 
behaviour are all accounted for on a genetic basis. This 
leads to a biological determinism which would constitute a 
justification of existing social institutions, as being 
adaptive. Human behaviour patterns could thus be viewed 
in the basis of adaptive radiation. 
Already in the "Victorian social milieu" Spencer's 
evolutionary positivism served as a "sociological model". 
With evolutionism as the basis, Spencer contended that 
progress was an integral aspect of Nature. Humanity was 
assured of inexorable progress so long as its moral and 
consequently social precepts were founded on a scientific 
basis. This would result in a natural social order. Just 
as Newton had discovered the universal laws of natural 
causation which governed the physical universe, so, 
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Spencer felt that evolutionism governed events in the 
biological universe. The scientific paradigm (Kuhn, T.S. 
1962) of explanation could therefore constitute the basis 
of all knowledge. Biological, and consequently, human 
phenomena could thus be explained and understood in terms 
of scientific (cause and effect principles) theory: 
(Positivist view) a belief in the uniformity of nature. 
And since all parts of Nature are fundamentally similar, 
they should yield to similar analyses. "This assumption 
has profound effects on the epistemological status of 
humans: human situations can be seen as biological 
situations, human institutions, as biological instruments 
for survival." (Miller, L.G. 1976 In Caplan, A.L. 1978). 
Thus human conduct could be seen as biological 
regularities. 
5.5 Sociobiology: an assessment 
Sociobiology can be seen as an ?ttempt to draw together 
the seemingly disparate behaviour patterns of birds, 
monkeys, insects, etc., in order to derive a common theory 
for the origin and maintenance of these behaviour patterns 
on an evolutionary basis: "to place all biological 
phenomena under a single rubric" (Miller, L.G. 1976. In 
Caplan, A.L. 1978). The sociobiologist aim is to develop 
a common set of parameters applicable to all the different 
groups of the animal world, including man. Bonner 
(Bonner, 1975) and Sade (Sade, 1975) express their 
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enthusiasm for the view that the extension of sociobiology 
to sociology, and perhaps to the humanities will give to 
the latter disciplines the "precise quantifiable findings 
of population ~iology and evolutionary theory" (Caplan, 
A.L. 1978 p.306) although Wynne-Edwards (Wynne-Edwards, 
N.B. 1976) and Morrison (Morrison, R.S. 1975) endorse 
Wilson's evolutionary approach. The former is dubious 
whether the definitions of "society" can be conferred on 
biological systems such as ant or bee colonies. They both 
agree that vagueness and uncertainty cloud the corporation 
analysis of behaviour and its assessment as far as humans 
are concerned. 
The sociobiologist attempt to derive society and ethics 
from altruism, kin selection, etc., is problematic since 
social communication and the "evolution of mentality" are 
also legitimate problems for the analysis of human 
behaviour (Waddington, C.H.1960J. Altruism, kin and group 
selection, should be seen in the background of 
evolutionary theory (contemporary- Mayr, E. 1961, 1972; 
Dobzhansky, T. 1962, 1972; Simpson, G.G. 1963; 
Waddington, C.H. 1960) where evolution concerns "the 
product of organisms striving to maximize their 
contributions to the gene pool of future generations. The 
individual is the primary unit of evolutionary change", 
(Caplan, A.L. 1978 p.307); the gene pool is composed of 
individuals. Instances of altruistic behaviour include 
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caste sterility, warning cries (which could be to the 
disadvantage of the individual giving the warning), 
adoption, food sharing, dominance hierarchy, etc. 
Reproductive and personal advantage are sacrificed in 
these instances for the benefit of other organisms. It is 
therefore difficult to reconcile the sociobiologist and 
genetic (Dawkins, R. 1976) theses that altruism serves 
reproductive and personal advantage, with the instances of 
altruistic behaviour. 
Altruism, therefore, is the central problem of 
sociobiology. Wilson (Wilson, E.O. 1980) postulates 
altruistic genes in ants which results in castes, each 
modified for certain functions in the colony. Such 
modifications do not occur in vertebrates, much less so, 
in humans. The class or caste systems of humans are 
cultural inventions for socio-political purposes based on 
a division of labour. Distinct~ons of the system are also 
. 
not as clear or as morphologically (or genetically) 
binding as in insect social systems. In a widespread 
species such as man, where there is much gene flow, 
selection will require much longer to effect changes in 
traits. It is also not known to what extent behaviour is 
under direct genetic control. 
Wilson's extension of altruistic behaviour from animals to 
man; that it is adaptive, serving in the evolution of 
292 
social behaviour both of animals and of man, is based on 
the assumption that such behaviour is present both in 
animals and in man and that even in man it is adaptive, 
has a genetic basis and is preserved and perpetuated by 
natural selection. To substantiate this claim Wilson 
tries to show that what is considered altruism in animals 
is moral behaviour in humans, or that these two concepts 
are so similar that they should not be separated. 
However, moral behaviour is intentional whereas altruism, 
concerned only with consequences, i.e. with genetic 
fitness, is gene-directed. In humans, moral or altruistic 
behaviour is not concerned with fitness. Guided by 
intentionality, moral behaviour in humans is concerned 
with human relationships; towards living in harmony with 
other humans. It is also concerned with the treatment of 
all forms of life. Schweitzer's "respect of life", for 
example, will be an exception to Wilson's thesis. 
Although the practice of moral behaviour may assume 
different forms in diffei~nt cultures, it is basically 
directed towards harmonious living, without concern only 
for the self. Its concern is for a way in which to 
understand and to accept society and so live in harmony in 
it, and not for personal fitness. Human "altruism" is not 
restricted to kinship or group selection; it is concerned 
with humanity at large. Situations are numerous, however, 
where human behaviour is motivated by personal or group 
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gain. But this is directed not by any genetic influence 
but by emotion and reason. 
Wilson's view is that altruism is gene-governed. 
Consequently, moral behaviour could not be derived from 
the same basis as altruism because it is largely culture -
or reason - determined. Thus ethical behaviour is 
consciously directed and so forms a basis for moral 
action. Human altruism could have had its origin in the 
belief that altruism is beneficial to humans. Wilson does 
not give any priority to this view for he sees behaviour, 
and interprets moral beliefs as " ••• arising from the 
emotive centres of the hypotbalamic limbic system" which 
is a product of natural selection (Wilson, E.O. 1980). 
But although the system could have evolved by natural 
selection each moral belief cannot be explained in terms 
of natural selection. 
The sociobiology thesis is thus built on a number of 
assumptions interpreting human social behaviour on a 
genetic basis and expressed in biological terms. This 
view suggests that biological conclusions or solutions are 
applicable to human problems, although the biological 
basis for human behaviour cannot be determined 
conclusively in scientific terms. Thus the formulation of 
theories of human nature bear the political and social 
biases of sociobiologists. 
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Sociobiologists, according to their theory feel that the 
present system of social and political thinking is the 
best since it has evolved through natural se·lection. Thus 
these systems must be preserved. They maintain that 
biological theory shows an evolution towards this system. 
Thus the present trend to change systems of government and 
society are not justified - on a biological basis as it 
would upset the status quo which have reached their 
present forms through the natural processes of biological 
evolution. 
Wilson also feels that ethics, aesthetics, politics, 
culture and religion, etc., are all in need of 
biolization, since his primary aim is to explain aspects 
of human behaviour: homosexuality, philanthropy, celibacy, 
slavery and martyrdom, all in terms of evolutionary 
theory. For his conviction is tpat their origins lie in 
the action of selection upon genes. It is easier to 
envisage, however, these aspects of behaviour together 
with warning cries, adoption" food-sharing, etc., being 
transmitted by culture. Religion, for example, can 
transmit the advantages of celibacy and philantropy to 
more people quicker than reproduction and the processes 
of (genetic) selection pressure on the organic traits and 
genetic components in human ancestors. 
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Darwinian processes are adaptive and natural selection 
operative in "sorting out" traits suited to the 
environment. Thus disadvantageous traits do not survive. 
According to sociobiologists (e.g. Wilson, R.O. 1980: 
Barash, D. 1979, etc.) human social structures are also 
adaptive and those not suitable share the same fate. 
This, however, does not imply a genetic control for 
altruism, for such traits are preserved and perpetuated in 
the tradition (stories, songs, etc.) of a people. 
Reciprocal altruism can thus be inculcated by learning. 
Since sociobiology has grown out of the accumulation of 
studies on animal behaviour placed in the background of 
"theoretical ecology and population" and molecular 
genetics, it provides to some extent a theory to interpret 
and predict the social structure of a species. This is 
perhaps applicable (to some, or to a greater degree) to 
non-human social organizations. , In such cases 
organization may be rigid intraspecifically, but not 
interspecifically where there is an immense variety of 
organizations. It is questionable whether a simplistic 
genetic explanation is sufficient of such behavioural 
plasticity: and human society as much more complex and 
plastic. Moreover, human society is not without 
ecological problems: consequently, it cannot ~e the best 
adapted. Wilson's thesis would tend to justify present 
social situations for it would see these as a product and 
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result of the action of natural selection. Youth 
aggression, neglect of responsibility, political and 
religious (ideological) intolerance, would all then be 
acceptable as inevitable and normal. But such a situation 
is clearly unacceptable. 
5.5.1 Methodological Investigations of Sociobiology 
Wilson and other sociobiologists use the comparative 
method (like comparative anatomists) to " .•• develop 
general biological principles and to extrapolate 
conclusions from one group to another" (Bock"W.J. 1978. 
In Caplan, A.L. 1978 p.398). However, sociobiologists do 
not provide the theoretical principles of (biological) 
comparison for their synthesis. They do not account for 
the mechanisms of evolutionary change and for the basic 
principles and methods of comparative biology or how these 
might be applicable to sociobiology. Where anatomists are 
concerned with structures and o;gans and can easily trace 
through homology the relationships and derivation of 
organs and structures from one group to another, the 
sociobiologist deals with behaviour and behaviour patterns 
between groups. These studies are usually based on 
analogous behaviour patterns of different groups of 
animals. 
Wilson's thesis is therefore also problematic on 
methodological grounds, (Burian, R.M. 1978. In Caplan, 
297 
A.L. 1978). His language, in opposition to known 
pleiotropism, is genetically atomistic treating behaviour 
traits as being under the control of single genes. 
Sociobiologist implication is that there are. specific 
genes for aggression, spite, etc., which breaks up into 
arbitrary units the totality of individual behaviour and 
social phenomena. Reification of these units is taken as 
the basis for the postulation of specific genes for each 
unit. These hypothetical genes serve only to further 
analogical explanations. The idea of gene-specificity has 
long been abandoned for it cannot be demonst~ated 
conclusively, even at an anatomical level. 
The sociobiologist argument that all behaviour is adaptive 
is a consequent of their view that society can be seen as 
an organism and its "specific units" of behaviour as 
organs - adapted for the good of society. At present, 
however, there is no consensus among geneticists whether , 
adaptive or random processes constitute the basis of 
evolutionary processes. Huxley, (Huxley, J. 1948) avoids 
extreme selectionism in organic evolution by emphasizing 
allometry: organs may change as a result of their 
developmental links to others that are under selective 
pressure. Similar process could be operative in human 
social organization. 
Selection also is not operative on single genes but on the 
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phenotype; selection pressure affecting large assemblages 
of genes (Mayr, E. 1975. In Caplan, A.L. 1978). Absolute 
selective values thus cannot be assigned to a gene: its 
expression is dependent on its possible background. 
Consequently, sociobiology which assigns "fixed fitness" 
values to genes which are treated atomistically, 
encounters technical difficulties in relating, "current 
sociobiological calculational apparatus to a realistic 
genetics" (Burian, R.M. In Caplan, A.L. 1978 p.389). 
Universality of common behavioural traits and their 
continuity in different groups in the animal .k i ngdom, 
especially between primates and humans, need not 
necessarily be genetic. Most are analogous: similarity of 
result does not indicate "identity of cause". This is 
aptly shown by adaptive radiation and convergent 
evolution. 
The Sociobiology Study Group of,Science for the people 
(S.S.G.S.P.) asserts the absence of any behavioural 
homology, on a genetic basis, between the primates and 
humans. It is possible that natural selection has 
operated on different genes. This has elicited convergent 
responses as adaptations to similar environments. 
Wilson's and other sociobiologist analyses can thus be 
seen as the "metaphorical impositions of human 
institutions on animals", (S.S.G.S.P. 1978. In Caplan, 
A.L. 1978) and then finding the human instance from the 
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animal. In this way human behaviour and institutions seem 
to be natural, having their origins in non-human ancestors 
- even from groups that are not on a direct evolutionary 
line leading to humans. 
As a neo-Darwinist evolutionary theory, sociobiology has 
been extended to include besides details of social 
organization, taxonomy and ecology. While evolutionists 
try to extend their views over biology, ethologists 
attempt an integration of animal and human behaviour. 
Wilson attempts to " ••• stretch convergence fnto 
identity", with the humanities and biology constituting 
the common foundation of sociobiology. However, a form of 
biological determinism is implicit in the sociobiological 
framework. Within this framework, the evolutionary 
history of the organisms concerned should form the basis 
of explanations emerging from genetic and ecological 
parameters, and the natural historical descriptions of 
organisms. However, sociobiological descriptions of the 
behaviour are based on "back metaphor" in which 
anthropomorphic descriptions are used to describe both 
animal and human behaviours. X~nophobia, for example, is 
used to describe all types of aggression against newcomers 
and aggression is applied to competition as well as 
fighting which usually results in the submission of one of 
the contestants without suffering any real injury or harm. 
The behaviour pattern, therefore, cannot be real 
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aggression as applicable in the human context (War, etc.). 
Wilson thus seems to strain his descriptive apparatus in 
order to explain or accommodate behaviours and human 
institutions within genetic explanations: even cultural 
evolution is built in "genetic potential" in the brain! 
Sociobiology is thus beset with numerous problems that 
restrict its value and its direct application to the study 
of human behaviour in its social and ethical aspects. 
Numerous conceptual problems also have to be solved as 
concepts used in the evaluation and description of human 
behaviour cannot be applied to animals. Also, 
explanations that might be applicable to animal behaviour 
are not appropriate in the human situation. One of the 
central problems is the use of consciousness in human 
behaviour. A genetic basis for human behaviour would be 
deterministic which is seen as instinct in anima~s, i.e., 
certain behaviour patterns are unavoidable. Human 
behaviour, however, is dependent on numerous factors: 
choice, duty consciousness, conscience, responsibility, 
etc. 
Sahlins (Sahlins, M. 1976) is of the view that 
sociobiological explanations undermine the role of culture 
in human behaviour. The constitution of reality via 
language through empirical and rational argument, has 
emancipated culture and human behaviour from complete 
301 
genetic domination. Methodological, ethical and technical 
difficulties also arise in attempts to study directly the 
biological basis of human behaviour. Usually other 
animals are studied and the results availabl€ are, with 
modification, applied to human behaviour. However, such 
applications are inconclusive, even if results from 
primatology are applied to man, since the conclusions 
drawn may be from inadequate evidence. Ethological 
studies, like sociobiological, are often subjective -
biased as behaviour cannot be categorized into discrete 
entities. Even though reliability checks are made, 
hypotheses cannot always be readily tested. Consequently, 
the applicability of sociobiology directly or even 
restrictedly to human behaviour is greatly undermined. 
Investigations also reveal that phenotypic expression (of 
the genotype) is to a great extent environment-dependent. 
Even though (an animal's) deve19pment might be completed, 
environmental influences can result in alterations in 
phenotypic expression, e.g. in the mechanisms of somatic 
or physiological adaptations. Phyletic evolution, the 
result of mutation and selection, is regarded as being 
"chance-based" or the accidental component of evolution. 
It is the result of the interaction between the 
environment and the phenotype (of individuals) where there 
is differential survival of the phenotypes. It is this 
that makes natural selection seem the "design aspect of 
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evolution", creating the impression of a progressive 
development towards man: as though man is the inevitable 
result of these natural processes. However, natural 
selection does not predetermine the nature o~ the 
genetically-based variations; it only selects from the 
variations those that will survive in the environment. 
The phenotype (or individual) is therefore the product of 
the interaction between the environment and the genotype. 
Thus, even from a biological viewpoint it can be seen that 
the genotype does not completely determine behaviour. 
The mechanisms of evolution, mutation, natural selection, 
speciation, etc., are all problematic and make Wilson's 
views on sociobiology, (the derivation of human behaviour 
through comparative behaviour) even more problematic and 
uncertain. Phylo-analysis and comparison of different 
groups shows that behaviour patterns do not have a common 
origin, especially when vertebrate and invertebrate groups 
are concerned. The origin of social and colonial 
behaviour in vertebrates is not homologous to that of 
invertebrates. Even though comparisons can be made, 
lineages -diverged very early in geological time. It is a 
matter of conjecture whether behaviour patterns of 
contemporary animals could have been the same in early 
geological time. Even if Wilson restricts his comparison 
to primates, an homology is difficult to obtain. 
The use of kinship relations by sociobiologists in their 
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discussions on altruism is couched in genetic language 
creating the impression that kinship relations are 
basically of a genetic nature. Human kinship relations 
are based on "arbitrary rules" (which is evident in the 
comparative anthropological studies of different peoples) 
of marriage, residence, and descent. They (kinship 
relations) are cultural, governing the co-operative 
relationships of the type unique to human societies, and 
are developed for specific purposes. Geneological 
relationships thus obtain arbitrary values from kinship 
relationships. Sociologists believe that these 
"categories are cultural manifestations of truer 
biological practices" (Sahlins, M. 1976). 
Wilson himself seems to contradict his views (earlier) 
when discussing certain types of behaviour. He feels that 
since the capacity to learn is genetic, it does not matter 
whether aggression, for example, is innate or learned. 
But this is precisely what does matter: for genes cannot 
be responsible, if, as he says, "they have given away 
their sovereignity" (Wilson, E.O. 1980). Wilson's view 
that genetic sovereignity "underlies" variations between 
cultures is also problematic. Although chromosome numbers 
are species specific, genetic (molecular) variations do 
occur, which are the "raw materials" of natural selection. 
His impilication is that these constitute the basis of 
cultural variations also. Such a view, however, would not 
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account for intra-cultural variations and the rate of 
cultural change for this is much faster than the operative 
rate of natural selection. population genetics makes 
predictions about rates of change and biochemistry 
provides data on the "degree of genetic differentiation 
between human populations". The correlation between these 
two, however, is "too small to agree with the very rapid 
changes that have occurred in human cultures historically 
and the very large cultural differences observed among 
contemporary populations" (Caplan, A.L. 1978 p.288). 
From a methodological viewpoint, the sociobiological 
argument is problematic. Closer examination of the 
Darwinian hypothesis and the genetic theory show that 
human behaviour and society, are much more complex than 
those theories can accommodate. Just as the effect of the 
environment is important for phenotypic expression, so is 
the effect of culture at a soci~tal level; where culture 
can be seen as the environment necessary for the 
development of the individual. Sociobiologist theory, 
therefore, is dependent not on definite scientific laws 
but also on prevailing historical conditions or historical 
periods. 
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5.5.2 The role of culture 
Alper is of the view that " •.. despite the sociobiologists' 
supposed disregard for social, historical anf political 
factors which shape human actions these factors are 
incorporated into the theory in the form of the 
behavioural traits suggested as fundamental to human 
society' (Alper, J. 1978. In Caplan, A.L.1978. p48l). 
Wilson does say that human behaviour (in society) is 
characterised by "indoctrinability", "spite", "male 
dominaqce", deception and hypocrasy" and "xenophobia". He 
also asserts that these behaviour patterns have a genetic 
basis. But such a view is based on social, political and 
historical analyses. viewed in this background the 
assumptions of sociobiology become apparent: that the 
predictable effects of genes are evident in human 
behaviour and that their relevance to human behaviour is 
the result of evolutionary pressure on non-human 
populations. Sociobiologists thus see contemporary 
"primitive" societies as the types of societies that could 
have given rise to modern societies. "Primitive" societies 
are also seen as having their origins in animal groupings. 
e.g., those of primates. Consequently data on studies on 
animal behaviour are applied to humans. Genetic 
constraints on animal behaviour are thus applied to 
human behaviour. But the failure to demonstrate a direct 
link between gene and behaviour in the individual or in an 
evolutionary view undermines the sociobiologist analysis 
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of human behaviour. 
The popularization of sociobiology has led to the view 
that its implications for human society are xevolutionary. 
It has been felt that this new science with its new ideas 
why humans sometimes "behave like cavemen, will show the 
relevance of zoology and primatology to human behaviour. 
It is also felt that some dilemmas of present society can 
also be solved if they are " •.• quantifiably related to 
analogous phenomena in other animal species"- on the 
assumption that the "facts"of sociobiology are applicable 
to the explanation of human behaviour in accordance with 
evolutionary principles. Social behaviour is thus 
explained in terms of "adaptive significance" (Alper, J. 
1978. In Caplan, A.L. 1978). 
According to Durham (Durham, 1978. In Caplan, A.L. 
1978) neo-Darwinist theory is ot the view that genetic 
traits optimal to animals in their envivironment are 
preserved over generations. Individual level natural 
selection is responsible for phenotypic changes. Thus 
genotypes influencing phenotypic changes suited to 
prevailing environmental conditions are preserved. 
In humans however the fUnction of the genotype is to a 
large extent assumed by culture., which, constituting the 
non-genetic component of the phenotype, promotes and 
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preserves in human populations, through literature, 
customs, traditions, art, etc.,features advantageous to 
both individual and population. It seems therefore that 
what was selected during human evolution "was an unusual 
capability for modifying phenotypes on the basis of 
learning and experience. Within limits culture enables us 
to alter and build onto aspects of morphology, physiology 
and behaviour without any corresponding change in 
genotype. This means of course that natural selection by 
itself iU neither adequate nor appropriate for explaining 
the culturally acquired phenotypic traits of _human 
beings," (Durham, W.B. 1978. In Caplan, A.L. 1978. p.429) 
This capability to what might be called "genetic 
plasticity"is not ~nique to humans. Statistical 
determinations show that all animals do not have the same 
behaviour all the time. There are always parti6ular 
instances of deviation from "normal"behaviour-to suit the 
circumstances. This behavioural plasticity is apparent 
f 
more in the primates and man than in the other groups of 
animals. This is taken to be an advance over other animal 
groups, and is seen as the (genetic) " Darwinian edge" 
that has culminated in man having the most unpredictable 
behaviour. 
Culture is governed by non-biological processes and is 
characterised by variations within and between groups. 
These variations undergo a selective process very similar 
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to natural selection. These could include" free energy, 
satisfaction, profit, population regulation, homeostasis 
and ease of replication and transmission of cultural 
instruction." It seems therefore that "genetic plasticity" 
was selected for as it permitted modifications through 
learning and experience and also for its survival value 
(Durham, W.H. 1978. In Caplan, A.L. 1978) .Humans do not 
passively receive culture but also develop selective 
biases towards phenotypic aspects which past experience 
has shown to be advantageous. Such selective processes 
occur at both individual and group levels, and cultural 
selection becomes complimentary to natural selection. In 
this way more forms of human social behaviour develop than 
could be produced by mutations and "transgenerational 
changes" in presumed behaviour-gene frequency. 
Sociobiologists therefore attempt to preserve the discrete 
gene-based behaviour hypothesis,by postulating "gene 
plasticity". This shows on the one hand, that sociobiology 
cannot explain human behaviour on a genetic basis, and on 
the other that culture being not gene-determined shows the 
inadequacy of present genetic theory as an explanation of 
heredity and also the uncertainty of the Darwinian 
hypothesis. 
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5.5.3 Value of sociobiological claims 
An analysis of sociobiology shows that human social 
behaviour cannot be viewed only in the light of biological 
claims. Culture allows phenotypic modification without 
any "concomittant genetic change" (Durham, W.H. 1978. In 
Caplan, A.L. 1978. p.444). This however, does not negate 
the value of human biology in human evolution as genetic 
influence and constraints are important in human 
behaviour. Thus human biology and culture must be 
integrated in studies on human adaptations. The processes 
~ 
of selective retention must be examined in order to learn 
about cultural selective mechanisms within and between 
groups. This view adds a historical dimension to theories 
of adaptation. 
Some sociobiologists (e.g. Trivers - refer Alper, J. 
et al. 1978. In Caplan, A.L. 1978) see sociobiology as 
setting up physical and social worlds to accommodate the 
biological and genetic components of human behaviour. 
Thus sociobiology sets up "sex role division of labour, 
competition and hierarchies" based on behaviour in e.g~, 
insect colonies, and sees these behaviour patterns as 
being "genetically controlled". Alper (Alper, J. 1978. 
In Caplan, A.L. 1978) sees these aspects of behaviour as 
being changeable within limits. The way society is 
structured and inequalities and other fundamental 
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questions dealt with depend on ethical principles. It is, 
however, the origin of these ethical principles which are 
in question. Sociobiology advocates an evolutionary 
approach to this question: "biologization" of ethics 
(Wilson, E.O. 1975). The striving for a free and equal 
society is one of the most important aspects of human 
behaviour. Sociobiology, however, shows the limitations 
of man for attainment of an egalitarian society since 
genetically influenced drives do not validate the claim 
for corresponding rights. Thus there is a greater need 
for relevance from genes to action. Caution -must, 
therefore, be exercised in attempts to culturally control 
or plan society on a genetic basis (eugenics, selective 
breeding, etc.). 
Altruism as discussed by Wilson (Wilson, E.O. 1980) is 
also not the same as ethical altruism since all instances 
of altruism do not fall under Wilson's theory. Some 
instances of moral behaviour might be explained in 
biological terms but this is not enough to establish 
normative claims about altruism. The explanation of facts 
in biological terms and the making of moral assertions are 
not identical activities. Thus altruism cannot be 
explained in moral terms without the use of further 
sociobiological premises. Sociobiologist altruistic 
behaviour does not encompass the concepts of Will and 
responsibility, - and these are necessary aspects of 
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ethics or moral behaviour. "To show that ethics was 
merely a specialized branch of biology, one would need to 
establish a conceptual connection between the concepts of 
the two sorts of claims. A form of sociobiology 
attenuated enough to be plausible seems to be too weak to 
take ethics out of the hands of philosophers" (Mattern, R. 
1978. In Caplan, A.L. 1978. p.470). Thus the 
"biolization of ethics cannot be established or claimed on 
contemporary genetic or biological theory. 
It is also a "naturalistic fallacy" to claim that ethics 
is nothing but biology. It raises the question of whether 
ethical claims can be derived from factual ones. Both 
critics of sociobiology and sociobiologists have assumed 
that "normative conclusions follow directly from 
scientific premises". The S.S.G.S.P. sees in sociobiology 
a behavioural determinism contending that it constitutes a 
defence of the status quo, because of its social , 
implications: that theories of sociobiology "operate as 
powerful forms of legitimation of past and present social 
institutions such as aggression, competition, domination 
of women by men, defence of national territory, 
individualism, and the appearance of status and wealthy 
hierarchy" (S.S.G.S.P. 1976. p.182) 
Neither side of the dispute has addressed the problematic 
status of derivations of value claims from scientific 
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ones. Although there might be a relevance of biological 
fact to justification of moral claims, the facts 
themselves are insufficient - as moral claims are also 
seen in a cultural context. Consequently, instead of 
genetic constraint the cultural context itself constitutes 
a sort of constraint. Without such constraints, it is 
possible that humans could decide the type of society they 
want and proceed to bring it about. This is possible only 
if human behaviour can be seen as completely malleable. 
The S.S.G.S.P. contends that only basic functions are 
genetically controlled while others, e.g., behaviours are 
learned. Against such views Wilson contends that he is 
not advocating a biological determinism. His intention is 
to show that the relevance of biology to social behaviour 
can be demonstrated through sociobiology. He warns that 
if human behaviour can be seen as completely malleable, it 
would allow for the imposition of "personal" systems and 
for the justification of social/and economic arrangements. 
It can be argued against this however, that if human 
behaviour is genetically determined, the status quo is 
justified as unavoidable. But Wilson also states, "On the 
.basis of objective evidence the truth appears to lie 
somewhere in between, closer to the environmentalist than 
to the genetic pole. That was my wholly empirical 
conclusion in Sociobiology: The new synthesis, and 
continues to be in later writings." (Wilson, E.O. 1976. 
In Caplan, A.L. 1978). 
313 
According to Wilson, the final chapter of Sociobiology: 
The new synthesis must be seen not as the conclusion drawn 
from previous chapters but as the beginning nf studies 
into human behaviour with an assessment of the earlier 
chapters for their relevance to such behaviour. Even 
though he postulates genes for diagnostic human traits, it 
does not mean that there are specific genes for "spite", 
etc. "The tendency to develop such behaviour in a 
distinctly human form, is part of an immensely complex 
social repe~tory which is undoubtedly dependent on large 
numbers of genes" (Wilson, E.O. 1976. In Caplan, A.L. 
1978. p.295). There are certain features of behaviour, 
e.g. facial expressions conveying basic emotions that are 
relatively inflexible and transcultural", and even similar 
to higher ceropithecoid primates. His aim is to place 
human behaviour in "clearer evolutionary perspective", but 
his critics read his statements out of context and 
I 
therefore see his work as a "genetic determinism". 
Consequently, they see his work as racist or as an attempt 
to justify the status quo in social and political issues. 
To suit their purposes critics (e.g. S.S.G.S.P. and Alper, 
J. et al 1978. In Caplan, A.L. 1978) select only those 
passages in Sociobiology: The new synthesis that seem to 
justify the status quo. Wilson warns against the reading 
of his work as "What is, should bel" Genetic biases 
cannot be used to justify practices in present or future 
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societies. Even though certain practices could have been 
advantageous to Neolithic man, for example, the 
continuance of such practices might not be advantageous in 
contemporary society. Wilson thus says that "Genetic 
biases can be tresspassed, passions averted or redirected, 
and ethics altered: and the human genius for making 
constructs can continue to be applied for making healthier 
and freer societies" (Wilson, E.O. 1975. InCaplan, A.L. 
1978. p.267) 
Sociobiologists are, therefore, only providi~g possible 
answers, not asserting correctness of their claims. But 
even through the difference that exists between cultures, 
some genetic bonds do emerge, e.g. language, altruism, 
religion, etc. (Ruse, M. 1978. In Caplan, A.L. 1978). It 
is probable, however, that the "genetic bond" as far as 
language is concerned is not the ability for language but 
for the development and production of the organs and organ 
I 
systems used in the articulation of language. It is 
easier to see "altruism" and "religion", however, as 
dependent on culture. 
5.5.4 Links between biology and sociobiology 
Gould (Gould, S.G. 1978. In Caplan, A.L. 1978) contends 
that Wilson's critics have failed to see the relevance of 
biology to human behaviour, as, human biological nature 
does impose constraints on behaviour. Wilson's view is 
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that although human social and altruistic behaviour are 
genetically controlled, their subset of possible patterns, 
though restricted, are much different from those of ants, 
chimps and other social animals. Consequently, although 
Wilson endorses biological determinism, he does realize 
. the importance of cultural influences. He feels that just 
as Darwinism reformulated biological science, it could 
reformulate behavioural science. It is probably on this 
assumption that he expresses the view that "genes" do 
"maintain a certain amount of influence in at least the 
behavioural qualities that underlie variations between 
cultures" (Wilson, E.O. 1978. In Caplan, A.L. 1978 
p.345). However, since Wilson fails to produce evidence 
for direct genetic control of social behaviour, his view 
is merely speculative - for Darwinism needs genes to 
select! 
Although Wilson does provide a ~horough discussion of 
social behaviour in different animal groups, the final 
chapter of Sociobio1ogy: The new synthesis, "Sociobio1ogy 
to society" does not show any direct genetic link between 
non-human and human behaviour. It is an "extended 
speculation on the genetic basis of supposedly universal 
patterns of human behaviour" (Gou1d, S.G. 1978. In 
Caplan, A.L. 1978 p.344). 
Gou1d's view is that man's large brain (with all the 
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attributes that come with it) obviates the need for 
"coding" for any behaviour. He does not see the need for 
genes for specific behaviours for he sees behaviour not as 
"biologically determinist" but as "biological potential": 
behaviour is thus "biological" as the brain represents a 
subset of a range of possible behaviour patterns. 
Behaviour is thus determined by the social structures or 
by the creation of specific social structures that would 
permit certain specific behaviour patterns to flourish • 
. Gould sees his criticism of Wilson, not as a "non 
biological environmentalist; it merely fits ~he concept of 
biological potentiality, with a brain capable of the full 
range of human behaviours and predisposed towards none, 
against the idea of biological determinism, with specific 
genes for specific behavioural traits" (Gould, S.G. 1978. 
In Caplan, A.L. 1978 p.349). 
Gould's position, however, although he denies it, implies 
"environmental determinism". If the brain is capable of 
the "full range of human behaviours" it is the environment 
that is "selective" of any specific behaviour that is best 
suited to the particular situations. This would also 
imply that there is a set range of human behaviours: such 
a view is also determinist, although it is in this case 
the environment that dictates the selection of the "set" 
that is best suited to it. 
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Such a view, however, raises questions concerning the 
origin and transmission of the "set of behaviour 
patterns". It would also imply that all humans have 
identical or similar sets of behaviour patt~rns. Thus 
although Gould emphasizes the environmental and Wilson the 
genetic component of behaviour, they both begin in a 
biological determinism. 
Gould's idea of "potential", however, is significant as it 
introduces the ideas of choice and responsibility in human 
behaviour and action. This seems to be linked to the 
"large brain" of humans. However, choice, as far as Gould 
is concerned would be passive, the expression of the 
behaviour pattern being dependent on the environment. In 
humans, however, behaviour patterns are to a large extent, 
a matter of conscious choice, i.e. the expression of the 
behaviour pattern is the result of deliberation. 
Advantages and disadvantages are weighed in the light of 
past events and possible future repercussions, before 
acting. There is also a certain desired goal to any 
action, that must "fit in" with other actions, past and 
subsequent. The eventual action is, therefore, dependent 
on "consciousness and will": the individual can exercise 
some control over the behaviour pattern chosen under any 
particular set of circumstances - or condition of the 
environment. The behaviour pattern expressed therefore, 
is the outcome of "free will" and "choice", introducing 
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the idea of "responsibility" into behaviour. Humans are 
thus responsible for their actions. Although genetic 
influences do restrain action to some extent, it is 
neithe~ the genes nor the environment that dictate 
behaviour. These together do influence behaviour, but the 
final action, depends on the individual, showing freedom 
of choice. 
Besides "choice" and "responsibility" human action also 
embodies "conscience", so that choice of action is 
questioned (by the individual) with reference to certain 
norms and values of the individual and of society. Human 
behaviour, consequently, cannot be seen only in terms of 
hereditarianism or environmentalism, but in both these 
perspectives in addition to tradition and consciousness in 
all their multidimensional aspects. The large brain of 
humans thus introduces a new perspective into behaviour. 
Wilson's focus on "intuitionistic approaches to ethics" 
also narrows his view of ethics. Seen in the background 
of natural selection, Wilson sees natural human drives as 
"egoistic", like Dawkins (Dawkins, R. 1976), and not as 
beneficial to others. Darwin, however, had anticipated 
this natural drive and in his approach to ethics saw 
altruism not as egoistic, but as " ••• the most noble of 
all the attributes of man, leading him without a moment's 
hesitation to risk his life for that of a fellow creature. , 
or after due deliberation, impelled singly by the deep 
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feeling of right or duty, to sacrifice it in some great 
cause" (Darwin, C. 1871 p.148). Although Wilson's 
approach to ethics might be narrow, the significance of 
his views lies in the fact that he elucidates reference to 
natural features or to "genetically influenced 
attributes". Consequently, ethical theory is invested 
with a broader scope as it is not restricted to "empirical 
claims peculiar only to some members of the species". 
The relevance of biological fact to ethical theory lies in 
their informing theorists of the constraints Mon ethical 
claims: humans can do no more than they are biologically 
capable of doing! Limitations can be both environmental 
and genetic. "Biological considerations are also relevant 
to ethics because they inform us of what is already 
accepted as valuable to humans, what they do not need to 
be persuaded to treat as important. But what we are 
naturally inclined to do need npt be restricted to what 
our genes predispose us to do. If culture moulds and adds 
to natural attributes in profound ways, as it certainly 
seems to do, the whole set of features thus produced is 
the factual basis which may be relevant to moral claims" 
(Mattern, R. 1978. In Caplan, A.L. 1978 p.472). In 
claiming the relevance of biological claims only to 
ethical theory, psychological claims also have to be 
considered unless it is felt that psychological claims are 
reducible to biology. 
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Sociobiology: The new synthesis can thus be seen as a 
biological framework for understanding human behaviour, 
within which the possibility of a biological ethics cannot 
just be assumed. Since his framework lacks the factual 
basis for his claims, Wilson can claim only necessity, not 
sufficiency for the ethical theory he attempts to draw 
from animal behaviour. Ethics thus cannot completely be 
"biological". Sociobiology must be seen as a supplement, 
not a replacement for ethics. It provides a basis from 
which science can approach the origin and meaning of human 
values from which ethical and sociopolitical views emerge. 
Although sociobiology might give a deterministic view of 
human behaviour, it does throw some light upon the 
relationship between animal and human behaviour. The 
closeness or distance of this relationship depends on the 
genetic theory of inheritance - whether the theory in its 
present state is supportive of Wilson's arguments. It 
also "offers the possibility" of understanding in a 
different light the utilization of concepts and research 
techniques of ethology and population genetics in 
investigations concerning interactions between behaviour 
of individuals and functional aspects of "such macro~ 
structures as the state. Political scientists, for 
instance, could investigate socialized forms of, for 
example, "aggression" with a view to determining ways of 
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coping with such social behaviours, that have been part of 
history itself. 
Although Wilson's thesis implies a genetic origin for 
behaviour, he does not show how such behaviour is 
inherited. His use of analogous behaviour patterns 
undermines his views as such behaviour patterns could 
originate in different causes, and be transmitted by 
different genes. The sociobiologist views can only be 
accepted if it can be shown that behaviour patterns in 
different animals are the result of the inheritance of 
homologous genes. Sociobiology also does not show any 
gene behaviour correspondence. 
Sociobiology can be seen to arise out of contemporary 
social and political systems - as an explanation of these 
systems. Sociobiologists try to find the cause of certain 
behaviour patterns and social systems at a genetic level 
f 
and argue that these patterns have emerged and continue 
because of the efforts of the gene to perpetuate itself. 
That behaviour is adaptive and genetically determined 
shows that it has been selected (Darwinism) and thus is 
legitimate and unavoidable as it is the product of the 
natural biological process. 
Wilson, however, changed his determinist approach when 
criticisms were levelled against his theory. He contended 
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that his work was being misinterpreted. The problem 
probably arose out of the fact that the language used in 
Sociobio10gy: The new synthesis and the approach, are both 
determinist. Wilson's later view that, "Genetic biases 
can be trespassed, passions averted or redirected, and 
ethics altered; and the human genius for making constructs 
can continue to be applied for making healthier and freer 
societies" (Wilson, E.O. 1975. In Caplan, A.L. 1978 
p.267) shows that he distances himself from the 
determinist approach in his later theory. It also shows 
his belief that humans can override their genetic 
determinants and can to a large extent construct their own 
way of life. The focus of human action, therefore, must 
be on responsibility for he must so construct the world 
that it provides a basis for his moral conduct. This view 
of Wi1son also shows that besides being influenced by 
society, scientific theory, also influences society and 
constitutes a basis for ethics; for human behaviour 
depends on how the world is seen. 
It is evident that problems arose with Wilson's 
sociobiologica1 theory because he accepted Darwinism, 
ethology and the genetic theory as objective and "correct" 
biological theories - as a true reflection of reality or 
what actually happened in biology. Closer examination of 
sociobio10gy, however, showed that these theories too 
provided only certain views of the world; of the 
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biological world and that they also rose out of certain 
historical situations. 
For Wilson's theory to be acceptable it has to depend on 
contemporary genetic theory. Genetic theory must show 
that not only morphological but also behavioural 
characteristics must be gene-determined and transmitted. 
It is thus important to examine genetic theory to find 
whether it meets the requirements imposed on it by the 
sociobiologist and other biological theories. Examination 
of the genetic theory shows that it arose as a result of 
certain particular requirements of other biological 
theories to which it is closely related (Darwinism, 
natural selection, sociobiology, etc.). Concepts of the 
gene arose out of certain particular historical situations 
and along with the evolution of biological theory and 
society the concept of the gene has also evolved. 
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CHAPTER 6 




Advances in molecular biology led to a re-examination of 
the eugenics policy of the pre-war and war years. The 
investigations revealed class and racial prejudices which, 
to a large extent, are rooted in social Darwinism: 
Darwin's views had been used to justify these prejudices. 
The essence of Darwinism was ignored or so interpreted as 
to accommodate social and political ideals. Darwinism 
thus constituted the basis of social engineering (refer 
Stoddard, L. 1925) directed to the development of a "super 
race", for such men as Stoddard and Hitler believed that 
"racial impoverishment" causes the decay of society and 
civilization. This was believed to result from the mixing 
of inferior genetic material, or the mixing of superior 
with inferior races, causing an impoverishment of the 
superior race and leading to social decay. It was felt 
that through selective breeding and the avoidance or 
destruction of inferior strains, a "pure race" could be 
produced and social decay avoided. 
The atrocities of the : V?aryears, however, had led to the 
development of an almost violent reaction against social 
engineering and eugenics. The idea that intellectual 
progress of different "ethnic, national and social groups 
was indicative of genetic capabilities, fell into 
disrepute. All peoples were regarded as equals. The 
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environmental view of progress developed, in which 
education, economics and social reform were emphasized as 
the basis for social development and progress. It was 
argued that all people should therefore be given equal 
opportunities in social development and political self-
determination. However, social development and progress 
were still seen in the background of western standards. 
Political development was directed towards we~tern 
political ideals. Even though social Darwinism and 
eugenics were frowned upon, evolutionist ideas yet 
prevailed and political progress or changes in political 
structure were seen as "self-determination", in the east 
towards "communism"' and in the west, towards "democracy". 
The abandonment of the view that genetic endowment was 
determinative in the performance and achievements of 
different ethnic, national and social groups had 
consequences for both social and political development. 
Belief in progress through education and social reform was 
emphasized in the environmental view of progress. The 
environment, therefore, was to a large extent 
deierminative in the development of the individual, and 
consequently, of social and political institutions, for it 
superseded genetic influence (Winchester, A.M. and 
Mertens, T.R. 1983). Anthropological studies of people of 
different religious convictions, of different races and 
political ideals also contributed to the realization of 
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environmental influence on the views and behaviour of 
different peoples and that racist policies were based more 
on social and political ideals than on biological fact. 
Consequently, irrespective of genetic endowment people 
were socially and politically equals. 
Such views thus constituted the basis of the call for 
equal opportunities and education for the different 
peoples, for example, under colonial rule. The result was 
the rise of ethnicism and nationalism which were largely 
contributive in the dismantling of colonialism in many 
parts of the world. However, with the withdrawal of 
colonial rule most of the countries were left to rule 
themselves through institutions that they had hitherto not 
known and in many cases which were not applicable in the 
situations in which the colonies had been left. This was 
due to the deprivation of the proper social and political 
education during colonial rule. Consequently, chaotic 
conditions arose in the vacated countries, which were 
often viewed as being the result of inherent 
primitiveness. However, the internal strife was also due 
to different groups in the population struggling to gain 
power, each feeling itself superior in some way to the 
others. Viewed in the light of the Darwinian hypothesis, 
this was seen as the "struggle for survival"; the 
victorious group emerging as the one best fitted to rule. 
In evolutionary perspective it was seen as inevitable -
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the progress from tribalism, through colonialism, and 
military rule to democracy or a free society. The move 
towards democracy was not a consequence of evolution; of 
maximization of genetic heritage. It was the result of 
dissatisfaction (of the masses) with colonial or post-
colonial rule - arising therefore, out of the historical 
situation in which the people found themselves. It was 
not because of an inexorable movement as described by 
evolutionists (e.g. of the Marxist school). 
Scientific theory, however, did play a part in this change 
~ 
for Darwinism showed that differences were due to not any 
inherent inferiority but to adaptive radiation. Thus the 
influence of Darwinism depended largely on its 
interpretation, firstly, in terms of the prevailing 
historical situation, and secondly, in such a way as to 
justify the status quo or subsequent social development. 
Darwinism, sociobiology and genetic theory are, therefore, 
closely linked. Darwinism and sociobiology do depend ona 
sound genetic theory. Such a theory must show that the 
gene is an entity that is inherited or a paiti~le. that 
passes from parent to offspring. It must also show that 
it solely is determinative in morphological and 
behavioural characteristics in humans and that it can 
change and so introduce variations depending on 
environmental conditions. 
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6.2 Genetic theory 
Advances in molecular biology and a re-examination of the 
Mendelian principles of inheritance at the turn of the 
century (Burns, G.W., 1976) have resulted in advances in 
molecular genetics. The "negative eugenics" policy of the 
war years was re-examined in the light of molecular 
genetic developments. The nature and action of genetic 
material, the processes of recombination, transformation, 
transduction, the production of mutations, all led to the 
resumption of the "eugenics" policy on a new~evel. The 
ideals, however have not changed from those of the war 
years: they are still directed to the production of a 
"superman". It is hoped that the knowledge gained from 
genetic research would constitute the basis for the 
development and production of such a man. Although racist 
thought had permeated eugenics, the idea has a "sound 
core". The health of genetic material is the basis on 
f 
which to build sound populations; important both to the 
individual and to society. 
Genetic research has shown that segments of DNA can be 
joined to produce biologically active Recombinant DNA in 
vitro (Berg, P.D. et al 1974). Xenopus laevis ribosomal 
DNA has also been linked to DNA from bacterial plasmids. 
This recombinant plasmid has been shown to replicate 
stably in Escherichia coli where it synthesizes RNA 
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complementary to xenopus laevis ribosomal DNA. Drosophila 
chromosomal DNA segments have been incorporated into both 
plasmid and bacteriophage DNA yielding hybrid molecules 
that can infect and replicate in E. coli. 
Beckwith, J. et al (1969 in Wade, N. 1974) isolated a pure 
gene from a bacterium: the isolation of the "biological 
atom" thought to constitute the basis of all "life 
processes". Techniques developed to determine the 
structure of a gene also show the possibility of gene 
transfer between unrelated organisms (Benzer~ S. 1962; 
Cohen, S.N. 1975; Berns, M.W. 1974). Although these 
workers have, to some extent, managed to isolate genes, 
the structure-function relationships are as yet not 
completely determined (Shapiro, J. et al 1969; Agarwal, 
K.C. et al 1970). Benzer, S. (1962), Berns (1974) and 
Cohen (1975) have also shown that genes do have the 
ability to survive and reorganize the genes in host cells: 
foreign genes are able to destroy host genes and "take 
over" the host cell. Such experiments do have beneficial 
effects but they could also be used to destructive 
purpose. They do, however, open up numerous avenues of 
possibilities. 
6.3 Possibilities of Genetic Manipulation 
The work of Aaronson and Torado (1969. In Burns, G.W. 
1972) showed the value of "genetic surgery" in the curing 
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of such diseases as "sickle cell anemia", where SV40 DNA 
could be introduced into a cell and become "a permanent 
part of the host cell genome". Specific information could 
thus be inserted into and become a permanent . part of both 
somatic and sex cells. The isolation (Shapiro, J. et al 
1969) and synthesis (Agarwal, K.C. et al 1970) of 
bacterial genes has led to the possibility of "curing" 
some hereditary diseases: where there are germ cell 
abberations, these could be altered to prevent development 
of abberent forms. Developing embryos could thus be 
modified. Thus besides his ability to control his 
environment to some extent, man has also developed 
techniques that could be used to control and to direct his 
evolution. It is also felt that with proper understanding 
and control of the gene, human behaviour could be better 
understood and possibly altered. 
6.4 Social implications of genetic theory 
Molecular genetics has vast implications for society. 
Genetic surgery, the possibility of introducing genetic 
information into a chost genome, could be used for medical 
and other beneficial purposes. It could be used to alter 
or to introduce certain genetic information into embryos 
in order to produce certain particular types of 
individuals for specific purposes. This could lead to 
selective breeding resulting in the production of certain 
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castes fitted to the performance of particular tasks in 
society. Coupled indirectly with genetics (intelligence 
tests, etc.) selective procedures are at present carried 
out at educational institutions and through educational 
systems. Consequently, "genetic selection" is not the 
only type of selection that can be practised. It is, 
however, based on "aptitude" which is assumed to be 
genetically determined. Consequently, it was felt that 
subjects were genetically fitted only for the performance 
of certain tasks. And according to results of the tests 
subjects are assigned to certain educational ~urricula 
which equip them for only certain categories of 
occupation. However, such tests are often designed on the 
basis of certain educational curricula and in a particular 
social system. They are then used in different areas with 
different curricula or social systems. Consequently, the 
results are often biased, even on racial lines, Also in 
the design of the tests, little consideration is given to 
I 
the effect of the environment. 
Even though eugenics and the modern approach to education 
are both heavily reliant on genetic theory, it is evident 
that genetic theory is not completely supportive of their 
views. These views embody a "genetic determinism" 
although contemporary work in genetics weighs against 
this. Yet, old ideas remain and to a large extent guide 
scientific investigation. Genetic fitness is still used 
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as a basis for justification of hereditary dominance of 
caste or group. Contemporary genetic theory is used as a 
basis for the dominance of the intelligentsia over other 
groups. Association of such groups (intelligentsia) with 
academic hosts and "prestige" jobs, identifies them as a 
select group to which others must look for guidance, and 
follow, to progress. The result is social stratification 
or hierarchy in which the elite group is the leader. By 
the formation of certain societies which specify 
particular conditions for membership, the structure and 
dominant position is maintained. As more people from 
other groups become eligible for membership the entrance 
conditions are raised and modified so as to maintain the 
status quo. This often results in the formation of other 
societies in opposition to former ones; an opposition 
which might assume various forms. On such bases many 
still argue for the " ••• evolutionary virtues of war, 
nationalism, race and class prejudices and conflict as 
agents of the biological progress of mankind" (Dobzhansky, 
T. 1962 p.13). 
Society has often used and still finds in genetic theory a 
basis for the social dominance and segregation of race or 
ethnic group. Religious belief and technological 
achievements are often considered the criteria which 
delineate the Europeans as superior to the darker-skinned 
races. Religious superiority is claimed on the grounds of 
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progress from mythological thinking, through polytheism to 
monotheism. It is felt that polytheism still prevails in 
most of the religions or religious beliefs of the darker-
skinned races. Technological achievements are considered 
as proof of superior intelligence which is thought to be 
hereditary, and, of consequence, from a superior genetic 
constitution. And since they have "raised" others out of 
their primitive ways of thinking both religiously and 
technologically, they constitute a superior race. 
Consequently, to maintain the superiority of this race or 
the society this race has created, integration with other 
groups must be avoided. Integration both racially and 
ethnically is often frowned upon as it is often felt that 
customs and traditions which had been inherited over many 
generations, would be lost. Although the "inheritance" is 
cultural, the depth of conviction (for custom and 
tradition) is felt to be biological. 
The formation and maintenance of societies is thus 
directed to the maintenance of the status quo, each 
holding the view that it is superior to, if not equal to 
the others. Yet it is equally a fallacy that all " ••• men 
are born equal", and biologically alike. Thus ethical, 
and social and political concepts are used openly in 
biology and also seek justification in biology. According 
to Dobzhansky, "equality" must be taken to mean " ••• that 
all humans are entitled to equal opportunity to develop 
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their capacities to the fullest, not that these capacities 
are identical" (Dobzhansky, T.1962 p.14). 
6.5 Implications of modern genetic research 
Technological advances in molecular genetics have given 
rise to numerous and novel possibilities through chemical 
and molecular modifications in the genetic apparatus. 
Works such as Genetic Fix, Biological Time Bomb, Genetic 
Revolution, Fabricated Man, and Biocrats (in Suzuki, D.T. 
et al 1981) all warn of the dangers of modern genetic 
technology. Geneticists also fear that exposure to 
~ 
chemicals presently being manufactured could also be 
changing man's genetic make up. Consequently, even though 
the effects might not be apparent immediately, they could 
appear in time (Suzuki, D.T. 1981). This is of particular 
significance in an age in which man seems able to direct 
his future evolution~ For he needs to take cognizance of 
what present conditions or how the present environment 
will be affected in future and the effects this might have 
on man's further evolution. Thus even if man were to 
direct his evolution, he would not be able to do this 
without consideration of the environment. 
As early as 1933 techniques were developed, both 
electrical and m~chanical, which could separate male from 
female determining sperm (Koltzoff, N.K. and Schroder, 
V.N. 1933; Lindahl, B.E. 1958)~ Coupled with the work of 
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Edwards, R.G. et aI, (1970) the exerpiments showed the 
possibility of sperm selection and the production and the 
development of sex-determined embryos. The application of 
artificial insemination on humans showed that the sex of 
the child could be determined and that parents could 
choose the sex of the child they wanted. This could have 
serious implications for society as it could result in 
sex-ratio imbalances and necessitate a change in the 
structure of society or the reorganization of society. 
Muller (1961) felt that man could enhance hiJ\}self through 
eugenics provided "life as a whole" is seen as a process 
of continual change. The accomplishments of natural 
selection had far surpassed other types of progress. 
Application of this principle to society could be effected 
through "genetic improvement:. This could be effected in 
various ways by birth control, artificial insemination, 
etc., or through conscious artificial selection. However, 
f 
such procedures were not feasible in a society yet 
undeveloped in values and limited in knowledge to make 
such a choice (Muller, H.G. 1961; Sonneborn, T.M. 1968). 
Such choice would involve a " ••• major change in social 
conditions and human attributes - namely, change from a 
capitalistic class stratified society to a socialistic 
society in which biological principles become common 
knowledge, birth control and artificial insemination are 
legal and positive selection and large scale genetic 
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iesearch on man are fostered." (Sonnebon, T.M. 1968, 
p.774). To this end Muller advocated that the theme in 
education should be evolution at all levels to show man 
his place in nature. Man could thus develop a greater 
cooperativeness and reorganize genetic and cultural 
togetherness. 
Such views, however, like that of sociobiology, are based 
on the assumption that natural selection presupposes that 
genes determine productive fitness and hence adaptive 
success in future generations. It is also assumed that 
adaptations are always suited to the conditions and 
therefore, that adaptations are advantageous. This led to 
the thesis that if the structure and functional mode of 
the gene could be determined, it would be possible to 
direct evolutionary development in lines suitable to 
future generations. Thus the evolution of society could 
be directed by what is desired by society or by what is 
I 
desired by particular groups. Consequently, human 
evolution could thus be directed by the needs and desires 
of any particular time or of any society. 
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6.6 Evaluation of the dangers of genetic theory 
Gene transfer (Davis, B.D. 1970) and DNA hybridization 
(Singer, M. and SolI, D. 1973) could result in the 
formation of new kinds of "plasmids" whose nature could be 
unpredictable and hazardous. Experiments in cloning have 
been performed only up to the amphibian level. It is 
felt, however, that in time experiments could be performed 
up to the human level. But before such experiments are 
performed their possibilities for social and ethical 
import must be evaluated. The contemporary effects of 
such experiments might be plausible and even desirable, 
but their effects on future generations must also be 
considered. Such experiments could lead to an excessive 
conservative influence on the population and consequently 
also on cultural achievements. Society could thus be 
deprived of the richness that emerges out of new gene 
combinations. Cloning could also be problematic for 
clones might not all develop in the same way as 
development is often dependent to a large extent on 
parental influence and on the cultural climate, for 
literary, political and socialdev~lopment are largely 
dependent on experience. 
Evolution has also shown that the success of a species 
depends not only on adaptation but also on genetic variety 
or on the potentiality for unrealized adaptations for the 
survival of a species in yet unencountered environments. 
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Homogenization of a ~opulation by cloning or by other 
means, could also produce a survival hazard as clones 
would only be adapted to certain particular environments 
and changes in the environment could be deleterious to the 
clones. Cloning could also be used for political ends 
where political indoctrination has failed, as a mechanism 
to regulate behaviour or to depress human potential. This 
is often effected largely through pharmaceutical, surgical 
and nutritional means. The results of scientific 
achievements have long been used by governments or by 
ruling groups to obtain political objectives. Supported 
by goveinment, armies conduct "biological warfare" 
laboratories which are attempting to improve the lethality 
of viruses and bacteria, harmful to man. such enterprises 
are clearly supportive of political objectives; and are 
directed, usually to the maintenance of the status quo: 
human thinking has always been found to be resistent to 
change of any type. Little thought is given to the fact 
that change is both imperative and adaptive. 
6.7 Scientific responsibility 
Recent advances in biogenetic research (Berg, P.D. et 
al., 1974; Agarwal, R.L. et aI, 1970; Shapiro,J. et al., 
1969; Benzer,S. 1962; Cohen,S.N. 1975) facilutate 
solutions to important theoretical and practical 
biological problems. However, they could also lead to the 
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production of novel types of problems through the creation 
of new types of infectious DNA elements whose biological 
properties cannot completely be predicted in advance. 
These biohazards could have deleterious effects on the 
population. Unlike any other group of preceeding 
scientists, the biologist has seen the potentialities of 
his work as both beneficial and hazardous in biological 
and social contexts. Consequently, scientists attending 
the 1973 Gordon Research Conference on nucleic acids 
(Singer, M. and SolI, D. 1973) requested the National 
Academy of Sciences to ask for the ·deference bf 
experiments on biogenetics till the biological properties 
of "cells" produced could be predicted with certainty. 
Experiments involving genetic manipulation of living cells 
and viruses have consequently been temporarily banned. 
This is the first time in the history of biology that 
scientists are willing to accept restriction on the 
freedom to research (Wade, N. 1~74), other than those to 
do with human experimentation. The group recognized that 
adherence to its recommendation " will entail 
postponement or possibly abandonment of certain types of 
. 
scientifically worthwhile experiments ••• " but says that 
its concern " ••• for the possible unfortunate consequences 
of indiscriminate application of these techniques 
motivates us to urge all scientists working in this area 
to join us in agreeing not to initiate experiments .•• 
until attempts have been made to evaluate the hazards , " 
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(Wade, N. 1974 p.332), although these experiments could 
elucidate the structure and workings of animal 
chromosomes. Thus, the onus of how the results of 
scientific research might be used, falls on the scientist. 
He is the most qualified to know at least some of the 
potential dangers of his research. The publication of 
research results is therefore important in that it be done 
such that his work not be misunderstood. The scientist 
should thus publish both negative and positive aspects of 
his work and should he find it prudent, be allowed to 
withhold certain results of his work which could be 
misused. Davis,B.D. (1974) shows that "genetic 
engineering" in bacteria led to fears that such techniques 
could be used, not only to cure diseases, but also to 
alter human nature. 
Any assessment of the problems connected with genetic 
research or engineering must co~sider that genetic traits 
are not always determined by a single gene, as it is, for 
example, in sickle-cell anemia. Genetic traits are 
usually determined by multiple genes, which include 
intelligence, dexterity, strength, etc. Such traits are 
socially more important as they show a range of variations 
with which they may be operative often depending on the 
" sum of small contributions of many genes interacting 
with many environmental factors" (Davis, B.D. 1974 p. ). 
The success of molecular genetics, so far, is confined to 
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only single gene traits. The fact that genes have 
multiple effects which vary continuously (Davis, B.D. 
1970) and also the fact that even if all the genes were 
known, traits could not still be determined for " ... a set 
of relevant genes does not fixedly determine the 
corresponding trait". Both past and present environments 
are important in the determination of the genotype and its 
phenotypic expression. Most genes determine a range of 
potentialities for any trait. Consequently, actual 
phenotypic expression is dependent on a range of genetic 
possibilities and of environmental conditons_ 
Extension of the techniques of genetic manipulation to man 
will raise numerous sociological and moral issues. 
Therefore, since it cannot be predicted when a particular 
kind of manipulation may become feasible, and since moral 
standards and social needs change with time, it would be 
presumptuous to try to " ••• guige future generations by 
present wisdom" (Davis, B.D. 1974). However, the 
dependence of the future on the past is nowhere more 
apparent or important than in genetics. For it is genetic 
structure which is to a large extent determinative in the 
survival of a species. But as far as humans are 
concerned, they have to a large extent been emancipated 
from genetic fetters or their genetic systems function in 
a less determinative way than in the non-human world. It 
is therefore the duty of science to help guide society in 
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its decisions as far as research is concerned so that 
harmful experiments can be avoided and research evaluated. 
In this respect the responsibility to a large extent falls 
on the scientist to inform society of achievements and 
also of areas of failure or of doubt or of the potential 
problems of the results of research programmes. Many 
drugs, for example, although they have been "passed" for 
use, have later been found to have deleterious effects: 
such drugs as Thalidomide and L.S.D. 
which have been found to interfere with genetic systems. 
Since the introduction of the steam engine it has been 
felt that " ••. society must adjust to new technologies" 
(Etzioni, A. 1968). New technologies, however, as was 
evident during the "Industrial Revolution" do not usually 
sustain prior values and institutions. The result is 
undesirable effects on society., However, scientists often 
argue that science is concerned with the search for 
"truth"~ and that the "applications of scientific findings 
are not determined by the scientists, but by society, 
politicians, corporations and the citizens" (Etzioni, A. 
1968 p.lllO). It is also argued that the course of 
science is unpredictable and therefore scientific findings 
could be used for good or bad purposes. Scientists often 
argue that external intervention in their work could 
retard the growth of knowledge and be detrimental to 
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certain applications of scientific findings that are at 
present for the good of society (e.g. birth control). 
According to Etzioni, these arguments are given " ••. as if 
they themselves were empirically verified or · logically 
true statements. Actually, these arguments merely 
represent a formula which enables the scientific community 
to protect itself from external intervention and control" 
(Etzioni, A. 1968 p.llIO). 
It is possible that science does thrive in societies where 
scientists are given less freedom than in models which 
imply that science must have total freedom in which to 
develop. But freedom of science is not always the 
ultimate value. It is often felt that society at large 
deserves the same protection that a human subject does 
from research. Thus the scientific community cannot be 
excused from the responsibility of asking what effects its 
endeavours have on the community. On the contrary, only 
an extension of the existing codes and mechanisms of self 
control will ultimately protect science from a so~ietal 
backlash and external regulation. The intensification of 
the debate over the scientists' responsibilities with 
regard to the impact of their findings is by itself one 
way of exercising it, because it alerts more scientists to 
the fact that the areas they choose to study, the ways 
they communicate their findings, to each other and to the 
community, the alliances they form or avoid with corporate 
345 
or governmental interests - all these affect the use to 
which their work is put" (Etzioni, A. 1968 p.l110). The 
careful supervision of technological inputs into society 
is therefore imperative. The attempts to build a bridge 
between scientists and society has also been problematic 
as the media is quick to exploit situations even before 
scientists could double-check their results and their 
implications. Regulatory systems must thus appreciate the 
difference between science and technology, (bearing in mind 
that technology is born of science). 
Etzioni (1968) thus distinguishes between science and 
technology. Control of technology could thus free science 
and protect society. Societal and political preferences 
and needs could thus guide research and technology, so 
that financing could go more to research, than to 
technology: as it is at present with the development of 
armaments, etc. Etzioni (1968"p.l1Il) also feels that 
society shoud have " ••• less concern with nature and more 
with society". 
This view, however, is contradictory as it is the concern 
of society with itself that is at the root of the problems 
that do beset society: the protection and enforcement of 
political and social ideals. To maintain order and to 
maintain a way of thinking that is deemed to be God-given 
or in accord with nature, society is prepared to destroy 
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other ways of thinking or of ideals that differ from its 
own. 
certain groups in society guided by feelings of 
superiority support scientific development in directions 
which would further support such views or in attempts to 
justify their beliefs. Superiority in technological 
achievements that have led to the economic and financial 
superiority of certain groups have led to feelings of 
superiority over other groups. 
The rapid increase of knowledge in genetics has uncovered 
a host of problems. This knowledge coupled with 
developments in technology has presented society with new 
and sophisticated technological services. Their use 
widely, especially in medicine, has raised a number of 
ethical questions. According to Ladimer(Ladirner, I.1977~ 
it is important to translate values into social and 
scientific properties: towards genetic disease reduction, 
parental diagnoses, genetic surgery, etc. The expression 
of existing phenotypes could be improved and the gene pool 
protected by world policy to minimize exposure to 
mutagens. Artificial insemination and - cloning (it is 
felt) could also assist in the creation of "genetically 
superior individuals". 
Genetic counselling and the eugenics programme have also 
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been used in a negative way. Screening and testing 
programmes for genetically transmitted conditions have 
often had negative psychological impact on subjects and 
society, who have learned, because of the way the 
screening and test i ng had been conducted and because of 
the way the results have been made available, to treat the 
carriers of genetically transmitted conditions in a 
negative way. In virginia, America, testing programmes 
for sickle-cell-anemia has led to "stigmatization of (the) 
black school children" (Jemison, E.W. In Lipkin, M. and 
Rowley, P.T. 1977. p.75). Others have either lost their 
jobs and even been refused jobs because they are carriers 
~ 
of some genetic conditions (Desmoyers, A: Lipkin, M. and 
f \ 
Rowley, P.T. 1977). Screening programms have also been 
"discriminatory" in schools because in many cases they 
have been carried out only on certain groups of children 
(Brosseau, G.In Lipkin, M. and Rowley, P.T. 1977) .Such 
programmes have had adverse eff~cts as the results have 
often been racially construed without regard to the origin 
of the condition (e.g. sickle-cell-anemia) which had 
adaptive significance. It has also been suggested that 
genetically based, black IQ was lower than that of whites 
(Desmoyers, A. In Lipkin, M. and Rowley, P.T. 1977), 
leading - to racist campaigns against blacks. It has also 
been felt that the children of racially mixed parents are 
more prone to genetic defects. This has led to 
suggestions on research into the "hereditary basis of 
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social behaviour" and of genetically transmitted diseases. 
It was thus hoped to show that the origin of social 
problems lay in social mixing. The primary aim however, 
had historical roots in the division between. the races in 
the country and the view of white racial superiority, 
based on prejudice. 
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PART III 
MAN'S CONTINGENT EXPERIENCE OF LIFE AS THE 
COMMON GROUND BETWEEN SCIENCE AND MORALITY 
CHAPTER 7 
CONTINGENT EXPERIENCE, SCIENCE AND MORALITY 
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7.1 Introduction 
A historical investigation into science and morality, both 
shows that knowledge of the world or rather knowledge of 
the structure of the world is based on experjence and the 
constitutive faculty of the mind. In science, experience 
(empirical) of the world constitutes the basis for the 
formulation of theories of the world: the way a particular 
scientist experiences the world contitutes the basis for 
his construction of the world. Consequently, each 
scientific theory concerning the world, or each world 
theory, is based on the particular experienc, of the 
scientist in that particualr historical situation in which 
he finds himself. It follows, therefore, that the 
different world theories enter into a "critical 
relationship" with each other. 
World theories, besides providing knowledge of the world, 
that is, besides having epistemological, are also of , 
ethical significance. Moral theories, therefore, also 
emerge from world theories or from the scientific 
constitution of the world, in any particular historical 
situation. And just as scientific theories (of the world) 
enter into a "critical relationship" with each other, so 
do moral theories. Scientific theories and moral theories 
are, therefore, constituted and reconstituted in the light 
of past and contemporary theories. Since these theories 
are inconclusive they are problematic in that they can 
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provide neither certain knowledge (concerning the world) 
nor an authentic direction for moral action, so that man 
might live an "authentic existence". It is, however, the 
realization that the problematic nature of these theories 
lies in man's imperfection, which shows that he cannot in 
any particular historical situation provide a conclusive 
answer, that can point to a moral ground. According to 
Rauche, "This critical relationship points beyond each 
theory to a moral ground which lies outside it and which 
is common to all mankind and, in this sense, universal: 
man's contingent experience of reality. It is from this 
universal experience that all theories are constituted." 
(Rauche, G.A. 1985, p.251). 
Scientific and moral theories arising from certain 
particular historical situations or conditions constitute 
a reflection of the problem situations or the conflict of 
each historical period. This iry itself is evidence that 
no scientific or moral theory can be conclusive. Arising 
out of certain situations, they constitute an attempt to 
overcome the situation, and thus attain an "authentic 
existence", defined in terms of freedom and justice, which 
terms have themselves undergone changes in preceeding 
"historical conditions". These conditions thus constitute 
reality, experience of which results in the formulation of 
scientific and moral theories. Experience thus has both 
epistemological and ethical significance. 
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Since theories cannot provide any conclusive answer 
concerning reality, they point to an inherent limitation 
which represents the limitation of man. This limitation 
points to a moral ought which obliges man to enter into a 
critical relationship with his fellowman - if he wishes to 
maintain justice and freedom (Rauche, G.A. 1985). The 
historical nature of scientific theories (indeed, of all 
theories!) is indicative of the fact that they cannot 
produce ultimate answers in terms of reality. Their 
historical dimension restricts their applica~ion to 
situations that lie in the future. It is therefore with 
caution that man must tread the path that leads beyond the 
compass of his experience. For to go beyond this would be 
"self-transcendence". This would mean that man transcends 
his limitations in an act of absolutization of his theory 
- into an ideology. This is done at the expense of 
reference to his fellow-man, which results, often in a 
polarization, leading to conflict. In such an act man 
does not strengthen but forfeits his freedom. For freedom 
lies in the realization that even under changing 
historical conditions man depends on his fellowman for a 
rational constitution of reality based on experience. 
Freedom does not lie in religious or scientific dogmatism 
or in 'social or political ideology. Absolutization of any 
ideology would lead to domination of one group over 
another - which is so evident in past and even in 
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contemporary history where scientific, religious, 
political, social, cultural, etc., ideologies lead to 
totalitarian practice. In such circumstances self-
control, tolerance and respect are lost, leading to unrest 
and violence. 
It must be recognized, therefore, that theories, and 
scientific theories are no exception, represent a 
Weltanschauung which is based on certain premises arising 
from certain particular historical conditions - man's 
contingent experience. Based on such premise-s, the 
Weltanschauung constitues a certain way of looking at the 
world in a particualr historical period. Seen in this 
light scientific theories constitute a certain framework 
in which to understand the world. Understanding the world 
is therefore directed in a certain way and is dependent on 
past experience. Knowledge gained or constituted from 
past experiences thus provides the basis on which 
contemporary theories of reality may be constructed. 
The moral aspect of scientific theories also arises from 
the fact that no scientific theory stands by itself. 
Scientific theories are dependent on one another. Besides 
their mutual dependence within a single discipline, 
scientific theories of different disciplines are also 
dependent on one another. Thus theories in biology 
(especially evolutionary theories) are related to geology, 
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physics, chemistry, etc. Biological "laws" may thus be 
expressed in terms of physics and chemistry. The mutual 
need of these theories for each other in order to increase 
their explanatory content, also shows the ethical aspect 
of scientific theories. It is on this account that Newton 
was able to say "If I have seen farther, it is becuase I 
have been standing on the shoulders of giants." Such a 
realization shows the mutual need and dependence of 
different scientists on one another. In this 
acknowledgement can be seen the basis for the conduct of 
scientific activity in the spirit of tolerance and 
humility for scientific theories provide only "truth 
perspectives". 
The present "piecemeal" approach of science which ends in 
scientists turning specialists, results in their looking 
at the world through their various specialities. They 
feel, therefore, that reality can be understood by looking , 
at the world in certain particular ways. But each 
speciality reveals only a certain aspect of reality. This 
is very evident in biology. Biological phenomena, viewed 
through different specialities do not provide a picture of 
an animal as a whole. An animal is viewed from an 
anatomical, a physiological, a psychological or a genetic 
background. Consequently, only certain aspects of an 
animal come to light. Thus an holistic approach is 
necessary to understand an animal, as a whole. This 
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requires an integration of different disciplines, showing 
the mutual need of different disciplines, or of different 
specialists for each other. Man thus has need for his 
fellowman for his understanding of the world- can only be 
fulfilled in society which provides a basis for a 
multidisciplinary approach. Mutual dependence and need 
again constitutes the basis for society. Although society 
is born of conflict, that is, the natural conflict that 
exists between different scientific theories, it also 
emerges from the need to resolve this conflict. This also 
constitutes the basis for tolerance, self-restraint and 
humility of man towards his fellowman. 
Science can, therefore, be seen to have moral 
implications. This is born of the very nature of science 
and governs the relationships between different scientific 
disciplines and consequently, of different scientists. 
The "conflict-nature" of science emerges from the 
historical conditions under which specific scientific 
theories are developed - which conditions are largely 
determinative in the way a theory is developed and 
formulated. The empirical nature of scientific theory is 
thus evident in the critical relationship that exists 
between theories. Since morality emerges from this 
relationship under specific historical conditions, it can 
be said that morality is empirical. The formulation of 
moral theories change along with the formulation and 
reformulation of scientific theories or, with the 
constitution and reconstitution of reality, under specific 
"historical conditions". Consequently, man's attitude to 
his fellowman and to the world also emerges from the way 
in which he constitutes his world. Science, therefore, 
has moral implications, while morality can be said to be 
empirical. In this sense both scientific and moral 
theories are products of man's "contingent experience" of 
the world, or, from his knowledge of a changing reality. 
Since it is man who constitutes his reality, ~he knowledge 
on which he formulates his theories concerning the world 
is also a product of knowledge from within himself or it 
might be said, an experience of the self. From a 
biological (evolutionary) point of view, human form and 
function (in all its manifold aspects) can also be seen as 
the formulation and reformulation of experience, in 
organic form emerging in particular geological periods -
which are particular historical conditions. The gene (in 
whatever form understood) can, therefore, be considered as 
the organic manifestation of knowledge. Its particular 
structure can be seen as the product of its reaction to 
changing ' historical (geological) conditions. Although the 
change is not instantaneous, it does represent the 
interaction of gene and environment. That gene survives 
which is best suited to the particualr environment. In 
such a view extinction can be seen as "an act of 
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alienation from reality" - at genetic level. Survival 
would thus represent "genetic plasticity" or the ability 
, 
to live in harmony with the environment, that is also 
changing. There is, therefore, a dynamic interaction in 
the close relationship between organism and organism and 
between organism and environment. In such a system, or an 
ecosystem, it is the recognition and realization of 
position, function and limitation, in the ecosystem that 
maintains its harmony. "Position", "function" and 
"limitation" do not, however, represent or constitute any 
hierarchical system. They represent the equality of 
responsibility - that every organism in the system shares 
the responsibility for the maintenance of the system. 
Although both the organism and the environment are 
constantly changing, the dynamic relationship that exists 
between them ensures the maintenance of stability in the 
system. There is, therefore, a constant interplay between 
the gene and the stability (harmony) of the ecosystem - or 
between knowledge and stability (a dynamic stability). In 
this interplay the gene is both instrument (directive) and 
product (directed by the ecosystem - this, however, must 
be seen in the light of population genetics). In the 
relationship between gene and stability of ecosystem can 
be seen the "interplay between theory and practice" which 
arises from experience. 
The ecosystem, of consequence, is of supreme importance 
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for on its survival is dependent the harmony and survival 
of all that constitutes it. such an ecosystem must be 
seen not only from the viewpoint of biological theory but 
also from the centre of a compass that defines man in his 
biological, anthropological and cultural aspects: where 
his biological aspects define his relations to the non-
human world; his anthropological aspects define his 
specific human characteristics and his cultural aspects 
define all his creations as part of his needs for 
existence. Thus, although man's origins are rooted in the 
non-human world (through evolution) the gene ~ic 
constraints that seem to be confining in this world (that 
is, the non-human) have to a significant extent 
disappeared in the human. This view sees man from a 
vantage point that is regarded as a culmination of 
evolution (biological evolution). But if evolution is 
seen as a continuous and continual process then, each 
stage in evolution can be seen as a transcendence; an 
attempt to cope with the specific conditions of life or to 
lead an "authentic existence:" " ••• even Darwinian 
evolution can be seen as a process of perpetual and 
increasing transcendence." (Skolimowski, H. 1981 p.67). 
Evolution can, therefore, be seen ' as an attempt to 
maintain harmony and for the maintenance of this harmony 
the versatility of the gene is the basis for the dive r sity 
of living forms that are needed (to maintain this 
harmony). The gene is also responsible for the constraint 
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in each organism. For any organism in an ecosystem to 
exceed its constraints would upset its harmony, both in an 
individual and a collective sense. 
Human biological constraints, unlike those of the non-
human world, (consonant with evolutionary theory) ,are 
reduced to basic functioris. Human action therefore, can be 
considered moral since they are restricted by no 
constraints, besides those of conscience and will. Human 
action therefore relies on freedom and places on the human 
an obligation: freedom, therefore, places on~he human a 
moral ought. 
7.2 The ecological imperative 
During the Industrial Revolution and the period following 
it, the "struggle for survival" and the "survival of the 
fittest" meant competition, and those survived which were 
victors in the competition. In such a view the "ends 
justified the means". For it was victory that was all 
important and whatever means deemed necessary to secure 
victory were employed. Competition became the basis of 
moral action. 
The situation, however, has changed after the Second World 
War. The destruction caused by the war, especially by the 
two atomic bombs, has revealed the awesome power that 
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science has placed into the hands of man. The subsequent 
development of nuclear power shows that the potential for 
destruction has been increased many fold. Disaster 
situations in countries received aid world-wide and even 
during the Chernobyl disaster (Serril1, M.S. 1986.) The 
soviet Union had to get help from the United States of 
America. These and numerous other instances show the need 
for co-operation and also the need for mutual aid. 
Present scientific development has shown that despite 
ideological differences the need for interdependence is 
steadily and rapidly growing. In the contemporary 
concern for survival against the military arsenals of the 
world, the threat of nuclear disaster, is evident the need 
for interdependence and mutual aid. Even in the upheavals 
of the present political climate the different nations of 
the world, despite their mistrust of one another, realize 
their mutual interdependence. 
The ecological and conservation movements are born of this 
concern for the environment and ultimately for survival. 
Where evolution was once interpreted as the movement 
towards perfection and perfection meant the "survival of 
the fittest" (through competition, which included 
aggression, etc.), it is now interpreted to mean "mutual 
aid" (Kropotkin, P. 1903; Huxley, J. 1944; Waddington, 
C.H. 1967; etc.), "interdependence", "co-operation, etc. 
For it is only through such realization that the "harmony, 
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stability, and delicate equilibrium of nature as a self-
recycling energy system" (Richards, S. 1983. p.140) can be 
established and maintained. The realization of the need 
and dependence of different nations and of different 
groups within the nation on one another for a harmonious 
society, has both influenced and is influenced by 
ecological thinking as a model "for human society as the 
closely integrated richly interwoven and self-sufficient 
pattern derived from an idealized image of nature." 
(Richards, S. 1983 p.140). 
Opponents of ecological thinking, however, stress that 
nature is wasteful and has many "imperfections". It is 
urged that these ("imperfections") can be eliminated by 
genetic interference. But this view is only based on pre-
existing ideas of what is, or, will be best for society. 
Such prejudiced views determine the interpretation and 
application of scientific theory and emphasize those 
aspects only, that are to their advantage. This to a 
large extent, constitutes the basis of the thinking that 
mastery over nature should be sought rather than 
investigate nature's mystery to understand the workings of 
nature, as a whole. 
Evolutionary theory shows that everything is in a state of 
continual change. And always, this change is directed to 
stability, or it might be said an "authentic existence". 
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This can easily be seen in embryological processes where 
different parts of an embryo function inter-relatedly to 
achieve stability in growth and with the environment. 
Evolution and genetic theory also elucidate this close 
interrelationship between animal and environment and 
embodies also the mechanisms needed to achieve this 
relationship that leads to stability. 
The idea of altruism also emerges from evolutionary 
theory. Skolimoski (Skolimoski, H. 1981) regards altruism 
as an essential aspect, in fact, the modus operandi of 
evolution. Where sociobiologists explain altruism only in 
genetic terms, Skolimowski, (Skolimowski, H. 1981) 
contends that such explanations do not take into account 
that evolution is a process of transcendence. And as 
altruism is based on co-operation and sacrifice, so is 
evolution. Human life is, therefore, to a large extent 
filled with sacrifice; for it i? not merely a means 
towards an end: in sacrifice, man fulfills himself as 
human. Thus sacrifice can be treated as an end in itself. 
According to Skolimowski (Skolimowski, H. 1981), this is 
in accord with the Kantian imperative that treats every 
human life as an end in itself. Human life, therefore, 
participates in sacredness, making man an ultimate value, 
in whom the workings of evolution may be acknowledged. 
This acknowledgement is also the basis of the premise that 
in the continuation of evolution man will transcend 
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himself. Man is, therefore, both a means (an instrument) 
and also an end. Thus man, although a product of 
evolution, retains his sovereignity in an evolving 
universe. Evolution thus preserves man's "rights" as an 
individual. This also follows from man being part of an 
ecosystem (in which he has been placed by evolution), for 
every entity in the system has a "place" and a "right" 
within the system. Individual "rights" are thus justified 
within the framework of ' the ecosystem for they allow that 
action that is imperative for the maintenance of the 
system. 
It is within the ecological framework that man is nurtured 
and sustained. He reaches his full development in 
society, as he both creates and is created by society. 
This ensures man's rightful place, and consequently, t hat 
of society in an ecosystem. Each society adapts in a 
particular way to the environment (adaptive radiation ) , 
and thus creates and is created by the environment. The 
ecosystem thus constitutes the womb within which man 
resides. It is the acknowledgement and realization of 
this position that shows man his place in the' ecosystem -
his place in nature. To disregard the dynamic balance of 
the ecosystem would amount to a disregard for his place in 
nature. It would constitute a severence of the cord that 
binds him to the ecosystem through which he hs nurtured 
and which he influences. His place in nature shows man 
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the need to maintain a balance and not to alienate himself 
from nature. 
Through evolution, man has emerged from and is thus a part 
of the other life-forms in the ecosystem. Consequently, 
it is of value to man not only as a resource, but also 
because he is a part of it. Because of the dependence of 
the different parts of the ecosystem on each other, the 
destruction of any part of it would result in the 
destruction of the whole. This dependence has been 
created and expanded and become more closely ~nterwoven by 
the processes of evolution. The destruction, therefore, 
of even one thread of the fabric, would mean the undoing 
of the whole tapestry: thus the ecological imperative! 
Evolution has also shown that as life-forms become more 
complex their dependence on more of the ecosystem 
increases. In a system in whicb each life-form has a 
particular ecological niche, the greater is the need for 
the maintenance of a balance between the different niches. 
The contemporary imbalance of the ecosystem can be seen to 
rise largely out of different interpretations of Darwin's 
theory of evolution. The ideas of the struggle for 
survival" and "survival of the fittest" and the 
"individualism" that emerged from this, have contributed 
largely to the imbalance of contemporary systems. 
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Although science and its child, technology, have 
contributed largely to knowledge of nature, they have also 
been responsible for the contemporary position of the 
world. 
Evolution, therefore, as a biological theory, shows the 
need for a balance between all the life-forms: a balance 
that would preserve the ecosystem, and life. This is the 
principle aim of evolution, to adapt life-forms to their 
particular conditions of life. In such a context the 
"struggle for survival" and "survival of the 1ittest" 
cannot be interpreted in terms of Dawkins' or ethologists' 
theories, only. Evolution does not only mean competition 
and consequent progress, as many biologists believe: it 
also means "balance". The ecological imperative thus 
points to the need to discard ideologies or to modify them 
in the presence of other ideologies, in order to maintain 
a balance. 
According to Skolimowski: "Within the structure of 
evolution, the more highly developed the organism, the 
greater its complexity and its sensitivity and the more 
reason to treat it as more valuable and precious than 
others. In a nutshell, the exquisiteness of man is more 
precious than the exquisiteness of the mosquito. In time 
of conflict, we care more for the life of a human being 
than for the life of a mosquito. We have always known 
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instinctively that the life of a human being is more 
important than the life of a mosquito" (Skolimowski, H. 
1981 p.84). This view, however, does negate the 
expression of the ecological imperative. But if man is 
important, he is so in view of the fact that it is he who 
has caused the most destruction to th~ ecosystem: and it 
is his responsibility to correct the situation. Although 
nature has "corrective mechanisms" within itself, man has 
upset these to a large extent. It is, therefore, his 
responsibility to correct the problem, which can be 
accomplished through ecological thinking. AThd in this he 
should not just assume his importance: for it lies only in 
the fact that it is he who has caused the present 
situation. 
The social and ethical aspects of evolutionary and 
ecological theory arise out of the fact that man is, like 
his fellow creatures, a product / of evolution and 
therefore an integral part of nature. Consequently, he 
has to live so as to maintain the dynamic balance in 
nature. Since the balance continually changes, man must 
not alienate himself from the world situation by 
absolutization and conflict. Ecological thinking seeks to 
avoid such conflict and shows that harmony can be achieved 
only through realization of the need for interdependence. 
In this sense evolution can be seen as biological history. 
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It shows how different conditions produce different life-
forms. Thus on both a theoretical and a practical level 
evolution shows how historical conditions are important in 
the production and development of values. Those aspects 
of conduct are valuable, which serve in the enhancement of 
evolution. From this point of view evolution becomes the 
product of action and interaction in the constant search 
for stability or for harmony for through evolution the 
present becomes a product of, and is related to the past. 
Evolutionary theory thus "fits" its different pasts or 
aspects into a definite (often hierarchical order) order 
or cosmos. 
7.3 The cosmic imperative 
The metaphysical aspects of scientific theory, both 
physical and biological, point to the transcendent 
character of understanding or reality. Even though 
knowledge is constituted from m?n's experience of reality 
(of the physical world) it is understood only within 
certain categories which have their "origins" in 
metaphysical entities. Those not able to fit into 
scientific categories just have to be accepted (on faith) 
and are used in man's attempt t9 lead an "authentic 
existence". To find the basis of such existence, man has 
to go beyond the physical, for without such transcendence 
existence would seem meaningless and void. 
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Scientific theory (contemporary scientific theory) and 
existentialism leave man "aimlessly drifting through the 
meaningless universe, a desperate lonely particle" 
(Skolimowski, H. 19S1 p.10S). Man thus loses his 
uniqueness and life has no more purpose than existence, 
becoming merely an "instrument" of survival, thought of in 
terms of chemistry and physics. Reduced to the mechanisms 
of atoms, life is thought of in terms of "mechanistic 
interactions of physical bodies and chemical particles" -
scientific rationality reducing life to mere "physio-
chemical matricies". 
But viewed in the background of evolution and ecology, it 
can be seen that life is much more than the product of the 
mechanistic terms into which it has been reduced. The 
metaphysical aspects of scientific theory show that life 
cannot be reduced to these terms only. In his search for 
his identity man has struggled to preserve his humanity 
and his spirituality. He has always reached beyond 
himself to secure explanations giving meaning and purpose 
to his life. Religion has provided a framework for ideals 
which inspire and sustain life. Through absolutization 
and idealization (perfection) of human qualities deities 
have been endowed with "perfection". It is through the 
emulation of these attributes that man attempts to direct 
his life or live a moral life. In ~his "symbolic" 
tran~formation of reality, man attains his humanity 
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through "mirroring qualities he has himself vested in 
deities. Thus religion, through transcendental ideas 
inspires man to unselfish and altruistic acts to preserve 
life and unity in society. This has resulted in the 
development of religious practices and rituals that have 
enriched culture. 
Thus even in religion, in attempting to understand himself 
or in searching for his identity man has reached far 
beyond himself. In search of his origins scientific 
theory has taken man to the farthest reaches ~f the 
universe. For it is in the search and knowledge of 
origins that it might be possible to determine 
"authenticity", for "authentic existence" is of moral 
value: an "authentic existence" is a moral existence since 
it is of the very fabric of nature. 
Religion, of consequence, does provide man with an ideal 
or a world-view in which man can strive for perfection and 
so develop a moral universe. The world-view provided by 
science seems to be devoid of values, concerned as it is 
with the "ideal of material progress". But seen from an 
evolutionary point of view, the scientific world-view can 
provide the basis on which to view the world as part of a 
moral universe. This emerges not from any religious 
precepts provided by the great religions of the world but 
from scientific theory itself. 
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Evolutionary and genetic theory concern the change of 
life-forms or the different manifestations of life itself 
- how it changes under changing historical conditions. 
Life constitutes both the store and the act of knowledge. 
If this could be expressed in material terms it would be 
the gene that is knowledge, and life the articulation and 
manifestation of knowledge. Theory and practice thus 
coincide or are identical in the gene. It constitutes the 
knowledge of millions of years (of knowledge of changing 
historical conditions) that it has gained in -its evolution 
and manifestation in one form or another; through diverse 
interactions in changing historical conditions. In its 
perpetual experien~e, of changing environments, which it 
attains through the sense organs of life forms (it has 
itself created) the gene changes and stores the acquired 
knowledge it requires for survival. Its efforts are 
continually directed to adjustiQg itself, and 
consequently, the life-forms, to be in harmony both with 
the Universe and with other life forms. The knowledge 
that it acquires thus constitutes the basis for its 
"behaviour" towards other life-forms. This does not mean 
that the gene is deterministic in its direction of 
behaviour, but that the knowledge it has acquired 
constitutes the basis for the potentiality of its 
reactions. The gene recognized the need for other life-
forms for they provide the environment in which it must 
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survive. In its interactions with other life-forms, the 
gene increases its knowledge in directions conducive to 
survival. 
This knowledge also manifests itself in the embryological 
development of life-forms. It reveals itself in the 
mechanisms embryos employ to survive and find their niches 
in the ecosystem, to maintain the balance of that system. 
The gene's continual survival (through reproduction) 
ensures that the knowledge it has gained in its 
relationships and interactions under different historical 
conditions (geological periods) is serviceable in the 
survival of life-forms. Its variety of form thus becomes 
the expression of life. 
Although the gene is directive in the way life-forms 
develop and behave, this must not be read to mean that it 
is totally in control of the bepaviour in the sense that 
life-forms become mere machines as Dawkins', ethologists' 
and sociobiologists' theses might suggest. The gene is 
the embodiment of . knowledge and where knowledge is 
directive, the idea of choice is inherent and with it that 
of freedom.The living of life-forms can be seen as the 
expression of that knowledge in all its diversity of 
behaviour and form. This shows the very close link 
between life and knowledge. 
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A curious aspect of life is that is transcends its varied 
categorizations by the scientific method and its 
manifestations in life-forms. Both religion and the 
evolutionary theory agree than man is the most important 
life-form. But even he cannot understand the 
"epistemology of life". Living life has endowed man with 
the ability to objectivize. Scientific understanding or 
interpretation is the product of this activity which 
abstracts from experience and categorizes - understanding 
being in terms of those categories. But these categories 
express but parts of wholes, not the whole itself. 
Religion accepts the "Whole on faith; the entire cosmos is 
accepted on faith, as divine creation. Without this basic 
acceptance which emerges from experience, neither religion 
nor science could hope to survive. It is accepted on 
faith that there is a coherent and integrated whole that 
can be investigated and understood through categories of 
I 
the mind's making. Viewed in the background of 
evolutionary theory, the entire knowledge of the cosmos is 
in man, and has directed his evolution. it is contained 
in the "chemistry of life" (Skolimowski, H. 1981) that 
circulates in his blood: the elements of which the cosmos 
is constituted in its material form. The "chemistry of 
life" can be seen as the expression of cosmic order, which 
is the basis of life. 
373 
Both religion and science (evolution) have required the 
entire cosmos for their expression: man has required the 
entire cosmos for his origin and development. This view 
has been corroborated by Hoyle and Wickramasinghe (Hoyle, 
F. and Wichramasinghe, C. 1983, 1986). Their findings 
show that life "arrived" on earth from outer space in the 
form of "cosmic genes". This theory lends support to the 
view that life pervades the Universe. Through 
evolutionary (and genetic) theory, therefore, man is more 
closely related to the cosmos: he is constituted of the 
elements of the cosmos. In it he has his origins and 
through his interrelationships with the rest of it, he has 
attained his present form. In this view man becomes a 
manifestation of the interrelationships of life with the 
rest of the cosmos. 
Man, therefore, has his origins in the depths of order; an 
order that is maintained by bal?nce. He also has 
knowledge of this order, for it can be said that a "piece" 
of the cosmos is in him or that, it is he! Such balance 
or order originates in the depths of love and is 
maintained in the realization of responsibility. 
Consequently, if man has his origins in the cosmos, he is 
related to the rest of the cosmos, and thus has a 
responsibility to the cosmos. It is in the realization of 
this relationship and responsibility, that man's life is 
fulfilled and his existence meaningful. And it is this 
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fulfillment in realization that originates in love 
(cosmos) that constitutes the basis of moral conduct. 
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CONCLUSION 
An investigation of scientific theory from its origins in 
Greek philosophical systems to contemporary physical and 
biological scientific theories reveals that no theory is 
conclusive in the sense that it can provide a final answer 
to the problems that confront the human condition, which 
condition has in itself been constituted by the human. In 
this sense there is an almost organic link between 
theories. Thus although theories are not conclusive, they 
cannot be said to be incorrect since they are posited 
under certain historical conditions and serve as a 
worldview or as part of a worldview in those particular 
conditions. Succeeding theories are therefore dependent on 
and are built on preceeding ones. 
Since scientific theories are inconclusive and are posited 
under certain historical conditions by humans who 
themselves bear limitations, it,points to the ethical 
aspect of theory in any given situation: since the theory 
arises from such - situation. As scientific theories 
continue to be posited in different historical conditions 
the dialogue between different theories is assured, in the 
sense of a continuing critical and self-critical , ' 
relationship. This again reveals the ethical dimension of 
scientific theories. In such a relationship scientific 
theories continue to change historical conditions and are 
themselves influenced and changed by the historical 
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conditions. This ongoing critical relationship between 
theories implies an ought showing the practical dimension 
of scientific theories. Taken positively, the moral ought 
shows human limitations leading to the view that the 
scientific argument should be conducted in a spirit of 
patience and tolerance. The understanding of scientific 
theory in this light can contribute to the avoidance of 
destructive ideologies. 
Viewed in the background of changed and changing 
historical conditions the evolutionary aspec~ of 
scientific theory becomes evident. In such a view the 
interrelatedness of theory implies the interrelatedness of 
different and seemingly diverse cultures, traditions, 
religions and peoples. All have drawn from their 
experience of the universe, in the development of their 
theories. And since these theories are linked and 
dependent on each other it implies a universal dependence. 
Evolutionary theory also implies a universal dependence 
and relatedness. In such a view the ethical aspect of 
scientific theory also emerges showing that religion, 
nationality, race, ethnicity, etc., bear no absolute 
relevance and can be seen as only aspects of a changing 
universe. 
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